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Abstract 
 
Animal health problems such as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and foot 
and mouth disease caused significant problems for government in the last two 
decades of the twentieth century. The ministry responsible for animal health 
policy, MAFF, was replaced by a new department, Defra, which was given a 
wider role than simply agriculture and farming, and claimed that it would work 
in a new, more open and transparent way, with wider stakeholder participation. 
 
This thesis evaluates this claim and, in particular, asks how far Defra has 
adopted a way of worNLQJ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH LGHDV RI µQHZ JRYHUQDQFH¶ ,W
argues that Defra does work in a new governance manner but that this 
approach is applied inconsistently in the animal health policy sector. Two 
recent animal health policies ± the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy 
(AHWS) and the bovine tuberculosis strategy serve as case studies to illustrate 
the argument. The empirical work - interviews, observation and document 
analysis examines how Defra delivers these policies in practice. A policy 
network model is then used to examine and explain the extent of network 
change over time. 
 
Key findings are that a distinctive new governance approach can be seen in the 
case of the AHWS. However, in the case of bovine TB, the lack of stakeholder 
consensus has limited the opportunity for partnership working, stakeholder 
participation and open policy making. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Ian Forbes, Dr Sujatha Raman and Dr 
Susanne Seymour for their wonderful advice and support. At different times 
each has made a comment or suggestion that has assisted either my work or my 
belief that I could do it. Together they made supervision meetings special- 
inspiring, challenging and always valuable. Truly I have been fortunate. 
 
I have also been fortunate in working in the Institute for the study of Science 
and Society (ISS). My thanks go to Cecily, Ilke, Michael, Murray and Xinxin, 
my office mates for the last two years, for the pleasure of their company and 
conversation. Particular thanks must go to Gill Farmer, the ISS postgraduate 
secretary who, for all of us, could be relied upon for practical help and support. 
 
I would also like to thank those people who were kind enough to give their 
time to be interviewed for this research and who gave me such valuable data. 
In addition, staff at the two VLA laboratories visited during the research 
welcomed me into their world and made that aspect of my work a real 
pleasure. 
 
Finally, my thanks go to my lovely wife, Katy and our sons Simon and 
Matthew for their love and who ensured a great work/life balance. But for the 
ODVWWLPHIDPLO\,¶PQRWDVRFLRORJLVW 
 
 
List of contents 
 Page no. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Rationale for the research 3 
Agriculture in context 7 
Research questions 15 
Structure of the thesis 18 
  
Chapter 2: Research design and process 22 
Research design 23 
Analytical framework 26 
The process of fieldwork 41 
Data recording and analysis 62 
Conclusion 63 
  
Chapter 3: The old settlement 65 
%ULWDLQ¶VROGSROLF\PDNLQJVW\OH 68 
System under challenge 77 
Policy problems 88 
Conclusion 106 
  
Chapter 4: The new settlement 108 
Drivers for change 109 
Defra ± a new department 115 
New animal health policies 120 
Conclusion 143 
  
Chapter 5: Animal health and welfare strategy 145 
England Implementation Group 146 
The work of the EIG 163 
Veterinary Surveillance Strategy 175 
Conclusion 181 
  
Chapter 6: Bovine tuberculosis 183 
The science of bovine tuberculosis 184 
History of bTB control 189 
Bovine tuberculosis and badgers (meles meles) 192 
Stakeholder engagement 216 
Conclusion  223 
  
Chapter 7: Modelling policy change 226 
Features of the Marsh and Smith model 232 
Using the model 237 
Conclusion  254 
  
Chapter 8: Conclusion 258 
Summary of findings 259 
Recent developments 269 
Possibilities for future research  272 
Conclusion 274 
  
Bibliography 282 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
µ$QLPDOGLVHDVHRXWEUHDNVFDQKDYHDPDMRULPSDFWRQDQLPDOZHOIDUHKXPDQ
health, farmers, the wider rural economy and the environment. Experience has 
DOVRGHPRQVWUDWHGKRZH[SHQVLYH WKH\ FDQSURYH WR WKH WD[SD\HU WRR¶ 'HIUD
2003a, p.2). These opening words of the executive summary of the Department 
IRU WKH (QYLURQPHQW )DUPLQJ DQG 5XUDO $IIDLUV¶ 'HIUD YHWHULQDU\
surveillance strategy contain echoes of past policy problems that had dogged 
'HIUD¶VSUHGHFHVVRUWKH0LQLVWU\RI$JULFXOWXUH)LVKHULHVDQG)RRG0$))
Concerns about animal welfare had arisen from the serious outbreak of foot 
and mouth disease (FMD) in 2001, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), 
and Salmonella spp. infections. Human health had been affected by outbreaks 
of Salmonella spp. in eggs, E.coli O-157 in beef, and by variant Creutzfeldt-
Jakob Disease (vCJD) caused by eating beef from cattle with BSE. The 2001 
FMD outbreak caused tremendous stress to farmers, and had a significant 
deleterious impact on other rural enterprises, especially tourism. BSE and 
FMD had also resulted in large bills for the Treasury both in compensation 
payments to farmers (though not to other affected businesses), and during the 
FMD outbreak, to contractors to implement the controversial control measures 
employed to rid the country of the disease. Maintaining high standards of 
animal health has thus presented government with a number of problematic 
and costly policy issues in recent years. 
 
MAFF came to be regarded as part of the problem and was replaced after the 
2001 General Election by a new department, the Department for the 
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Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). However, Defra ought not to be 
seen simply as a response to these animal health problems. Rather, its creation 
should be seen as a response to a variety of drivers for change. These drivers 
are discussed in detail in chapters three and four. Chief among them was a 
move away from traditional patterns of government and administration along 
WKH OLQHV RI WKH µ:HVWPLQVWHU PRGHO¶ WRZDUGV D PRUH FRPSOH[ JRYHUQDQFH
arrangement where both public and private sector actors have important roles 
and where the line between the public and private becomes blurred. These new 
DUUDQJHPHQWV DUH FRPPRQO\ UHIHUUHG WR DV µQHZ JRYHUQDQFH¶ 8QGHU QHZ
governance the appropriate role of the state comes into question, and becomes 
significantly altered. Whereas previously the state shouldered the burdens of 
pROLF\ PDNLQJ DQG LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ GRLQJ WKH µURZLQJ¶ RI SROLF\ DV ZHOO DV
steering it), new governance measures are intended to improve the efficacy of 
JRYHUQPHQW E\ ZLGHQLQJ WKH UROH RI VWDNHKROGHUV DQG UHGXFLQJ WKH VWDWH¶V
responsibility for implementatioQ ZKLOH UHWDLQLQJ WKH FDSDFLW\ WR µVWHHU¶ WKH
process (Osborne and Gaebler 1993). 
 
This thesis investigates how one government department, Defra, has translated 
the ideas of new governance in one small policy area, animal health, in terms 
of both new policies and institutions of governance. It asks the question, how 
different from MAFF is Defra in animal health policy? The central argument 
of this thesis is twofold: Defra did adopt a policy making style that can be 
accurately characterised as consistent with new governance ideas, thus 
marking a break with MAFF. However, in the specific case of animal health 
policy the process has not been uniform. While good examples of new 
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governance policy, institutions and working can be found, so too can features 
of old governance. 
 
This introductory chapter has four aims. First, it seeks to explain the rationale 
for this research. Second, there is a brief overview of the changing nature of 
farming in the rural economy. Third, the specific research questions that 
underpin this study are given and, finally, there is an outline of the structure of 
the thesis. 
 
RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH 
The origin of this research lies in personal experience. For thirteen years to 
2000 I worked for MAFF; for eleven of them at a MAFF Veterinary 
Investigation Centre, a diagnostic laboratory that provided scientific support to 
practising veterinary surgeons. I watched the unfolding story of the 2001 Foot 
and Mouth (FMD) outbreak knowing that friends and former colleagues would 
be directly and severely affected. During my time in MAFF there had not been 
a FMD outbreak; indeed there had not been a major outbreak since 1967-68. 
The response to the outbreak of the disease puzzled me. Why was there so 
much culling? Why was vaccination not part of the original plan? 
 
That personal experience of working in the animal health field and my interest 
in animal health raised questions from a political science perspective. Defra 
appeared to be a different department to MAFF ± more wide-ranging in its 
responsibLOLWLHV DQG IROORZLQJ 0$))¶V H[SHULHQFHV ZLWK %6( DQG )0'
committed to a more open way of doing business. This led to the first and most 
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central question: is Defra different to MAFF in its approach to animal health 
policy? 
 
BSE, FMD, Salomella in eggs, E-coli O-157 had all caused MAFF 
considerable difficulties. One problem for government that has arisen from 
these high profile animal health problems is that public confidence and trust in 
government use of science has been severely dented. MAFF was a small 
department, with few policy actors aside from the civil servants and the 
1DWLRQDO )DUPHUV¶ 8QLRQ ,WV SULPDU\ REMHFWLYH ZDV WKH SURPRWLRQ DQG
protection of British agriculture in keeping with the productivist ethos of the 
department identified below. Indeed, such was the limited nature of the policy 
QHWZRUNDURXQGDJULFXOWXUHWKDW0$))EHFDPHNQRZQDVµWKHSDUDGLJPFDVH
RIDFORVHGSROLF\FRPPXQLW\¶(Smith 1993). Scientific advice was sought and 
given under conditions of secrecy; any internal debates were normally hidden 
from public view. It was this closed policy making environment that came 
under pressure most particularly in the aftermath of BSE where advice given to 
the public was ultimately shown to be optimistic or just plain wrong. Advice 
that British beef was safe to eat as BSE posed no risk to human health was 
based not on clear scientific evidence to support the claim, but by concerns 
about the nature of public reaction to an admission of any uncertainty as to the 
risk to humans. Indeed, the Phillips Inquiry, set up in the aftermath of the crisis 
WRH[DPLQHJRYHUQPHQWKDQGOLQJRIWKHSUREOHPIRXQGWKDWµ7KH*RYHUQPHQW
ZDVSUHRFFXSLHGZLWKSUHYHQWLQJDQDODUPLVWRYHUUHDFWLRQWR%6(¶(Phillips of 
Worth Matravers 2000). 
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However, throughout the BSE and FMD stories, government insisted that its 
policies were guided by science. Thus during BSE, government was advised 
by the Tyrell and Southwood Committees and later by the Spongiform 
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC). Handling of the FMD outbreak 
in 2001 was carried out by the Prime Minister and his Chief Scientific Adviser, 
David King, advised by various groups of epidemiologists. Policy again was 
SUHVHQWHG DV KDYLQJ WKH EDFNLQJ RI µVFLHQFH¶ +RZHYHU LW LV FOHDU WKDW WKH
chosen policy for FMD was not the only option that had support from science 
(Taylor 2003; Woods 2004a; Woods 2004b),QRWKHUZRUGVWKHWHUPµVFLHQFH¶
was used inaccurately to suggest the existence of one correct, and true answer 
to complex policy problems. From this it can be seen that problems existed 
both within the MAFF based policy making structure and, more widely, in the 
government use of science which led to difficulties in maintaining and 
securing public trust in science-based decision making. 
 
Government response to these problems has had to address these two 
difficulties. First, what institutional changes were required to meet the 
challenge of the wider rural economy and the generation and implementation 
of animal health policy that would reduce the possibility of expensive 
problems in the future? Second, how could the process of policy making be 
altered in such a way that the outputs of the process enjoyed public 
acceptance?  
 
One of the first things that the government chose to do was change the 
structure. Responsibility for food safety was separated from responsibility for 
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food production in recognition of the distinction between the interests of 
consumers and producers. Food safety was placed in the hands of an arms 
length agency, the Food Standards Agency (FSA), while responsibility for 
farming and animal health policy was vested in a new department, Defra, 
whose remit became far wider than narrow farming interests. The issue of 
public acceptance of science based policy making was addressed by replacing 
the old MAFF approach which sought consensus among a restricted set of 
elites, with a model that made claims for openness and transparency across a 
wider range of stakeholders. The new model was applied not only for animal 
health policy, but also across government departments. Indeed, these ideas of 
openness and transparency became a feature of policy making across the 
European Union, particularly where regulation was concerned. 
 
However, these new arrangements have, in various studies, been seen to have 
presented new problems. The use of the precautionary principle in the EU has 
led to an increase in uncertainty rather than a reduction in the case of GM 
crops (Levidow 2001) and continuing problems around legitimacy in GM 
crops (Levidow, Carr and Wield 2005). A desire to encourage public 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQULVNPDQDJHPHQWKDVVXIIHUHGIURPDODFNRIDµEOXHSULQW¶IRU
KRZ WKDW FRXOG EH GRQH UHVXOWLQJ LQ µFRQVLGHUDEOH FXOWXUDO LQHUWLD ZLWKLQ WKH
VFLHQWLILFDQGSROLF\FRPPXQLW\¶)UHZHUand Salter 2002, p.143). In the case 
RI D SURSRVDO RQ VWHP FHOO UHVHDUFK µWKH WUDGLWLRQDO UHOLDQFH RQ VFLHQWLILF
DXWKRULW\ ZDV DSDUW IURP QHFHVVDU\ SDUOLDPHQWDU\ GHEDWH WRWDO¶ )UHZHU DQG
6DOWHU  S $ VWXG\ RI WKH )6$¶V LQTXLU\ LQWR WKH SRVVLEle risks of 
BSE in sheep found that the potential benefits of stakeholder participation did 
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QRW µQHFHVVDULO\ SURGXFH PRUH GHPRFUDWLF RU UREXVW SROLF\ WKDQ FORVHG
SURFHVVHV¶5RWKVWHLQSDQGWKDWH[LVWLQJUHVRXUFH-rich groups were 
better placed to frame both the issues and conclusions (Rothstein 2004, p.876). 
Finally, the new model of regulatory decision making was found to have 
µWHHWKLQJWURXEOHV¶LQWHUPVRIDYRLGLQJVHOHFWLRQELDVLQSDUWLFLSDQWVDYRLGLQJ
amplification of risk, and building trust among stakeholders (Lofstedt 2004). 
 
Despite these problems identified in other studies, so far, specific studies of 
animal health policy as presently being produced and implemented by Defra 
have not been carried out. The justification for studying animal health policy is 
thus twofold. Firstly, it is justified by the contrast offered between the old 
consensual model of policy making seen under MAFF and the new model of 
Defra whose policies for animal health articulate a desire for greater openness 
and transparency. Secondly, it is justified by a desire to understand how the 
new governance model is working in this particular policy area. 
 
AGRICULTURE IN CONTEXT 
 
Farming, like other economic enterprises, does not exist in a vacuum. It is 
conducted with regard to the structural confines both of the local and 
international marketplaces for its produce and under regulatory regimes 
derived from both the British government and by the European Union (EU). It 
also conducts its activities in particular spaces, rural spaces, and its needs 
compete with those of other interests in what is now a quite complex rural 
HFRQRP\,QGHHG WKHYHU\QRWLRQRIµWKHUXUDO¶ LVDFRQFHSWRSHQWRGLIIHUHQW
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interpretations and constructions (Ilbery 1998). To conduct a study of animal 
health policy as though it existed solely as the consequence of scientific debate 
LQWR WKH ³EHVW´ SROLF\ RU DV WKH UHVXOW RI FRQVHQVXV RU FRQIOLFW ZLWKLQ WKH
animal health sub-sectoral policy community would give only a partial and 
inadequate view. Consequently, a brief look at the historical development of 
agriculture, at least during the twentieth century, is required. In addition, the 
place of agriculture within the wider rural environment, its relative importance 
and status, needs to form part of this story. Providing this historical and 
contemporary context will help demonstrate how developments in animal 
health policy can be seen as part of a larger process of rural change.  
 
$W WKHEHJLQQLQJRI WKHV%ULWLVKDJULFXOWXUHZDV LQDSRRUVWDWHDW µthe 
nadir of the agricultural depression that began with the onset of overseas 
FRPSHWLWLRQLQ WKHV¶0DUWLQS%ULWDLQZDVWKHQDFRXQWU\ WKDW
produced less than 40% of its food requirements; the substantial deficit being 
filled by imports from commonwealth and other foreign producers (Martin 
2000, p. 2). Nevertheless, in the 1930s, agriculture was by far the most 
LPSRUWDQW HOHPHQW RI WKH UXUDO HFRQRP\ ,QGHHG LW µZDV PRUH RU OHVV
V\QRQ\PRXV ZLWK WKH VWDWH RI WKH UXUDO HFRQRP\¶ 0DUWLQ  p. 2). State 
involvement in the agricultural sector was limited, largely confined to 
preventing food adulteration and in promoting scientific research (Martin 
2000, p. 6).  
 
The exception to this general rule in the pre-second world war period were the 
Great War years. Although agriculture at this time was labour intensive, the 
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demands of the armed forces on manpower removed many workers from the 
fields. In addition, food prices rose by 35% by 1915 compared to the pre-war 
level (Beveridge 1928 quoted in van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005, p. 43). 
The War Government had little choice but to act. It created the Ministry of 
Food in 1916 and the new ministry instigated a policy of state intervention in 
DJULFXOWXUH ZKLFK µHIIHFWLYHO\ UHYHUVHG WKH UHSHDO RI WKH &RUQ /DZV¶ YDQ
Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005, p. 43). The new measures included: 
 
x  a guaranteed minimum price for domestically produced wheat 
x  a guaranteed minimum wage for agricultural workers 
x  a freeze on rents for farm workers 
x  controls on the acreage that could be used for cultivating crops and for 
livestock, and 
x  the elaboration of a bureaucracy for the administration of those 
controls (van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005, p. 43). 
 
These measures were continued in the immediate aftermath of the war. 
Indicating the apparent importance of protecting farming interests the 1920 
$JULFXOWXUH$FWUHTXLUHGJRYHUQPHQWWRJLYHIRXU\HDUV¶QRWLFHRILWVLQWHQWLRQ
to abolish the price controls established during the war. However, the 1920 Act 
was repealed at the end of the post war economic boom. In the economic 
downturn of the late 1920s, the repeal of the Act resulted in falling prices and a 
reduction in the amount of land used for arable farming (Martin 2000, p. 6). 
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While the importance of the Second World War for the re-emergence of 
government intervention in agriculture and the establishment of a powerful 
policy community ought not to be underestimated, Martin sees 1931 also as a 
VLJQLILFDQW ZDWHUVKHG LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI %ULWDLQ¶V DJULFXOWXUH SROLF\ 7KH
Agriculture Marketing Acts of 1931 and 1933 established the Marketing Board 
(MMB). Incidentally, Winter states that these Acts were passed during the time 
of the second Labour government (Winter 1996, p.91), yet by 1931 the party 
KDG VXIIHUHG WKH µ*UHDW EHWUD\DO¶ of MacDonald who formed a National 
Government. However, the Milk Marketing Board was established in 1933 and 
sought to increase milk consumption and to regulate the price for milk. Martin 
notes that the prospect of a regular cheque from the MMB made dairy farming 
DSSHDU µD OXFUDWLYH DQG VWDEOH DFWLYLW\ LQ FRPSDULVRQ ZLWK RWKHU RSWLRQV¶
(Martin 2000, p. 24). However, the Marketing Boards could not buck the 
general economic trend for agriculture. Like much of the rest of the economy 
in the 1930s, agriculture remained in recession. Winter argues that at the 
beginning of the Second World War, British agriculture had slumped such that 
it provided only one third of its food requirements and that between the wars, 
µWKH 8. DJULFXOWXUDO DUHD KDG IDOOHQ E\  PLOOLRQ acres to just over 31.5 
PLOOLRQDFUHVRIZKLFKQHDUO\ZDV LQSHUPDQHQWSDVWXUH¶:LQWHU
p.88). Van Zwanenberg and Millstone see, at this time, interest from doctors in 
addressing the problems of malnutrition, and quote the then President of the 
British Medical Association, Lord Horder, as locating this within the problem 
of food production (van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005, p. 44). 
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A number of authors thus agree that while the Second World War marks the 
point at which state intervention in agriculture becomes institutionalised, the 
inter-war years saw developments emerging from the economic slump of the 
time which prepared the ground for formalised state involvement in agriculture 
(Marsden et al 1993, Winter 1996, Martin 2000, van Zwanenberg and 
Millstone 2005). War once again made agricultural production a high priority. 
State intervention in the agricultural sector was required to boost production. 
Guaranteed prices for farmers were used as a tool to increase production 
together with a policy to bring more land into agricultural use. The National 
)DUPHUV¶8QLRQ1)8ZKLFKEHIRUHWKHZDUZDVEHJLQQLQJWRH[SHULHQFHDQ
increase in influence, came to be seen as a major partner of government in 
delivering the objective of increased food productioQ *RYHUQPHQW WRR µZDV
experiencing the advantages of working closely with a representative farming 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI SROLF\¶ :LQWHU  S  7KHVH
features came together to develop the post war agricultural settlement. 
 
Marsden et DOKDYHGHVFULEHGWKHSRVWZDUVHWWOHPHQWDVDµSURGXFWLYLVW¶
regime, and see it as characterised by five pillars of policy. Tennant farmers 
were given security of tenure for life by the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948. 
µ7KLVSODFHGWKHVHDORQ WKHascendancy of productive capital (represented by 
WKH1DWLRQDO)DUPHUV¶8QLRQ± NFU) over landed capital (represented by the 
&RXQWU\ /DQGRZQHUV¶ $VVRFLDWLRQ ± &/$¶ 0DUVGHQ HW DO  S 
Second, the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act granted farming a pre-
emptive claim over the use of rural land. Marsden et al argue that this also 
enabled MAFF to achieve a dominant position with respect to rural land use, 
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giving it powers to watch over other agencies with an interest in the rural 
environment - such as National Parks Authorities - to ensure that their policies 
met the needs of agriculture (Marsden et al 1993, p.59). Third, it is generally 
held that the 1947 Agriculture Act gave farmers financial security by 
establishing a system of negotiated annual reviews of prices for staple products 
(Marsden et al 1993, Smith 1993, Marsh and Smith 2000). Fourth, the position 
of the NFU became institutionalised within the policy network granting 
political primacy and security to farming interests. This influence was based 
QRWRQWKHHFRQRPLFSRZHURIWKH1)8EXWUDWKHUµIURPHIIHFWLYHRUJDQLVDWLRQ
in the context of a politically prescribed partnership between government and 
WKH IDUPLQJ FRPPXQLW\¶ 0DUVGHQ HW DO  S  /DVWO\ WKH SRVW ZDU
settlement was based upon an ideological orientation founded upon a common 
outlook between the NFU and MAFF, together with food processing interests. 
This common outlook was largely based upon a consensus view that 
production was the most important consideration in agricultural policy 
(Marsden et al 1993). 
 
The post war settlement gave power to emerging groups in the food industry 
and was able to integrate them into the consensus view that ever increasing 
production was the number one goal of policy. However, it would be incorrect 
to assume that the MAFF view was unchallenged. The 1970s and 1980s saw 
the development of critical responses to the productivist approach to 
agriculture. Chapter three examines in detail the challenge of the political New 
Right to the general style of British policy making. This challenge can be 
summed up as a range of measures operating under the label of New Public 
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Management (NPM). While this was very important in undermining and 
eventually bringing to an end the MAFF dominated agriculture policy 
community and provoking both institutional change and change in the use of 
science by government, the significance of New Right thinking here is that in 
holding to a belief in the operation of free markets as the best economic 
arrangement, New Right ideas can be seen as a challenge to the interventionist 
basis of the post war settlement expressed both in domestic British agricultural 
SROLF\ DQG LQ WKH WKHQ (XURSHDQ (FRQRPLF &RPPXQLW\¶V DJULFXOWXUDO SROLF\
through the Common Agricultural Policy. As such they represented a political 
challenge to that consensus. 
 
Smith argues that structural factors were more important than political factors 
in challenging the post war settlement (Smith 1990, p.179). In an early hint of 
what would develop into his (in collaboration with Marsh) dialectical model of 
SROLF\QHWZRUNV6PLWK DUJXHV WKDW µSROLWLFDO IDFWRUVRSHUDWHZLWKLQ VWUXFWXUDO
constraints and that to understand their impact it is important to understand the 
FRQWH[WZLWKLQZKLFKWKH\RSHUDWH¶6PLWKS6PLWh identifies three 
VWUXFWXUDO IDFWRUV µWKH OHYHO RI RYHUSURGXFWLRQ WKH FRVW RI WKH &$3 DQG WKH
LQWHUQDWLRQDODJULFXOWXUDOVLWXDWLRQ¶6PLWKS 
 
Food is a product for which, despite growing levels of obesity, there is 
relatively inelastic demand. Thus if incomes double, the demand for food does 
not also double. Higher incomes may alter the type of foods bought, but the 
overall quantity demanded alters little. Thus there comes a point at which 
further expanding production results in unsold surplus. This point was reached 
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in Europe in the 1980s leading to the infamous food mountains in EEC stores. 
This overproduction was the consequence of a combination of high CAP prices 
encouraging farmers to produce more and improved agricultural technology 
affording greater yields per hectare of land (Smith 1990, p.180). In a situation 
of overproduction, a policy encouraging even more production struggles to 
gain acceptance beyond an inner circle of present beneficiaries.  
 
Another significant structural development during the twentieth century has 
been a decline in the importance of farming relative to other spheres of 
economic activity to the rural economy. By 2003, agriculture accounted for 
only 3% of rural employment yet accounted for 84% of government spending 
on rural areas (Hill 2005, p.17). In addition, Britain was no longer faced with 
the problems of food shortages that occurred in the immediate post war period 
which led both to the recognition of the NFU as a partner in delivering 
increased production and to the institutionalisation of government intervention 
in agriculture, with increased production the primary objective of policy ± an 
REMHFWLYHWKDW0$))DFKLHYHG,QGHHGµ,WKDVSUHVLGHGIRUIRUW\\HDUVRYHUWKH
most consistent and conspicuous succesVVWRU\ LQ%ULWLVK LQGXVWU\¶+HQQHVV\
1990, p.444). 
 
A consequence of the declining significance of agriculture in economic terms 
has been that arguments justifying agriculture having its own ministry 
weakened in strength. The incoming Labour Government of 1997, self 
DQRLQWHGDVµPRGHUQLVLQJ¶ZHUHGUDZQLQWRUXUDOSROLF\WKURXJKDFRPELQDWLRQ
of factors as diverse as the increasing cost of agricultural subsidy, perceptions 
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of failure in MAFF as an institution (Chapter three), the hunting debate, and 
broader policy concerns such as rural transport, environmentalism, housing, 
education and rural social exclusion (Ward and Lowe 2007). While the 2001 
FMD crisis may reasonably be seen to mark the end of the MAFF policy 
community, the forces arguing for change were already gathering strength. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The claim and promise of Defra was that it would manage animal health policy 
in a new way. Important features of the new approach would include 
stakeholder participation in open and transparent decision making, 
consultations, and evidence-based policy making. Animal health policies 
emerging from Defra envisaged new structures and processes to facilitate these 
new processes. 
 
This brings us to the over-arching question of this research: 
 
Is Defra policy-making qualitatively different to that of MAFF? If 
so, how, and in what ways, do governance structures and processes 
reflect that difference? 
 
These questions address two important aspects of the transition from one 
model of policy making to another. The aim is to identify the success of 
stakeholders in gaining access to animal health policy making actors and 
structures, and to examine the variety of advice, including that from 
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stakeholders, that Defra calls upon in the development and implementation of 
its animal health policies.  
 
This thesis adopts a case study approach, explained in chapter two, using the 
Animal Health and Welfare Strategy (AHWS) and bovine tuberculosis (bTB) 
as the two cases. The AHWS offers the opportunity to investigate a wide-
ranging and long term strategic approach to achieve a broad policy outcome, 
namely animal health. The bTB case has the advantage of being a more limited 
issue, but it is one characterised by debate over the use of science and a mix of 
competing interests from within as well as outside the farming community. In 
addition, so far as the question of culling badgers as a control measure is 
concerned, the room for compromise among stakeholders is limited. Badgers 
are either culled or not. This case study approach leads, logically, to two 
additional questions specific to the particular cases. 
 
How have the new governance structures created by the AHWS 
worked in practice? How do stakeholders participate in the policy 
process? 
 
Has Defra effectively deployed new governance measures to 
resolve the problems posed by competing interests and uncertain 
science to produce policy on bovine tuberculosis? 
 
The first of these questions allows an assessment to be made of how far the 
claims of the new policies are borne out in practice. Have they resulted in 
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significant stakeholder participation, and have those stakeholders been drawn 
from beyond traditional producer interests? Have the outcomes of policy been 
significantly different in practice to those that might have been expected during 
the MAFF era? 
 
The second of these questions focuses on bovine tuberculosis, a disease 
characterised by differences between stakeholders and differences in the 
interpretation of the available scientific evidence.  
 
TB in cattle is a serious condition for the farmer as a diagnosis places upon the 
farm restrictions and a rigorous and time consuming testing regimen. The 
majority of farmers believe that an important wildlife reservoir of infection is 
the badger, and have pressed for some years for a policy of badger culling to 
protect their herds from infection with the disease. A number of reports 
looking at the disease have been published (Defra 2004b; Defra 2004c; Defra 
2004d) which examined the possible role of badgers in the disease. The 
VLWXDWLRQLVQRWKRZHYHUVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGµ+RZZHWDFNOHWKHWKUHDWIURPWKH
wildlife reservoir in GB, in particular badger populations, is scientifically 
complex¶ 'HIUD E S P\ HPSKDVLV ,Q DGGLWLRQ VRPH FRQVHUYDWLRQ
groups are resolutely opposed to a culling policy and deny any special role for 
badgers in the disease transmission. Bovine TB represents an animal health 
issue where there is ongoing scientific controversy and competing interests 
within the wider Defra governed policy network. The issue represents an 
interesting case study within animal health policy which requires scientific 
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input, and where policy making is played out within an ostensibly more open 
model.  
 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Having introduced the policy areas for study and stated the research questions, 
it is time to set out the structure of the thesis. Each chapter makes a 
contribution toward supporting the thesis and investigating the associated 
research questions. 
 
Chapter two discusses the design of the research and addresses questions of 
methodology and methods used to produce the work. The reasons behind key 
decisions such as choice of cases and methods are discussed. In addition, 
governance can be understood through use of an organising framework. A 
policy network approach is used in this research and, in particular, the Marsh 
and Smith dialectical model. This chapter therefore discusses this model, and 
policy networks more generally by reference to the literature. 
 
Chapter three examines MAFF and the old model of policy making for animal 
health and the reasons why it came under pressure. It is interesting to note that 
an earlier governance initiative, namely ideas associated with New Public 
0DQDJHPHQWLVVKRZQWREHLPSRUWDQW LQUHGXFLQJ0$))¶VRZn capacity for 
surveillance and reach into the farming community, together with causing 
uncertainty and fear about market testing and privatisation. Particular animal 
health policy problems, BSE and FMD are analysed to illustrate the workings 
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of the old model of policy making and partially explain why MAFF was 
replaced by Defra. Crucially, this brought to an end the old policy community 
FHQWUHG XSRQ D FORVH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ 0$)) DQG WKH 1DWLRQDO )DUPHUV¶
8QLRQ7KLVFKDSWHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHWKHVLVis to explain the structures and 
policies that Defra has sought to transcend. To explain how Defra is different 
to MAFF, it is necessary to understand MAFF first. 
 
Chapter four considers Defra as the successor to MAFF. Important similarities 
and differences between the two are identified. Defra is seen to be the 
institutional apparatus of the new, more open policy making model. The 
FHQWUDOREMHFWLYHRIWKLVFKDSWHUKRZHYHULVWRFULWLFDOO\DQDO\VH'HIUD¶VQHZ
set of animal health polices, especially the policies that form the basis of the 
two case studies, but also more broadly. This chapter contributes to the broad 
thesis by explaining how Defra sees itself as being different to MAFF. 
 
Chapter five covers the case study on the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy. 
It looks at the results of the empirical work undertaken on this case and 
contributes to the thesis by offering evidence to show how themes such as 
stakeholder participation, partnership working and cost and responsibility 
sharing have worked in practice. In addition, the chapter considers the 
functioning of the England Implementation Group as a new governance 
structure.  
  
Chapter six looks at the case study of bovine tuberculosis. As a significant 
point at issue in this case is the interpretation of the scientific evidence, space 
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is given over to a detailed discussion of the science of bTB. Part of the New 
Labour modernising ethos was to respect the science and create evidence-
based policy. As will be seen, bTB offered a serious test of that commitment. 
As with chapter five, there is then a report of the findings of the empirical 
research undertaken into this case. This chapter contributes to the thesis as a 
whole by showing that contra the example of the implementation of the 
AHWS, bTB is characterised by a more closed policy style. Furthermore, 
µHYLGHQFH¶ LQ WKLV FDVH KDV EHHQ FRQVWUXFWHG WR LQFOXGH WKH RSLQLRQ RI
stakeholders as much as available scientific findings. This undermines claims 
of evidence based policy making. In addition, this chapter shows how industry 
attitudes on this one disease can present a significant and potentially 
insurmountable problem for Defra, and that bTB may come to be a cause of 
policy failure not just in respect of bTB, but for the larger AHWS project. 
 
Chapter seven adopts a more theoretical approach and uses the policy network 
model directly to try to explain policy change. The role of the three 
relationships identified by Marsh and Smith are each discussed in turn. This 
chapter contributes to the thesis by showing the importance of resources to 
actors within the network, the effect of outcomes on the network as well as the 
importance of both endogenous and exogenous factors in producing policy 
FKDQJH7KLVFKDSWHUDVZHOODVSURYLGLQJDWKHRUHWLFDOµOHQV¶WKURXJKZKich to 
analyse animal health policy, also serves as an important test of the utility of 
the dialectical model. 
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The final chapter brings together the work of the previous chapters, reviews the 
evidence gathered and provides answers to the research questions that support 
the arguments of the thesis. Findings are discussed, conclusions are drawn and 
speculation on future direction of animal health policy is attempted, including 
discussion of some extremely recent developments in both the bTB and 
AHWS cases. Finally, some possibilities for future research in the field are 
identified.  
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Chapter 2: Research design and process 
 
Within social science what can be said about a phenomenon is determined to a 
very large extent by how the phenomenon was studied. Choice of methodology 
and method, and the design of the research serve to shape the form of 
knowledge that can be derived. The purpose of this chapter is to explain and 
justify the research decisions that were taken and how those decisions 
contributed to, or limited, what the broader thesis says about governance and 
the use of science in animal health policy. 
 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one discusses how and why 
the two case studies were chosen. This section also explains the choice of 
methods and data collection that were made. Section two introduces the 
analytical frameworks used in this study, the governance literature, the Marsh 
DQG 6PLWK PRGHO RI SROLF\ QHWZRUNV DQG %HYLU DQG 5KRGHV¶ ZULWLQJ RQ WKH
interpretive approach to political science. Section three considers the process 
of interviewing, the two episodes of participant observation, and the episodes 
of observation of meetings of the England Implementation Group. Again, key 
decisions such as the one not to return for a second spell at VLA North, and 
not to interview farmers are explained. Finally, section four looks at analysis, 
what was done to and with the collected data.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In chapter one, the rationale for studying animal health policy was given. 
Animal health policy problems had given MAFF significant difficulties from 
the late 1980s onwards, with salmonella in eggs, BSE and FMD all presenting 
JRYHUQPHQWZLWKH[SHQVLYHSUREOHPV'HIUD0$))¶VVXFFHVVRUFODLPHGWRGR
policy differently with an emphasis on openness, stakeholder participation and 
partnership working. How might this work out in animal health policy? 
 
A case study approach quickly suggested itself as Defra had issued a number 
of new strategies in the animal health field. Reflecting my own experience in 
the VLA, veterinary surveillance was an early candidate. The Veterinary 
Surveillance Strategy used the language of governance and promised a new 
role for science, fitting in well with a broader government commitment to 
evidence based policy making. However, on closer inspection, this case did not 
seem sufficient on its own. For one thing, it was a sub-strategy of a wider 
policy document, the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy (AHWS). The 
AHWS is filled with the language of new governance and, in addition, 
proposed the creation of a new type of governance institution, the England 
Implementation Group. So, rather than the Veterinary Surveillance Strategy, it 
was the AHWS that lent itself as a case study. However, consideration of 
'HIUD¶V XVH RI science in animal health policy still suggested that the 
surveillance strategy was a good one to look at. Therefore, the decision was 
taken to include a section on surveillance within the broader AHWS case 
study. 
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With the AHWS decided upon, a second case that suggested itself was bovine 
tuberculosis. The Government strategic framework for the sustainable control 
of bovine tuberculosis (bTB) in Great Britain ± henceforth the bTB strategy - 
is, like the Veterinary Surveillance Strategy a sub strategy of the AHWS. The 
case of bTB is characterised by conflict rather than consensus on the right way 
forward, especially on the thorny question of the role of badgers in the disease. 
On the face of it, this disease ought to be amenable to scientific solution. Yet, 
in practice, both sides of the badger debate have used scientific argument and 
evidence in support of their case. In addition, farming unions were committed 
to a culling policy. How far would or could Defra resist these demands if the 
evidence suggested that a cull was not a good policy? Would governance of 
this policy be new governance, stakeholder and partnership, or more like old 
MAFF, less open, less transparent? Would there be a strong contrast with the 
AHWS and might it be the case that Defra was different to MAFF only some 
of the time for some animal health policy areas? 
 
Methods 
 
Having decided upon a case study approach, the next decisions were concerned 
with how to study them. In terms of methodology, a qualitative approach was 
quickly decided upon. For this study, a qualitative methodology offered the 
EHQHILWV RI D µWKLFN GHVFULSWLRQ¶ RI QHZ JRYHUQDQFH DV LW KDV ZRUNHG RXW LQ
practice in the animal health policy field and also the possibility of providing 
space for actors to give their understanding of what is going on and to compare 
this with what the policies say ought to happen. 
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Within a qualitative methodology, a variety of methods can be used to obtain 
data. The two case studies lent themselves to a mixed approach of policy 
analysis, interviews and observations both in the context of the VLA but also 
of meetings of the EIG. 
 
Each case study has, as its beginning, a policy document. These documents 
were carefully analysed to tease out themes and to detect similarities and 
differences between them. Interviews form a major element in data collection 
for this research and it was necessary to decide which actors to interview. The 
first group was Defra policy makers. Senior civil servants, including the CVO 
and deputy CVO as well as the then minister for animal health were identified 
as important actors. The VLA was a second group of interest. The reasoning 
here was that the VLA as a science based organisation would be a good site to 
see changes in the use of science. Interviews with senior VLA managers and at 
the two VLA centres visited would add useful context to any observed data. 
Both of these groups of Defra actors would also be able to tell the story in their 
own words. Practice vets were chosen because they constitute a major group of 
users of Defra animal health services. Did they think Defra was different to 
MAFF? Was it better or worse? Were they aware of the new policies and what 
they might mean for them and their clients? 
 
A third set of methods selected were observation and participant observation. 
Observation of EIG meetings was quickly decided upon as it offered the 
opportunity to observe the new governance in action in a forum deliberately 
designed to be different. Notes made at EIG meeting were supplemented by the 
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SXEOLVKHG PLQXWHV RQ 'HIUD¶V web site. Participant observation at VLA labs 
was chosen in order to see Defra science in action, to see what was different 
µRQWKHJURXQG¶LQUXUDODUHDVIDUIURP/RQGRQ 
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Having determined the cases to be studied and the methods to study them, a 
further decision needed to be taken on how to frame the analysis. The ideas of 
QHZJRYHUQDQFHXQGHUSLQVRPHRI'HIUD¶VFODLPVIRULWVDQLPDOKHDOWKSROLFLHV
and so new governance, used as an organising framework (Stoker 1998) 
offered a good starting point. However, on its own, new governance is 
arguably too vague a term to serve on its own; a degree of order was required. 
The policy network literature is often associated with ideas of governance and 
so a framework of policy network analysis suggested itself. My previous work 
KDGXVHG0DUVKDQG6PLWK¶VGLDOHFWLFDOPRGHO WRDQDO\VH%6(DQG)0'DQG
found that the model was a useful tool of analysis (Spencer 2004). Other 
studies had also come to the same conclusion (Toke and Marsh 2003). Finally, 
LQ GLVFXVVLQJ 'HIUD¶V DQLPDO KHDOWK SROLFLHV DQG WKH ZRUN RI WKH (,* , ZDV
concerned to give space to the language and discourses of the actors 
themselves. This approach is shared by the interpretive approach of Bevir and 
5KRGHV   ZKR VHHN WR µidentify the ways in which individuals 
FRQVWUXFW JRYHUQDQFH¶ %HYLU DQG 5KRGHV  S 7KLV VHFWLRQ H[DPLQHV
the literature on governance, policy networks including a description of the 
features of the Marsh and Smith model, and a brief discussion of the 
interpretive approach adopted by Bevir and Rhodes. 
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Governance 
 
That the word governance is open to a multiplicity of meanings is quickly 
evident to anyone who cares to browse through some of the books published 
recently on the topic. Many begin with a chapter where the author(s) consider 
what it is that should be understood by the term (Pierre 2000, Pierre and Peters 
2000 and Kjaer 2004 being three examples). What is clear is that in the modern 
context governance is not simply a synonym for government, it is different 
IURP WKDW )RU 5KRGHV JRYHUQDQFH µVLJQLILHV D FKDQJH LQ WKH PHDQLQJ RI
government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition 
of ordered rule; or the new PHWKRG E\ ZKLFK VRFLHW\ LV JRYHUQHG¶ 5KRGHV
1996, pp 652-653 emphasis in the original). So governance is an analytically 
distinct term from government as understood in the traditional British 
Westminster model. 
 
However, it is a term on which there is little agreement on meaning. The usual 
conclusion is that governance is used in various ways (e.g. Pierre 2000, Pierre 
and Peters 2000, Kjaer 2004). Yet, to be useful as a concept, governance as a 
term must have some meaning that differentiates it from government. If looked 
at this way, some measure of agreement on key points can be detected. 
Governance is often associated with a situation in which the Westminster 
Government is no longer able to rule effectively alone. Powers have devolved 
upwards to the European Union, and downwards to other state institutions such 
as the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, and to private and semi-
autonomous bodies responsible for delivering public services. This process is 
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XVXDOO\UHIHUUHGWRDVWKHµKROORZLQJRXW¶RIWKHVWDWH5KRGHV5LFKDUGV
and Smith 2002). 
 
A consequence of this that enjoys support in the literature is that the boundary 
between the public and private sectors has become blurred with semi-
autonomous government agencies or private bodies becoming more 
responsible for the delivery of government functions, rather than government 
functionaries themselves delivering services to a doubtless grateful populace. 
The role of government in these changed circumstances has become, to use a 
commonly employed metaphor, one of steering rather than rowing the ship of 
state (Osborne and Gaebler 1993). While this metaphor tells us a lot about the 
role of the state, and suggests that the state may retain a significant role in 
governance, it leaves open the question of how the government is to steer, 
what actual relationships and structures it ought to use to make sure that policy 
proceeds in the direction of its choice. Indeed, if state capacity is so reduced, 
and government needs civil society to play a role in policy delivery, it is surely 
not too fanciful to ask if, in reality, the state can determine the direction of 
travel without taking into account the preferences of those it expects to do 
some of the rowing. 
 
The state thus enables or facilitates but does not necessarily perform itself the 
actions of government. Thus, governance requires a change in the processes of 
JRYHUQLQJ µLW LV QRW ZKDW WKH VWDWH GRHV«EXW KRZ LW GRHV LW¶ 5LFKDUGV DQG
Smith 2002, p.279). Ultimately, the lack of agreement on definition is not so 
important. The value of the governance perspective lies in itV YDOXH DV µDQ
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RUJDQL]LQJ IUDPHZRUN¶ 6WRNHU  S 3LHUUH DQG 6WRNHU  S D
lens through which to observe changes in the processes of policy. Reflecting 
this, Jordan et al VHH µWKH LQVWUXPHQWV WKDWSROLF\PDNHUV«VHOHFW WR DFKLHYH
their polic\JRDOV¶-RUGDQHWDOSDVµDUHODWLYHO\VLPSOHDQDO\WLFDO
GHYLFHWKDWDOORZVHPSLULFLVWVWRGLVWLQJXLVKµQHZ¶PRGHVRIJRYHUQDQFHIURP
µROG¶IRUPVRIJRYHUQPHQW¶-RUGDQet al 2005, p.478). 
 
Policy networks 
 
When examining the literature on policy networks it quickly becomes apparent 
that there is a difference in their perceived explanatory potential between the 
UK literature, and the reported literature from the US and mainland Europe. 
Marsh (1998) conducted a review of the British, American and European 
literature. He argued that the use of policy network theory in the US was a 
response, a critical response, to the dominant American model of pluralist 
explanations of relations between government and interest groups. In the same 
book, Peters arJXHV WKDW µ$PHULFDQ SROLWLFV UHPDLQV PRUH XQVWUXFWXUHG WKDQ
WKDW IRXQG LQ PRVW (XURSHDQ FRXQWULHV « >EXW@ WKH IDFW WKDW WKH QHWZRUN
metaphor does not work particularly well in the United States does not negate 
LWVXWLOLW\HOVHZKHUH¶3HWHUVS6R in the US at least, policy network 
theory has not been persuasive either as a description of the policy making 
environment or as an explanation of policy making. 
 
By contrast, the European literature goes to the other end of the spectrum, 
seeing policy networks as a new form of governance in response to the 
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perceived failings of both markets and hierarchies. In his review Marsh 
identifies two European schools; one associated with the Max Planck Institute 
in Germany, the other a group of Dutch scholars (Marsh 1998, p.7). Rhodes 
DOVRUHIHUVWRWKH0D[3ODQFN,QVWLWXWH¶VZRUNDQGQRWHVWKDWIRUWKHVH
VFKRODUV SROLF\ QHWZRUNV DV D IRUP RI JRYHUQDQFH µ« DYRLG>V@ QRW RQO\ WKH
QHJDWLYHH[WHUQDOLWLHVRIPDUNHWVEXWDOVRWKHµORVHUV¶± that is, those who bear 
the costs of political decisions ± SURGXFHG E\ KLHUDUFKLHV«¶ 5KRGHV 
p.63). What makes policy networks viable as a form of governance is the 
growth in the participation of private sector organisations in the policy process, 
and the consequent declLQHLQWKHUROHRIWKHVWDWH)RU0DUVKWKHVHLGHDVµKDYH
PXFKLQFRPPRQZLWKWKH%ULWLVKOLWHUDWXUHRQWKHµKROORZLQJRXW¶RIWKHVWDWH¶
(Marsh 1998, p. 8). To the hollowing out of the state idea, the idea of the 
µK\EULG VWDWH¶ 5LFKDUGV DQG6PLWK could now be added. Richards and 
6PLWK IRFXV RQ 1HZ /DERXU¶V HIIRUWV WR ERWK FR-ordinate policy making 
µMRLQHG XS¶ JRYHUQPHQW ZLWK ILQGLQJ HIILFLHQW ZD\V WR LPSURYH SROLF\
delivery. Such ways have increasingly included recruitment of private sector 
organisations to provide public services but without direct financial charge to 
the end user of the service. Examples would include Private Finance Initiative 
schemes to build schools and hospitals, private investment in education 
through City Academies and the XVHE\WKH1DWLRQDO+HDOWKVHUYLFHRI µVSDUH
FDSDFLW\¶LQSULYDWHO\UXQKRVSLWDOVWRUHGXFHZDLWLQJWLPHVIRU1+6SDWLHQWV 
 
The British literature focuses upon policy networks as an explanation of policy 
making and implementation. Thus a key question is how useful is the concept 
in explaining policy making and implementation? What is their explanatory 
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power? Within the British literature, there is controversy over the utility of 
policy networks. One argument advanced frequently by Dowding (1995, 2001) 
is that the concept of policy networks is nothing more than a heuristic device, a 
metaphor. Dowding insists that explanations of policy making can be found by 
analysing the motives and actions of political actors directly. Dowding is thus 
approaching the explanation of policy making from the perspective of rational 
choice theory, a perspective characterised by both Marsh and Smith (2001, 
S DQG 7RNH DQG 0DUVK  S DV µSRVLWLYLVW¶ 'RZGLQJ GRHV QRW
deny the need for models of policy analysis, but argues that a model must have 
both stated assumptions and predictions (Dowding 2001, p.92) which can be 
empirically evaluated. However, he does appear to favour models which are 
capable of statistical assessment. Models such as policy networks which rely 
uSRQ TXDOLWDWLYH H[SODQDWLRQ DUH IRU 'RZGLQJ PRGHOV ZLWK µORZ OHYHUDJH¶
(Dowding 2001, p.95). These observations seem to support the claim that 
Dowding is more or less a positivist in his epistemology. By contrast, Marsh 
and Smith deny the charge of positivism though they do claim that their 
models have explanatory power. They claim that they are epistemological 
UHDOLVWV 0DUVK DQG 6PLWK  $OWHUQDWLYHO\ LQ FRQWUDVW WR 'RZGLQJ¶V
SRVLWLYLVPZKLFKRQWRORJLFDOO\KDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDVµFOHDUO\IRXQGDWLRQDOLVW¶
(Marsh and Smith 2001, p.529), some policy network theorists claim that what 
is required is an anti-foundationalist approach. This stand is adopted by 
Rhodes (2000) who argues that explanations of policy networks have to begin 
from the standpoint of the actors involved in the network. However, this 
approach tends to downplay the possibility of using networks as a predictive 
tool. 
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These debates essentially are about the relative influence and importance of 
structure versus agency in determining policy outcome. From the early period 
of writing on policy networks, scholars have tended to emphasise the role of 
one or the other. For those who emphasise agency, the importance of 
interpersonal relationships is the key to understanding policy networks. This is 
the position taken by Richardson and Jordan (1979), early scholars in the 
policy network field, who stress the importance of negotiation between the 
various groups involved within the policy making architecture. By contrast, 
Rhodes (1981 cited by Marsh 19 µHPSKDVL]HV WKH VWUXFWXUDO UHODWLRQVKLS
EHWZHHQ SROLWLFDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DV WKH FUXFLDO HOHPHQW LQ D SROLF\ QHWZRUN¶
(Marsh 1998, p. 7). 
 
The structural element was also highlighted by Marsh and Rhodes (1992). In 
this key text they argued that policy networks could be characterised by 
reference to a number of factors such as number of participants, type of 
interest, continuity of the network, resources and power (Marsh and Rhodes 
S7KLV W\SRORJ\ZDVDGHYHORSPHQWRI5KRGHV¶W\SRORJ\LQ
which networks were placed on a continuum with policy communities at one 
end, with a restricted membership and highly stable structures, to issue 
networks at the other end, characterised by a large number of members and an 
unstable structure (Marsh and Rhodes 1992, p.14). 
 
0DUVK DQG 6PLWK¶V PRGHO LV DQ DWWHPSW WR WUDQVFHQG VXFK GLYLVLRQV DQG WR
recognise the importance of both agency and structure, network and context 
and network and policy outcome. Although their 2000 paper title includes the 
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ZRUGVµWRZDUGVD'LDOHFWLFDO$SSURDFK¶LWLVLQIDFWDQDSSURDFKWKDWKDGEHHQ
some time in coming. Hay (1995 cited in Marsh 1998, p.194) and Hay (1998), 
Daugbjerg and Marsh (1998) and Marsh (1998) had made strides towards such 
an approach. Hay (1998) stresses the dynamic nature of policy making and 
thus of networks. A longitudinal study is necessary for Hay. Although he 
emphasises the formation and termination of a network, the subject matter of 
this dissertation does meet the requirement of study over time, and arguably of 
the termination of the MAFF policy network. Marsh (1998) in his concluding 
chapter identifies the three key dialectical relationships (structure/agency, 
network/context and network/outcome) (Marsh 1998 pp.194 ± 197) which 
recur in his 2000 paper with Smith.  
 
Another question which emerges from the above debates is the appropriate 
level of analysis for policy networks. The micro level of analysis focuses on 
DFWRUV¶ EHKDYLRXU DQG RQ LQWHUSHUVRQDO UHODWLRQVKLSV EHWZHHQ DFWRUV 7KH
macro level examines broad state institutional structures, and indeed theories 
of the state itself. Policy networks have thus been often characterised as a 
µPHVR-OHYHO¶FRQFHSW5KRGHV0DUVK7KHDGYDQWDJHLQGRLQJWKLV
LV WKDW µ0DFUR-level theories are often abstract and frequently applied to 
concrete situations with little attention to mediating processes, while micro-
level theories tend to ignore the impact of broader structural factors on micro-
OHYHO GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ VHWWLQJV¶ (YDQV  S 'RZGLQJ SUHGLctably, 
DUJXHV WKDW WKHXVHRI µPHVR-OHYHO¶KDV OLWWOHPHDQLQJ 'RZGLQJS
However, if it is considered that the term has some meaning, then if the meso-
level can be incorporated with the macro and micro-levels then an explanatory 
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tool of potentially great power has been created. By recognising the 
importance of both structure and agency and the effect of each on the other, 
and by recognising the importance of both network and context (which we may 
conceptualise as external structure), and their effects on each other, and by 
accepting that policy outcomes effect networks as well as networks affecting 
policy outcome, the dialectical model may be a good way of integrating the 
meso-level concept of the policy network with both the micro and macro 
levels.  
 
µ2XU PRGHO ZLOO VWDQG RU IDOO DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKHWKHU LW KDV DQ\ XWLOLW\ IRU
UHVHDUFKHUVXVLQJWKHSROLF\QHWZRUNFRQFHSWWRDQDO\VHSROLF\PDNLQJ¶0DUVK
and Smith 2000, p.11). The present work can be seen as offering a test of its 
utility, thus research questions in this work reflect this intention. Toke and 
Marsh (2003) assessed the model in a study of the GM crops issue. This is an 
interesting and related case to the present study, covering, as it does, another 
aspect of agricultural policy making. However, there is a key difference 
between that study and this; in addressing an issue with an environmental 
dimension, a large number of outsider environmental groups were drawn into 
the GM controversy. Environmental policy making is more often characterised 
as an issue network, with many actors and groups (e.g. Bomberg and Peterson 
1999 on environment policy in the EU). There are differences between the two 
case studies in this thesis. Although welfare and environmental groups are not 
completely absent from debates around the AHWS, in the bTB case groups 
such as the Badger Trust are much more prominent. Neither, though, is seen to 
approach an issue network as network structure. 
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So, a key aspect of the methodology employed in this thesis is the choice of 
MarVK DQG 6PLWK¶V GLDOHFWLFDO PRGHO RI SROLF\ QHWZRUNV DV D WKHRUHWLFDO
framework for analysis. The model is based upon three relationships described 
E\ 0DUVK DQG 6PLWK DV µGLDOHFWLFDO¶ RU LWHUDWLYH 7KH PRGHO LV GHVFULEHG
diagrammatically in Marsh and Smith (2000, p.10), and also in Toke and 
Marsh (2003, p.231). Figure 1, below, is adapted from Marsh and Smith. 
 
)LJXUH0DUVKDQG6PLWK¶V'LDOHFWLFDO0RGHO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram shows clearly the three relationships identified by Marsh and 
Smith. These are between: the structure of the network and the actors operating 
within it; the network and the broader context within which it exists and 
operates; and the network and policy outcome. Put simply, Marsh and Smith 
argue that in the first of these relationships, neither structures nor individual 
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DJHQF\KROGVXSUHPDF\EXWWKDWDFWRUV¶DFWLRQVDUHFDOFXODWHGDQGFRQVWUDLQHG
within the structure of the network, that the structure limits the possible 
choices open to an actor. In the review of the literature on policy networks it 
was stated that policy networks can be viewed as a meso-level of analysis, and 
that if it can be integrated with macro and micro levels of analysis the power of 
the policy network concept is increased. In seeing the relationship between 
VWUXFWXUHDQGDJHQF\DVGLDOHFWLFDO0DUVKDQG6PLWK¶VPRGHOLVDQDWWHPSWWR
integrate the meso-level with the micro-OHYHO 7KH\ VHH µILUVW QHWZRUNV DUH
structures which constrain and facilitate agents; and second, the culture of a 
QHWZRUNDFWVDVDFRQVWUDLQWDQGRURSSRUWXQLW\RQIRULWVPHPEHUV¶0DUVKDQG
Smith 2000, p.5). It is not surprising that rational choice theorists such as 
Dowding oppose policy network analysis since a consequence of the Marsh 
and Smith approach is that µ,QWKLVYLHZGHFLVLRQPDNHUVDUHVDWLVILHUVUDWKHU
WKDQ WKH FODVVLFDO UDWLRQDO FKRLFH WKHRU\ PD[LPL]HUV¶ 'DXJEMHUJ DQG 0DUVK
1998, p.68). 
 
The relationship between the policy network and the context within which it 
exists and operates is a response to policy network models which emphasise 
network and policy change being caused either by factors endogenous to the 
network or by factors exogenous to it. Marsh and Smith (2000, p.7) argue that 
µWKH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ H[RJHQRXV DQG HQGRJHQRXV IDFWRUV LV GLIIicult to 
VXVWDLQ¶:KLOHQHWZRUNVUHIOHFW WKHEURDGHU LQHTXDOLWLHV IRXQGZLWKLQVRFLHW\
(Marsh and Smith 2000, p.7, Toke and Marsh 2003, p.233), they can be 
affected by exogenous factors. Both Marsh and Smith and Toke and Marsh 
accept Marsh and Rhodes (1992) four categories of change: economic, 
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ideological, political and knowledge based (Marsh and Smith 2000, p.7, Toke 
and Marsh 2003, p.233). Changes in any of these exogenous factors can 
influence the network leading either to policy change or the breakdown of the 
QHWZRUNLWVHOI+RZHYHUµ$OOVXFKH[RJHQRXVFKDQJHLVPHGLDWHGWKURXJKWKH
understanding of agents and interpreted in the context of the structures, 
UXOHVQRUPV DQG LQWHUSHUVRQDO UHODWLRQVKLSV ZLWKLQ WKH QHWZRUN¶ 7RNH DQG
Marsh 2003, p.233). Thus this dialectical relationship offers an opportunity for 
policy network theory to explain policy change, traditionally seen as a 
weakness of the approach. In this study, the network ostensibly breaks down, 
MAFF being replaced by Defra and the FSA.  
 
The final relationship between policy network and policy outcomes challenges 
WKHH[LVWLQJOLWHUDWXUH¶VFRQFHQWUDWLRQRQKRZQHWZRUNVDIIHFWSROLF\RXWFRPHV
For Marsh and Smith (2000), outcomes also affect networks in three ways. 
First, a policy outcome may affect the membership or balance of resources 
within a network. Second, policy outcomes may damage the position of a 
particular interest in the network. Marsh and Smith give as an example the 
weakened position of the trades unions in economic policy networks after the 
&RQVHUYDWLYH JRYHUQPHQW¶V FKDQJH LQ SROLF\ 0DUVK DQG 6PLWK  S
Third, policy outcomes affect actors: if a particular outcome fails to benefit an 
DFWRU¶VLQWHUHVWWKHQKHVKHLVOLNHO\WRSXUVXHDQDOWHUQDWHFRXUVHRIDFWLRQLQ
the future. 
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%HYLUDQG5KRGHV¶LQWHUSUHWLYHDSSURDFK 
 
The final framework used is the interpretive approach of Mark Bevir and Rod 
5KRGHV µ,QWHUSUHWLYH DSSURDFKHV EHJLQ IURP WKH LQVLJKW WKDW WR XQGHUVWDQG
actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp the relevant meanings, the 
EHOLHIVDQGSUHIHUHQFHVRIWKHSHRSOHLQYROYHG¶%HYLUDQG5KRGHVS
7KHDLPLQWKLVVHFWLRQLVQRWWRJLYHDFRPSOHWHDFFRXQWRI%HYLUDQG5KRGHV¶
interpretive agenda but to recognise the contribution that an interpretive 
approach can offer to a study in governance that uses a network model of 
DQDO\VLV7KHLUFULWLTXHRIµWKHPRGHUQLVWHPSLULFLVPDQGHYHQSRVLWLYLVPWKDW
LQIRUPV PXFK SROLWLFDO VFLHQFH¶ %HYLU DQG 5KRGHV  S DQG FRXQWHU
claims that this represents noWKLQJEXWD µVWUDZPDQ¶FDULFDWXUH6PLWK
are also not the purpose of this section, although they do raise important 
questions about how we should do political science. Rather, the purpose of this 
section is to borrow a few tools from Bevir and RhodeV¶WRRONLW 
 
The interpretive approach sits comfortably with a governance perspective as 
would be anticipated with Rhodes as one of the advocates of the approach. 
7KH\ VHHN WR GHFHQWUH JRYHUQDQFH SRVLWLQJ D µVKLIW WR D GLIIHUHQWLDWHG SROLW\
with a power-dependent core executive hollowed out by internal differentiation 
DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH¶ %HYLU DQG 5KRGHV  S &KDSWHU
three of this thesis examines drivers away from the Westminster model and 
toward a more differentiated polity including the challenge posed by New 
Public Management which Bevir and Rhodes identify as one of seven models 
of governance (Bevir and Rhodes 2003, p.46). 
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What then can be taken from Bevir and Rhodes? This research reflects an 
interest in attempting to grasp what governance means to the actors involved in 
the study and does this in three ways. First, by seeing the policy documents 
that form the basis of the case studies as an official narrative of what Defra 
wants to happen; second, by accepting that political actors believe in the 
approach to policy making that they are engaged in and, third, by an emphasis 
in chapter five on the meetings of the EIG as they seek to construct a viable 
way of working from that narrative ± Bevir and Rhodes might say that they 
construct governance in these meetings.  
 
However, this research should not be seen as accepting the entire interpretive 
agenda for political science, nor is it likely that Bevir and Rhodes themselves 
would recognise much of their approach in these pages. But within a 
governance perspective there is a role to play for discourses and narratives in 
animal health policy and space is given to actors to tell their story as they 
themselves want to tell it. 
 
The choice of methods and analytical frameworks is, undoubtedly, eclectic. It 
is reasonable, therefore, to wonder about the validity of these combined 
approaches and to ask how they can combine to deliver the aims of the thesis. 
A multiplicity of methods was required because the thesis, necessarily, adopts 
a multi-disciplinary approach. The principal question of this research asks 
whether Defra manages animal health policy in a different way to that adopted 
by its predecessor, MAFF. To understand this requires an examination of 
change over time. The dialectical model of policy networks offers a political 
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science tool to explain the observed changes in the network and the effects of 
previous policy episodes which impacted upon Defra's choice of approach in 
taking forward animal health policy. The policy network analysis served to 
impose some order into the project and prevented it from becoming a mere 
description of what Defra was doing. 
 
The thesis also asks how the new governance measures employed by Defra 
have worked in practice in respect of two animal health policies: the AHWS 
and bovine tuberculosis. To answer these questions fully a closer, more 
intimate, study of Defra was required. Policy network analysis could not, on its 
own, provide satisfactory answers to these important questions in the study. 
The political scientist's toolbox was not completely without use here. 
Interviews and the study of documentation are common enough methods to 
adopt. But these data required some way of being understood. An interpretive 
approach which allowed the actors involved to express their position as they 
wished was required. Within political science, the interpretive approach is now 
frequently associated with the work of Bevir and Rhodes and, in particular, 
their two books Interpreting British Government and Governance Stories 
(Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 2006).  
 
Their remained a need for a third approach, one not derived from political 
science, but rather from anthropology and sociology. Participant observation 
was used in order to obtain a clear picture of what was happening in regional 
laboratories to contribute to the delivery of the Veterinary Surveillance 
Strategy. Direct observation allowed for a more complete understanding of 
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how Defra was both claiming to be different and how it was implementing its 
new governance approach at a local level.  
 
The different methods and analytical frameworks contributed to a better 
understanding of different aspects of animal health policy; each was chosen to 
better illuminate the area of the project in which they were employed. When 
combined they lead to a more complete and richer understanding of the 
research questions than would have been the case had a purer methodological 
or disciplinary approach been adopted. 
 
THE PROCESS OF FIELDWORK 
 
Interviews 
 
The section on research design discussed the process of identifying the groups 
to be interviewed. This section discusses the process of obtaining consent to be 
interviewed and the conduct of the interviews themselves. 
 
As discussed above, the groups chosen for interview were Defra policy makers 
in London, the EIG, the VLA and veterinary surgeons in private practice. 
Selection of individuals to interview was, in some cases, very straightforward. 
:LWKLQ'HIUD¶VPDLQ$QLPDO+HDOWKRIILFHLQ3DJH6WUHHW/RQGRQHDFKDUHDRI
interest has a named individual as section head. These details were easily 
REWDLQHG IURP 'HIUD¶V ZHE VLWH ZKLFK FRQWDLQHG D VWUXFWXUDO PDS RI OLQHV RI
responsibilities. From the EIG only the chair was interviewed as representative 
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of the group and to discover how the group was put together and how, in her 
view, it functioned. Vets in private practice were not selected at random. Types 
of veterinary practice vary widely and from the perspective of this project only 
those practices with a significant large animal base were of interest. As another 
part of the research involved a two week long visit to VLA North, the decision 
was taken to select practices for interview that were frequent users of the VLA 
service. This process was eased considerably by past experience working at 
VLA North giving a ready recollection of the main practices in the area, and 
the hope that these practices might be more willing to be interviewed by 
someone whom they knew, however vaguely. 
 
Obtaining consent 
 
In the case of the Defra officials, contact was made initially by letter, on 
university headed paper, giving a very brief description of the research and 
how an interview with that particular person would be beneficial to add greater 
detail to information that was already available in the public domain on the 
Defra web site. Each letter concluded with an undertaking to make further 
FRQWDFWE\WHOHSKRQHLQDERXWDZHHN¶VWLPH2QO\RQHSROLF\PDNHUGHFOLQHG
to be interviewed, but he redirected me to one of his deputies who proved to be 
a good interviewee as she had charge over farm health plans and exotic 
diseases. Interviews with these policy makers were set up on the telephone 
with their secretaries for various dates over the summer of 2006. 
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In the case of Helen Browning, chairman of the EIG, contact was initially at 
the first Animal Health and Welfare Strategy conference held at Leicester 
racecourse in March 2006. We had both arrived rather early and the 
opportunity arose for a brief conversation. A formal letter was sent to her at the 
contact address for the EIG in Defra to which no reply was forthcoming. A 
second letter was therefore sent to her farm address on her business card and 
followed up, again by telephone, a little later. As she had already verbally 
agreed to be interviewed, consent in this case was a formality and a date 
arranged in summer 2006. 
 
It proved a little more difficult to obtain consent from private practice vets. As 
with Defra officials, initial contact was by letter addressed to the senior partner 
in each practice with a request to interview either them or one of their practice 
colleagues. Again, brief details of the research were included in the letter and 
the dates on which I would be in the county at VLA North together with an 
undertaking to telephone a week later. On being telephoned, one vet, 
fortunately not from a large practice, refused outright. Some agreed when 
telephoned. One vet was very difficult to track down by telephone. On 
telephoning the practice I was told that he was out visiting a farm. On calling 
again at a time I was advised he would be in, he was again out. It took a 
number of attempts before finally catching him in. On doing so, he was 
reluctant, initially, to agree to be interviewed. His was the largest practice in 
the county and the main private client of VLA North. His was also a practice 
that was regarded as forward looking and progressive and if he were not to 
participate in the research, this would be a significant setback. Alarmed, and 
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somewhat desperate, I sought to improve my credibility with him by 
mentioning that I had worked at VLA North and that I would be conducting 
some research there soon. On being reminded of who I was, his manner 
changed completely. No longer was he defensive and reluctant, but 
remembering who I was became friendly and agreed immediately to my 
request to interview him. 
 
The nature of the interviews 
 
Interviews with four private veterinary practitioners were the first ones to be 
carried out in March 2006 at times arranged to coincide with the observational 
research at VLA North. The short time scale available for the interviews 
necessarily generated a steep learning curve for time management and conduct 
of the interviews. In all cases the interviews were semi-structured. 
 
The design of the interview schedule was based upon the desire to cover key 
themes. While agreeing with Murphy and Dingwall that typologies of 
interviews are of limited value, these interviews were designed to be of the 
µJXLGHG¶ W\SH 0XUSK\ DQG 'LQJZDOO  S 7KH LQWHUYLHZV DOO EHJDQ
with a simple question about the LQIRUPDQW¶V SUDFWLFH ± its geographical 
coverage, size and balance between large and small animal practice. This was 
not intended to be a data generating question but, rather, a question designed to 
get the informant talking and comfortable with the presence of the recording 
equipment on the table. Subsequent questions covered the main topics of 
interest ± the experience of MAFF during the 2001 FMD outbreak, the main 
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policies that have emerged in animal health since Defra was created and 
questions about ideDV VXFK DV YHWV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WHUPV VXFK DV
µVWDNHKROGHU¶ (DFK VHFWLRQ RI WKH LQWHUYLHZ EHJDQ ZLWK D VWDQGDUG TXHVWLRQ
although the precise wording of it varied from interview to interview, and 
follow up questions depended upon the content of the infRUPDQW¶VDQVZHU 
 
The first interview, though planned to last an hour, was completed in just forty 
minutes. Another interview was just over half an hour. In contrast, some other 
interviews with this group exceeded the hour comfortably. These were the 
interviews with vets known personally, rather than ones not known so well. 
Perhaps some backup structured questions would have helped to further 
prompt the less talkative informant and also to prompt the, at this stage, very 
inexperienced interviewer. 
 
This lesson was learnt and, in later interviews with policy makers, a slightly 
different approach was adopted initially of having more prepared questions 
ready in case initial answers to topic introducing questions failed to produce a 
satisfactory line to follow up. That was the case for the first interview with a 
policy maker, the DCVO. Perhaps reflecting growing skill in interviewing, or 
SHUKDSV UHIOHFWLQJ WKH LQIRUPDQWV¶ JUHDWHU VNLOOV DW EHLQJ LQWHUYLHZHG RU WKHLU
desire to put across their story, several subsequent policy maker interviews 
ZHUHFRQGXFWHGLQOLQHZLWK5LFKDUGV¶SUHVFULSWLRQWKDWµWKHNH\UHTXLUHPHQWLV
IOH[LELOLW\¶5LFKDUGVS+RZHYHURIFRXUVHWKHVHLQWHUYLHZVZHUH
PRUH IRFXVVHG RQ WKH LQGLYLGXDO LQIRUPDQW¶V SDUWLFXODU UHVSRQVLELOLWies rather 
than ranging over the whole raft of policy areas. So, for example, informant 
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µ'HIUD RIILFLDO ¶ ZDV DVNHG DERXW E7% EXW QRW DERXW WKH 9HWHULQDU\
Surveillance Strategy. Those policy makers whose brief was more wide 
ranging, such as the Minister, the CVO and the Deputy CVO were asked 
questions across the animal health sphere. 
 
Participant Observation 
 
Participant observation at VLA labs was chosen as a research method for two 
reasons. Firstly, to offer a contrast between how the VLA went about its task in 
its MAFF days and how it operated under the new management of Defra. 
Considerable (thirteen years) experience of working for the VLA was brought 
to this part of the project. Secondly, participant observation offered the chance 
to observe at first hand how animal health policy was being delivered at a local 
level away from London. 
 
Decisions had to be taken about both where to conduct fieldwork and for how 
long. Initially, both decisions were straightforward but one came to be 
modified in the light of initial fieldwork experience. The answer to the 
question where to conduct fieldwork was driven by a combination of practical 
considerations and a desire to be able to undertake a comparative study for this 
part of the project in order that conclusions might not be based on just one 
observation. 
 
VLA North is located in the North-west of England. It serves a largely rural 
geographical area. The laboratory serves an area with a very large number of 
 47 
sheep farms together with dairy herds. Although there are some pig and 
poultry units, there are not many and these two sectors are not the significant 
HOHPHQWV RI WKH DUHD¶V IDUPLQJ PL[ 7KLV ORFDWLRQ ZDV FKRVHQ SULPDULO\
because it was where the vast majority of the experience brought to this project 
was obtained. This offered the advantage of already knowing many of the 
SHRSOHEHLQJVWXGLHGDOORZLQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIµSOD\LQJXSP\FUHGHQWLDOV¶DV
recommended by Bryman (2001, p.297) together with a geographical presence 
far from London and nearness to the practice vets that were to be studied. The 
original plan was to visit VLA North for two periods each of two weeks. One 
two week visit was intended to coincide with what, from experience, was a 
time of considerable workload. February/March was selected. This is because 
VLA North is located in an area with a high number of sheep farms. Ovine 
abortion is a common event, with cases beginning in late December and 
continuing through to lambing time in April. The peak period for ovine 
abortion is February and March. Traditionally, many vets liked to submit 
samples to the VLA for diagnosis and confirmation of the cause. The two main 
causes of ovine abortion are EAE ± Enzootic Abortion in Ewes ± caused by the 
bacterium Chalamydia psittici and toxoplasmosis. Diagnosis of EAE is 
straightforward clinically, the placenta becomes thickened and plaques can be 
observed in the inter-cotyledon areas. Laboratory confirmation of the condition 
is by stained smear of these areas revealing the bacteria characteristically 
stained. Toxoplasma is suspected on noticing spotty cotyledons and confirmed 
by a test on fluid obtained from the foetus, or by fluorescent antibody test 
(FAT) on a smear made from a clinically typical cotyledon on the placenta.  
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With up to 20 ± 30 cases a day being referred to the VLA lab there is 
significant pressure on a small staff to carry out the required work. In addition, 
both conditions are transmissible to humans and consequently pregnant women 
are excluded from contact with such material in the lab. With the gender 
balance of staff in the labs heavily biased toward women, a staff pregnancy can 
therefore also contribute to putting remaining staff under increased work 
pressures. Hoping to see the lab under strain would help with observations 
about how far quality procedures were implemented and would help to show 
what was not getting done in the lab. This would include seeing if surveillance 
farm visits were being cancelled at this time of year. 
 
VLA Midlands was chosen as a contrast to VLA North for again 
predominantly practical reasons. VLA Midlands was close to Nottingham 
University and thus easy to get to on a day to day basis saving both time and 
financial resources. In addition, the mix of farms served by VLA Midlands was 
different to that of VLA North. Poultry farming is much more common in the 
area served by VLA Midlands and there is far less in the way of sheep farming. 
One further difference was that VLA North was a relatively new, purpose built 
complex whereas VLA Midlands is a rather ad hoc arrangement utilising pre-
existing buildings that had a previous use. 
 
Obtaining access was a rather long process involving various bureaucratic 
hurdles. VLA local laboratories have a parallel management structure. Vets 
and clerical support staff are managed by the Senior Veterinary Investigation 
Officer, while laboratory staff are managed by the Senior Scientific Officer. 
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Permission was initially sought by letter to both managers at VLA North. The 
laboratory manager was then detailed to handle the application. There was no 
reluctance on the part of local managers to allow the fieldwork to take place, 
but formal permission was required from levels of manager above the local lab 
level. Telephone discussion with local management suggested that this would 
be given on the basis of his recommendation. Once formal permission was 
obtained there was a bundle of forms to complete including a health 
declaration, a criminal record check and an Official Secrets Act declaration. 
This latter one seemed a little odd since, as a former civil servant, I had already 
signed the Act many years previously. This process took some time and it was 
fortunate that planning for it had been undertaken well in advance. The first 
ZHHN¶VILHOGZRUNDW9/$1RUWKILQDOO\EHJDQRQ0RQGD\)HEUXDU\ 
 
Having obtained permission to visit VLA North using personal connections 
there, permission to visit VLA Midlands was easier to obtain. A letter was sent 
to management there mentioning that I had visited VLA North and suggesting 
that the manager there contact VLA North to check my bone fides. 
 
Ongoing Access 
 
Burgess (1984, p.49) refers to the question of access being a process not an 
event and that different people are likely to be gatekeepers to different areas of 
a research site. This proved to be the case in this project too, particularly at 
VLA Midlands where I was unknown by anyone at the lab prior to my visit. 
Some extracts from field notes written up in the evening give some examples 
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of where this was the case. The names used are not the real names of the 
people concerned. 
 
At VLA North, ongoing access was far less of a problem as I had worked with 
the majority of the staff there during my time as a civil servant. Most people 
were therefore happy to talk to me and to answer my questions. However, the 
person in charge of the bacteriology department, the place where most of the 
µDFWLRQ¶RFFXUVDW9/$1RUWKZDVXQNQRZQWRPH7KHVWUDWHJ\,XVHGWRWU\WR
obtain his trust was to present myself as a possible resource to him, desperately 
hoping that a nearly VL[\HDUDEVHQFHIURPWKHODEKDGQ¶WFRPSOHWHO\EOXQWHG
my skills as a laboratory worker. My research diary entry for that day records 
events thus: 
 
µ7RGD\,VSHQWWKHPRUQLQJLQWKHEDFWHULRORJ\GHSDUWPHQW,KRSHG
to be able to gain the trust of Gordon [Head of Bacteriology] and 
Harriet [another lab scientist], neither of whom knows me. To help 
with this I asked Gordon if there was anything that I could do to 
help. He asked me how was my parasitology. I asked if he meant 
the fleece stuff or the faecal stuff. This seemed to satisfy him that I 
knew enough. He then asked me to examine three sheep fleece 
samples for mites. I took this, in part, as some rite of passage for 
access. Note for those not me reading this: close up and personal, 
VKHHSZRROGRQ¶WVPHOl too good, though there are far worse things 
to sniff. Plus, looking for these mites can be a needle/haystack type 
proposition unless the sample has been well taken. Fortunately for 
me, these were well taken. I found a mite in the first sample quite 
quickly, put it on a slide and identified it as Psoroptes ovis (sheep 
scab) rather than Chorioptes (mange). That I could do this so 
quickly gave me great pleasure, and I guess that some things, if 
done often enough just get hard wired into the brain, never to be 
forgotten even after a long passage of time. The second sample was 
also positive for scab (again found quickly by me). It was as if I 
had never been away, plus Gordon and Harriet seemed content to 
take my word for it that they were Psoroptes. This I took as a good 
sign. Feeling confident was my big mistake. The third sample, like 
the others was a large sample. The general rule is that you have to 
look at as much sample as is submitted until a mite is found. An 
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KRXUODWHU,VWLOOKDGQ¶WIRXQGDGDPQPLWHLQWKLVVDPSOH,FRXOGQ¶W
believe that it could be negative, the scabs were quite convincing 
for Psoroptes. However, as Ruth very kindly said, this sheep could 
have been in a different field. The upshot of my not finding the 
mite was that Ruth would later have to boil up some of the scab in 
potassium hydroxide (KOH) to try to release mites encrusted in 
VFDE7KLVLVQRWIXQ>ERLOLQJIOHHFHLQ.R+@¶ 
 
This particular rite of passage successfully completed, Gordon was content to 
WUHDWPHPRUHRUOHVVDVµRQHRIXV¶IRUWKHUHVWRIP\YLVLWDQG,ZDVDEOHWR
lend a hand in the labs while talking to staff and making the observations that I 
wanted to make. I took the view that folk would be much more willing to 
speak and be less self conscious if they were talking to someone who was 
pitching in rather than just passively watching. Gobo (2008) writes that the 
researcher on site is obliged to assume a role (Gobo 2008, p.122). The role that 
I assumed was that of a familiar figure. In assuming that role I was able to 
participate and assist and gain the confidence of staff in the hope of improving 
the quality of my observations. This strategy was successful as I was able to 
DFKLHYH ZKDW 5\HQ FDOOV D µFXOWXUDO DZDUHQHVV¶ DOORZLQJ PH WR EHFRPH µWKH
FRPSHWHQWSDUWLFLSDQW¶(Ryen 2008, p.99). 
 
Day to day access problems were more severe at VLA Midlands where I did 
not have the advantage of prior acquaintance with any of the staff. Having 
negotiated access to the site the first problem was actually getting in to the 
labs. At VLA North I was issued with a security access card to get into the 
building. The fact that I was given one of these cards perhaps reflected my 
previous work there, the fact that I was known. At VLA Midlands I had to ring 
the bell each day to get in. Access here, to people and laboratories, was 
negotiated much more on a day to day basis. In one lab it was possible to try 
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the same approach as at VLA North of using what lab expertise I could offer as 
a way of gaining access. This was more unpleasant than at VLA North. At 
VLA Midlands, the task was cutting open day old chicks and removing various 
samples for salmonella testing. The samples were not the freshest.  
 
The arrangement of the labs at VLA Midlands presented a further problem. At 
VLA North, general cultures and examination of agar plates to identify 
bacteria took place in the one lab. At VLA Midlands, this task was split up into 
two separate labs. Access to the bacteriology lab was very difficult and 
ultimately achieved through a shared interest. My notes describe my reception 
E\WKHRIILFHULQFKDUJHRIEDFWHULRORJ\ZKHQILUVWVHHNLQJDFFHVVDVµQRWIURVW\
H[DFWO\EXWQRUZDVLWIULHQGO\¶5HVHDUFK'LDU\6HSWHPEHU$FFHVV
was finally gained when the discovery was made that Teresa was a runner. A 
µFDVXDO¶ EURDFKLQJ RI WKH VXEMHFW DW WKH DIWHUQRRQ WHD EUHDN VHFXUHG DQ
invitation to her lab for the next day. 
 
Comparing the two labs 
 
The decision to visit two VLA labs was proved to be merited when considering 
the differences between them. Esterberg (2002, p.63) discusses the boundaries 
of the site to be visited and the different locations within the site that make 
observations possible. There were clear differences between the two sites. Both 
labs were in a rural setting, but the similarities between them were few. VLA 
North is a modern, purpose built facility with modern benches and labs 
arranged to the convenience of the VLA North way of working. At this lab it 
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was possible to determine the way of working and place labs in situations that 
assisted these preferences.  
 
However, even here, changes in work patterns that had followed the 2001 
FMD outbreak had required alterations to the fabric of the building. These 
changes were prompted both by changing government policy post 2001 and by 
VLA management directives towards further rationalisation. One change to the 
building that followed after my visit was a major one. At the end of a meeting 
of the EIG, I spoke to a vet present at the meeting whom I had known from his 
practice at Cumbria. I mentioned that I had been there the previous year and 
had noted how much money had been spent on the site. Not possessing the 
skill of short hand I could not record his answer verbatim. However, his reply 
ZDV RQ WKH OLQHV RI µ0RQH\ ZDVWHG PRUH OLNH¶ ZKLFK ZDV IROORZHG E\ a 
complaint about rationalisation of laboratory testing and a mention of the fact 
that environmental legislation had caused the, at the time, purpose built 
incinerator to have to be decommissioned as it would prove too expensive to 
bring it up to present day regulatory standards. 
 
By contrast, VLA Midlands is a much more ad hoc arrangement of buildings. 
The main labs are located in one building, but the rooms are, by and large, 
rather small and cramped. Lighting was another problem that I noticed when 
there. Most of the time it was OK for normal activity, but from time to time it 
was a bit dingy. Indeed, the whole place had a slightly down at heel feel to it. 
Arrangement of rooms was also not conducive to developing a team spirit. 
Unlike at VLA North, the administration offices were split into two areas. The 
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reception area was a small room while the majority of the administrative staff 
worked in a larger room well away from the labs. Unlike at VLA North, it was 
quite possible to go through the day without seeing any administrative grade 
staff other than the person sat at reception. The labs, being smaller than those 
at VLA North, required a more specialist approach to activity. So, unlike at 
VLA North where culture and determinative bacteriology (the process of 
identifying bacteria) took place beside one another, with appropriate distance 
to prevent contamination, this was not possible at VLA Midlands. Routine 
FXOWXUHVWRRNSODFHLQµ0DLQODE¶ZKLOHGHWHUPLQDWLYHEDFWHULRORJ\WRRNSODFH
elsewhere. This required some significant movements of culture plates 
between labs. Furthermore, it meant that, unlike at VLA North, it was less easy 
for staff under-employed in one activity to see quickly if they might be better 
employed on another. The consequence of this was that some staff could be 
very busy while others were fairly quiet. 
 
The differences between the two labs also extended to working practices that 
were not constrained by physical environment. A striking example of this is 
the different approaches to determinative bacteriology. At VLA North, the 
SODWHV DUH µUHDG¶ WKH PRUQLQJ DIWHU FXOWXUH 7KH SURFHVV RI UHDGLQJ D SODWH LV
fairly straightforward. Most samples are cultured onto a general purpose 
growth medium called a blood agar plate. Most bacteria will grow on this 
medium. Particular samples, where specific fastidious bacteria are a possible 
isolate are also cultured using more specialist media, but, in general, it is the 
blood agar plate that is most common. To read a plate, remove the lid and take 
a cautious sniff. Hold it up to a light source (at VLA North the lab was 
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orientated south facing deliberately to aid this) and describe what is seen. 
Some bacteria have a characteristic appearance and can be presumptively 
identified on that basis alone. Others appear as white or grey colonies of 
varying sizes. All of this is described and written down, together with an 
estimate of the quantity of growth (e.g. trace, scant, moderate or profuse 
growth). Early identification is aided by samples also being cultured onto 
McConkey agar, a selective medium on which some bacteria will and other 
will not grow. Those that do grow demonstrate by their colour on this medium 
their ability to either ferment or not ferment the sugar lactose. 
 
This process was similar in both labs visited. However, at VLA North, the vet 
ZKR ZDV WKH µGXW\ YHW¶ IRU WKH SUHYLRXV GD\ ZKRVH FDVHV WKHVH ZHUH ZRXOG
come and look at what was grown and tell lab staff, after consultation with 
them, which isolates were of interest. This co-operative process where the vet 
brought her clinical expertise and knowledge gained performing the post 
mortem examination and the lab worker brought his specialist skill at 
identifying bacteria appeared to be appreciated by both parties. Routine cases, 
such as cultures of milk from mastitic cows where there is a limited number of 
significant isolates, were usually given less consideration by the vet who 
tended to confine her remarks to requiring a test of antibiotic sensitivity on the 
significant isolate or asking for further work where no cause for the mastitis 
could be determined from the initial culture. One consequence of this co-
operative practice was that a lot of time was saved in not pursuing the 
identification of isolates of dubious significance. This was not the case at VLA 
Midlands, where the vets stayed out of the labs and waited to be told what had 
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been isolated. The process here, consequently, was much longer and more time 
was spent identifying isolates than at VLA North. So, at VLA North, this 
process of identification would normally be over by lunchtime whereas at 
VLA Midlands it would usually continue into the afternoon session. 
 
There were, of course, similarities in practice too. Both labs undertook post 
mortem and bacteriology work from samples submitted by private vets. Both 
labs undertook cultures for tuberculosis. This was a reflection of the increasing 
importance of bTB as an economic disease (see chapter six for detailed 
discussion of this case study). At VLA North, this work was done in a lab 
converted from a virology lab, virology being a discipline that had been 
rationalised and no longer offered at VLA North. At VLA Midlands, a lab 
previously used for serology was being transformed during my visit into one 
for doing the gamma interferon test for bTB, while cultures for TB took place 
in a small separate building on the site. This building was the only one that was 
modern and kitted out to modern standards of fittings. The fact that it was 
separate gave it an isolated feel. This, in part, reflected the fact that although a 
PRGHUQ EXLOGLQJ LW KDG SUHYLRXVO\ EHHQ XVHG E\ WKH 9/$¶V 4XDOLW\ &RQWURO
Unit. This had now moved into different premises allowing VLA Midlands to 
use the building. 
 
The original research design, discussed above, proposed two visits each of two 
ZHHNV¶ GXUDWLRQ ERWK RI WKH WZR 9/$ ODERUDWRULHV +RZHYHU DIWHU WKH ILUVW
experience at VLA North, this decision was reconsidered. The reasoning 
behind the two visit strategy was to observe the labs at a time when it was 
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anticipated that they would be busy and again at a time normally considered to 
be quiet. This would allow observations to be made about the extent to which 
volume pressure of work served to restrict time available for surveillance visits 
and other activities that might be considereGSDUWRI WKH9/$¶VDQLPDOKHDOWK
remit. However, the first visit to VLA North, the visit at a time that was 
supposed to be busy, was not in fact busy. Conversations with staff confirmed 
that this was now normal following the programme of rationalisation and a 
shift from regarding the private vet as the customer of primary importance to 
regarding Defra as the most important client. The significance of this shift is 
discussed in chapter seven. Here, it should be noted that as the interviews with 
private vets and VLA staff had been completed in the first two week period 
and a good quantity of data gathered, there was no longer any need to pay a 
second visit. 
 
In the case of VLA Midlands, it may be argued that problems in gaining trust 
with staff there justified a second visit. However, here too, work throughput 
was fairly slow and the hectic activity characteristic of VLA labs prior to 2000 
was absent. Indeed, the only periods of frenetic activity observed, and a very 
minor one, occurred in respect of dealing with chick carcasses for salmonella 
work. The rush here was a time requirement to start the cultures by a particular 
time to comply with the Standard Operating Procedure for the test, rather than 
a rush induced by a heavy load of work. At VLA Midlands too, there was 
plenty of time for casual discussion and, again, the necessary data was 
obtained in the one visit. Consequently, in the light of these experiences, the 
 58 
decision was taken to restrict this package of work to one visit each to the two 
VLA labs.  
 
The researcher on site 
 
This package of work, the two visits to VLA laboratories, must inevitably raise 
the question of the impact of the researcher on the research setting. Esterberg 
(2002, p. 64), for example, discusses the attributes of the researcher in relation 
to the research site and project. Burgess (1984, p.89) discusses how his 
experience as a former teacher influenced the direction and conduct of his 
research in a secondary school. These considerations need to be discussed in 
this project as I was formerly with the VLA. 
 
The advantage of familiarity has already been alluded to in respect of gaining 
access both to VLA North in the first instance and also to private vets in the 
northern region. Another advantage of this familiarity was that at VLA North 
the process of ongoing access was fairly straightforward. This was not the case 
at VLA Midlands. Here, I was not known in the same way as at VLA North. 
My research diary noted the difficulties stemming from my own personality 
and also from the perception of me by VLA Midlands staff some of whom 
seemed to think that I was there at the behest of Defra management. Buscatto 
DOVR H[SHULHQFHG WKDW VHQVHRI µ«EHLQJDQRXWVLGH HPSOR\HH VHQW E\
WRSPDQDJHPHQWWRHYDOXDWHRUJDQL]DWLRQDOSUDFWLFHV¶%XVFDWto 2008, p.39): 
 
µ<HVWHUGD\ ZDV D OLWWOH XQFRPIRUWDEOH QRW WKURXJK DQ\ ODFN RI
welcome on the part of folk at the lab but because of the oddness of 
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it combined with my crashing inability to make small talk with folk 
about whom I know almost nothing. There was also the feeling that 
I was regarded with some suspicion by some people. Again today I 
had to explain, more than once, that I was not here at the behest of 
Defra, that I was not checking up on them or spying on them. It 
would have been better if Yvette [a senior manager at VLA 
Midlands] had read out my letter asking to come at her last team 
EULHILQJRUDWOHDVWWROGWKHPZK\,ZDVKHUH¶ 
 
VLA Midlands thus presented a more challenging task of gaining acceptance. 
One undoubted advantage was knowing the language. In any research 
involving ethnographic or observational methods, one problem can be learning 
the language of the subject group (Burgess 1984, pp.93±94). In this research, 
language was not a problem given my experience in the VLA and that I shared 
the same scientific language as those whom I was observing. While the 
specific language of the lab could have been learnt, knowing it already meant 
WKDWWKHUHVHDUFKµKLWWKHJURXQGUXQQLQJ¶DQGDOORZHGZKDWZDVDIDLUO\EULHI
period of time in the field. As Bradney and Cownie (2000, p.88) note in their 
VWXG\ RI 4XDNHU EXVLQHVV SUDFWLFH µWR OHDUQ D ODQJXDJH LV RQH WKLQJ WR EH D
QDWLYH VSHDNHU LV DQRWKHU¶ 7KHVH ODQJXDJH DQG WHFKQLFDO VNLOOV DV DOUHDG\
noted, were also very useful for the process of ongoing access. 
 
There was a possible problem, however, with possessing such knowledge from 
the start, a problem of balancing this insider status with the need to acquire a 
critical distance to conduct the research in a proper manner. The objective was 
µ>7@RPDLQWDLQWKHEDODQFHEHWZHHQµLQVLGHU¶DQGµRXWVLGHU¶VWDWXV WR LGHQWLI\
with the people under study and get close to them, but maintaining a 
SURIHVVLRQDOGLVWDQFHZKLFKSHUPLWVDGHTXDWHREVHUYDWLRQDQGGDWDFROOHFWLRQ¶
(Brewer 2000, p. 59±60). In part, especially at VLA North, this objective was 
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aided by the fact that this was not a long term ethnographic study of the sort 
that an anthropologist might undertake, but rather a targeted observation of the 
changing role of the VLA in delivering animal health policy. Despite the fact 
that the work at VLA Midlands was not as enjoyable as that at VLA North, this 
objective was still achieved in that the differences between the two labs were 
able to be observed and the functions of the lab were noted. It was more of an 
observation of process and the fact that it was not possible to enjoy the same 
level of acceptance by the staff at VLA Midlands compared to VLA North did 
not prevent this element of the work delivering useful data.  
 
EIG meetings 
 
The third element of empirical work undertaken for this project entailed 
attending and observing meetings of the England Implementation Group 
(EIG). The primary function of this work was to provide data for the case 
study into the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy. However, from time to 
time, these meetings also yielded information useful for the second case study 
into bovine tuberculosis. 
 
During the course of the project six meetings of the EIG were attended out of 
thirteen that took place during the research project. Consequently, not all 
meetings of the EIG were attended. There were two main reasons for this. The 
first reason was one of practicality. Some meetings of the group were held in 
the regions. Confined to public transport, it was not possible to get to the venue 
in time. Indeed, one meeting in Herefordshire was not accessible at all by 
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public transport. Two meetings in total were not attended for this reason. The 
other reason for not attending was that some of the meetings were not going to 
discuss topics relevant to this project. One meeting in particular was focussed 
entirely on companion animals and, as such, was outside the scope of this 
research and so not attended. 
 
At the meetings that were attended, the strategy adopted was to observe, take 
notes, and try to minimise my impact upon the meeting and the people at the 
meeting. This was not taken to the point of ill manners; I did speak to 
stakeholders present and also to members of the EIG during the, welcome, 
breaks for refreshment. As time went by and I got to recognise some of the 
more frequent attendees, I would engage them in conversation hoping to obtain 
some useful information. One such conversation at the end of an EIG meeting 
yielded a particularly interesting remark about money being wasted in the VLA 
and a good general discussion of bTB policy that reinforced my view that vets 
in practice are very enthusiastic for a cull of badgers. However, I deliberately 
chose not to ask questions or to make a contribution to discussion during those 
parts of the meetings where the chair specifically opened up debate to people 
in the audience.  
 
There was one occasion when this non-participation strategy failed. This was 
at the Animal Health and Welfare Conference held at Leicester racecourse. 
Plenary sessions were easy, just sit, listen and note. But this conference had 
workshop sessions and it proved impossible not to participate. I attended the 
workshop session on consumers, a session which confirmed my view that the 
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public is constructed in animal health debates almost entirely as consumers. 
During this session, the EIG Chair turned to me and required me to say what I 
thought on the point in question. 
 
DATA RECORDING AND ANALYSIS 
 
The previous section discussed the process of obtaining empirical data. This 
section looks at how the data was recorded and what was done with and to it. 
 
During visits to VLA labs a research diary was kept. This was written up in the 
HYHQLQJDIWHUHDFKGD\¶VZRUN ,WZDVZULWWHQ IDLUO\TXLFNO\ DQG WKHGHFLVLRQ
was taken not to alter it once written in order to preserve it as a record of 
immediate impression and description and not to turn it into a cosy post hoc 
narrative. This data is therefore quite raw. It has been selectively used, with 
quotes taken from it to illustrate points that I wished to make. Where quotes 
have been used, the names of individuals referred to have been altered to 
preserve anonymity. 
 
Notes taken at EIG meetings similarly have been used as a record of my 
observations at the meeting. Chapter five which looks at the AHWS has tended 
to use quotes from the official minutes which are extensive. These minutes, 
together with my notes, were analysed together to identify and address study 
WKHPHV HJ µVWDNHKROGHU¶ RU µSDUWQHUVKLS¶ $OO PLQXWHV DQG QRWHV ZKHUH D
particular theme was discussed were looked at and compared to give a flavour 
of how the EIG has understood these themes. 
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Interviews were partially transcribed from the digital audio recording, the 
degree of transcription dependent upon the relevance of the data. No attempt at 
conversation analysis was undertaken and so pauses for thought, unless long or 
REYLRXVO\ VLJQLILFDQW ZHUH QRW UHJDUGHG DV UHOHYDQW IRU DQDO\VLV 7KH µHUPV¶
and other manifestations of verbal punctuation were not transcribed. Once 
transcribed, analysis was done on the basis of coding for themes such as 
groups mentioned as stakeholders, bTB, badger culling etc. Doing this gave a 
choice of quotes illustrative of thinking about a particular theme by the person 
or persons concerned. In using quotes some, but not all, names have been used. 
So Ben Bradshaw and Helen Browning were content to be named. I decided to 
UHIHU WR 'HIUD RIILFLDOV DV µ'HIUD RIILFLDO ¶ HWF WR SUHVHUYH WKHLU DQRQ\PLW\
Practice vets too are not referred to by name for the same reason.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The primary focus of this research is on animal health policy and whether it is 
different in practice under Defra. Underneath that overarching question lie 
concerns about how science is being used and about changes in governance 
that reflect a broader shift from a government discourse to a governance one. 
This chapter has sought to explain the decisions that were taken in respect of 
how to study the questions and a description of how that research was carried 
out. 
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The chapter has described how the research was prompted by a general belief 
that animal health policy would be different following the 2001 FMD 
outbreak. Was that actually going to be the case in practice and how would any 
change manifest itself in terms of science and governance? The process by 
which the case studies were chosen and which groups of actors were chosen as 
objects of study was also discussed. Certainly other cases could have been 
chosen to study. Avian influenza or bluetongue might today be good choices. 
However, at the time of commencement of the research, bTB was the main 
endemic disease that was a cause of conflict over science in Britain and 
remains a good choice. The AHWS, as the over arching animal health strategy, 
and as a strategy that made in creating the EIG a conscious attempt to be 
different, is a case with a variety of animal health policy issues. 
 
This chapter has also introduced the analytical framework used in this 
research. The general literature on governance, policy networks and the 
interpretive approach was discussed and the specific features of the Marsh and 
Smith model discussed. The model is used fully in chapter seven in analysing 
and explaining policy change. 
 
The thesis now moves on from questions of research design to look in detail at 
the story of BSE and FMD and changes in governance that pre dated the 
creation of Defra. Then, the new settlement of Defra is discussed and the case 
studies looked at in considerable detail. 
 
 
 65 
Chapter 3: The old settlement 
 
The policies for animal health emerging now from the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) are presented by the department 
in a different manner and with a different emphasis than previously. Openness 
and public consultation are now commonplace features of Defra¶VVW\OH$WWKe 
time of writing, there are seventeen current consultations on a variety of 
strategies, plans, and proposed directives and regulations. The aim of this 
FKDSWHULVWRLGHQWLI\WKHIHDWXUHVRI%ULWDLQ¶VSROLF\-making style that preceded 
this discourse, and to discuss some of the factors which undermined this old 
style. Much of the literature on policy style is general. However, Dunleavy 
argues that a literature review should be focussed upon the research subject of 
the wider thesis (Dunleavy 2003, p.61). Therefore, although many of the 
sources used in this chapter refer to policy-making in general, an attempt is 
made to relate the arguments of various authors to the experience of the 
agriculture department, and in particular to its animal health responsibilities. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section the features of 
the old policy-making style are identified. The second section examines 
political factors which put this model of policy-making under pressure. 
Political pressures include the policy of the Conservative governments of the 
1980s and 1990s to expose the public sector to market forces wherever 
possible, and of the utilisation of management practices from the private sector 
in the public sector. These processes together consWLWXWH µ1HZ 3XEOLF
0DQDJHPHQW¶130:LWKLQ0$))WKLVSROLF\FDQEHVHHQWRKDYHKDGWKH
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HIIHFW RI UHGXFLQJ WKH GHSDUWPHQW¶V FDSDFLW\ IRU DQLPDO GLVHDVH VXUYHLOODQFH
and for action to handle animal health problems on its own. In addition to 
130 %ULWDLQ¶s membership of the European Union (EU), (previously the 
European Economic Community (EEC)) can be seen to put some institutional 
pressure to change policy-making style from a consensual model toward a 
model based more upon a rule-oriented approach common on the European 
continent and similar to the policy style in the United States. 
 
The third section discusses a number of policy problems which contributed to 
pressure being applied to the old policy style. Common to these policy 
problems is that they politicised animal health policy, bringing it into the 
public arena. In addition, it has been suggested that these problems contributed 
to a decline in public support for policies emerging from this old policy-
PDNLQJ VW\OH 7KH SKUDVH µSROLF\ SUREOHPV¶ LV FKRVHn deliberately. Some 
DXWKRUV SUHIHU WKH WHUP µSROLF\ GLVDVWHUV¶ IRU H[DPSOH YDQ =ZDQHQEHUJ DQG
0LOOVWRQH  RQ WKH %6( VDJD 'XQOHDY\ DUJXHV WKDW µ,GHQWLI\LQJ SROLF\
disasters is notoriously difficult. It can only be done with hindsight and even 
then LW LV UDUH IRU FRQVHQVXV WR EH DFKLHYHG¶ 'XQOHDY\  S
)XUWKHUPRUHµ>,@Q%ULWDLQWKHVDGWUXWKVHHPVWREHWKDWSROLF\PLVWDNHVRQD
very grand scale are now accepted as inevitable, almost routine, a natural 
FRUROODU\RIRXUV\VWHPRIJRYHUQLQJ¶ (Dunleavy 1995, p.54). However, in the 
BSE case, the charge that it was a policy disaster has come under specific 
attack by Forbes (2004). Furthermore, Fisher (1998) writing from a historical 
perspective has also challenged the idea that BSE constituted a policy disaster. 
Given that the objective here is to identify factors which placed a policy 
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making style under pressure and not to offer judgement on whether particular 
SROLF\ RXWFRPHV FRQVWLWXWH D GLVDVWHU WKH PLOGHU WHUP µSROLF\ SUREOHP¶ LV
preferred for this purpose. 
 
The particular policies examined all pertain to issues with an animal health 
involvement and which exercised the animal health policy network. These 
policy problems are the salmonella in eggs debate of the late 1980s, BSE 
which became a problem in the public sphere in the mid 1990s but whose 
origins lay in decisions taken earlier on, and the 2001 foot and mouth disease 
(FMD) outbreak. In the salmonella case the closeness of the relationship 
EHWZHHQ WKH 1DWLRQDO )DUPHUV¶ 8QLRQ 1)8 DQG 0$FF is seen to be an 
important factor in producing the policy outcome. However, the salmonella in 
eggs story also serves as an early example of how animal health issues can 
impact upon human health. The possibility for departmental conflict between 
the MAFF, responsible for animal health, and the Department of Health 
(DoH), responsible for human health is shown. In the other two policies, BSE 
and FMD, the interesting aspect from the perspective of examining changing 
SROLF\VW\OH LV WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VXVHRIVcience, and its claims to base policy 
on the best scientific advice. In both BSE and FMD, this government claim has 
been challenged. In the BSE case the tone of the critique is that the science that 
was relied upon by government was that which posed no threat to the objective 
of supporting the British beef industry. In the FMD case, the accusation has 
been made that an, arguably, equally valid policy, on the basis of the science, 
of vaccination was rejected for political reasons. The effect of both cases is to 
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contribute to a lessening of public confidence in government pronouncements 
on scientific matters. 
 
%5,7$,1¶62/'32/,&<0$.,1*67</( 
 
For Jordan and Richardson the British policy style has five overlapping 
features ± sectorisation, clientalism, consultation, institutionalisation of 
compromise and the development of exchange relationships (Jordan and 
5LFKDUGVRQ  S µ%ULWDLQ LV EHVW FKDUDFWHULVHG DV HPSKDVLVLQJ
consensus and a desire to avoid the imposLWLRQRIVROXWLRQVRQVRFLHW\¶(Jordan 
and Richardson 1982, p.81). The implications of this are clearly that policy 
changes are incremental and gradual ± radical changes are generally non-
starters, and that the British policy style is essentially a reactive rather than an 
anticipatory style. However, party manifesto commitments may sometimes 
override carefully constructed policy compromises and short circuit the 
µQRUPDO¶SROLF\VW\OH-RUGDQDQG5LFKDUGVRQS(DFKIHDWXUHRIWKH
system as identified by Jordan and Richardson is discussed. 
 
Sectorisation 
 
Sectorisation is the establishment of specialisms within government, of 
discrete policy areas. This has the advantage of limiting the necessary range of 
expertise that particular departments and policy communities need to have by 
rendering certain consequences of policy choices as irrelevant to its particular 
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concern. A consequence of this sectorisation for Jordan and Richardson is that 
ministers become spokesmen and women for their departments and are 
H[SHFWHG WR ILJKW IRU WKHLU GHSDUWPHQW¶V interests. Wilson (1977 quoted in 
Jordan and Richardson 1982) reports a view expressed to him by a civil 
VHUYDQWZLWKLQ0$))DV µ7KHGXW\RI0$)) LV WRSUHVHQW WKHDUJXPHQWV IRU
help for farming. Other Ministers will soon bring forth criticism based on trade 
SROLF\ RU LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU SXEOLF H[SHQGLWXUH¶ -RUGDQ DQG 5LFKDUGVRQ 
p.82).  
 
Clientalism 
 
With sectorisation resulting in departments being in competition with one 
another, Jordan and Richardson see the development of clientalistic 
relationships between departments and particular interest groups. The former 
Head of the Home Civil Service, Robert Armstrong dates this development to 
WKH 6HFRQG :RUOG :DU µ, VXSSRVH WKH EHVW NQRZQ H[DPSOH RI WKLV LV WKH
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, whose sponsorship of the farming 
and fisheries is so powerful, close and persuasive that they have frequently 
appeared to other departments, such as the Treasury, as the official spokesman 
IRU WKHVH LQGXVWULHV LQ WKHFRXQVHOVRI:KLWHKDOO¶ $UPVWURQJ quoted in 
Jordan and Richardson 1982, p. 85). For Jordan and Richardson, this means 
WKDW IDU IURPEHLQJXQGHUSUHVVXUH IURPLQWHUHVWJURXSVDGHSDUWPHQW µ>:@LOO
LWVHOI DWWHPSW WR PRELOLVH DFWLYLW\ E\ JURXSV¶ -RUGDQ DQG 5LFKDUGVRQ 
p.85). 
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Consultation and Negotiation 
 
The third feature of the British policy style identified by Jordan and 
5LFKDUGVRQ LV WKDW RI FRQVXOWDWLRQ DQG QHJRWLDWLRQ )RU WKHP µ&RQVXOWDWLRQ
DSSHDUVWRKDYHEHFRPHWKHEXUHDXFUDWLFQRUPPRUHVRWKDQLQRWKHUFRXQWULHV¶
(Jordan and Richardson 1982, p.85). They give a cultural bias seeing decisions 
as being legitimated by consultation and a functional necessity as the reasons 
why the British policy style was so characterised by consultation. It is this 
aspect of the policy style that renders the British system resistant to radical 
policy changes. They note the attempts by the Heath government to move 
towards a more anticipatory, information-based, perhaps today we would say 
evidence-based, method of decision-making and observe that it ran contrary to 
µ>7@KH VWURQJ WUDGLWLRQ RI EDUJDLQLQJ DQG FRQVHQW¶ -RUGDQ DQG 5LFKDUGVRQ
1982, p. 86). Parallels could perhaps be made here with the present 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V DWWHPSWV WR XWLOLVH DQ HYLGHQFH-based policy-making style 
leading to the Prime Minister claiming to bear the scars on his back as a result 
of his attempts to get public service reforms implemented as he discovered that 
some of the prescriptions ran counter to this culture of negotiation and 
consultation.  
 
This aspect of consultation contULEXWHVWRWKHQRWLRQRIµLQVLGHU¶DQGµRXWVLGHU¶
groups within a policy network. Insider groups are automatically on any list of 
FRQVXOWHHVIRUDSDUWLFXODUGHSDUWPHQWµ(YHQZKHUHDFRQVXOWDWLRQH[HUFLVHLV
very broad, it is often the case that the departments have a very clear view of 
µZKR FRXQWV¶¶ -RUGDQ DQG 5LFKDUGVRQ  S 7KXV ZLWKLQ WKH
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DJULFXOWXUDOVSKHUHWKH1DWLRQDO)DUPHUV¶8QLRQ1)8LVDQH[DPSOHRIRQH
such insider group. Some groups can enjoy partial insider status. For example, 
alWKRXJK SUHYLRXVO\ DQ µRXWVLGHU¶ JURXS the Soil Association is now very 
much an insider group in the sub-sectoral network around organic food where 
it fulfils an important job for government by certifying most produce sold in 
this country as organic. However, in other areas of agricultural policy it retains 
its position as an outsider group whose policy positions are largely ignored 
(Toke and Marsh 2003).  
 
$QRWKHUFRQVHTXHQFHRIDFRQVXOWDWLYHSROLF\VW\OHLVWKDWµ7KHQHHGWRFRQVXOW
and negotiate with a specific set of groups concerned with each policy 
SUREOHP RI FRXUVH KDV D GLUHFW EHDULQJ RQ WKH QDWXUH RI SROLF\ RXWFRPHV¶
(Jordan and Richardson 1982, p. 92). The insider groups likely to be consulted 
are insider groups precisely because they are prepared to accept the prevailing 
consensus policy position. Thus policy change is likely to be gradual and 
incremental rather than radical or anticipatory. An anticipatory policy is likely 
to come up against the carefully negotiated position within the policy 
community negotiated over a period of time perhaps running into years. 
 
The institutionalisation and regularisation of compromise 
 
Jordan and Richardson see the committee as the outstanding feature of the 
British policy process. The use of committees is a way of creating the formal 
structures for institutionalising group contact with departments. In addition, it 
is also the favoured way of recruiting scientific expertise to be mobilised for 
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government policy. Such committees can be standing or ad hoc. Again, for 
Jordan and Richardson the effect of these committees is to minimise risk and 
conflict within the policy community (Jordan and Richardson 1982, p.93). This 
element of policy style has continued within animal health policy, with the 
England Implementation Group continuing this tradition. 
 
The development of exchange relationships 
 
For Jordan and Richardson, this means that the members of a policy 
community share a common language and a common interest in the avoidance 
of sudden policy changes. Differences between parties within the policy 
community are acknowledged but each actor is expected to take account of the 
important, vital requirements of others in working out their own position. 
Policy making becomes a largely professionalised process and debates are 
couched in similar language and arguments treated with seriousness only when 
expressed in the language of the community (Jordan and Richardson 1982, p. 
94). Once more, exchange relationships work to increase co-operation between 
actors and to minimise sudden policy changes. In policies with a scientific 
element, the professional scientists within the advisory framework can become 
GHIDFWRSROLF\PDNHUV$V-DVDQRIIDUJXHVµ,Q(XURSHVFLHQWLVWVDUHRIWHQWKH
effective policy-makers, since a recommendation by a scientific panel tends to 
GHFLGHWKHXOWLPDWHSROLF\RXWFRPH¶-DVDQRIIS 
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Discussion 
 
,QVXPPDU\ WKHQ WKH-RUGDQDQG5LFKDUGVRQYLHZRI WKHµROG¶%ULWLVKSROLF\
making style is that policy making is sectored, with a department having 
responsibility for a discrete policy area, clientalistic, and based on a tradition 
and assumption that influential groups will be negotiated with over policy and 
that consultation is the norm. While they do not state so explicitly, the Jordan 
and RichardsRQYLHZVXJJHVWVWKDWJRYHUQPHQWGHSDUWPHQWVFDQEHµFDSWXUHG¶
by a dominant interest within their policy sector. In the case of the MAFF 
policy community, the dominant actor is the NFU. 
 
The co-operative nature of the British policy style relying upon consultation 
and negotiation has been described by other writers. Writing about 
HQYLURQPHQWDO UHJXODWLRQ 9RJHO QRWHV WKDW µ%ULWLVK UHJXODWLRQ LV UHODtively 
LQIRUPDO DQG IOH[LEOH¶ 9RJHO  S ,Q DGGLWLRQ µ>7@KH UXOHV WKH\
[regulators] issue tend to be based on a consensus among engineers and 
scientists in both sectors [businHVVDQGJRYHUQPHQW@¶9RJHO, p. 24). One 
FRQVHTXHQFHRI WKLVFRQVHQVXDOVW\OH LV WKDWRQFHDJUHHG WKHµOLQH¶VKRXOGEH
held by all parties to the agreement. Jasanoff agrees, µ>7@KH WUDGLWLRQ RI
consensual decision making dictates that a united front should be presented 
EHKLQGGRFXPHQWVWKDWDUHIRUPDOO\µDJUHHG¶¶-DVDQRIIS 
 
However, American writers such as Vogel and Jasanoff also emphasise that 
civil servants anG H[SHUW DGYLVRUV DUH SURWHFWHG IURP SXEOLF VFUXWLQ\ µ>,@Q
Britain regulatory officials remain relatively insulated from both parliamentary 
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and jXGLFLDO VFUXWLQ\¶ 9RJHO , p.21). Both Vogel and Jasanoff compare 
the American practice with the British. Both find that the American system is 
PRUHFRQIOLFWXDODQGRSHQWRFKDOOHQJHLQWKHFRXUWVWKDQ%ULWDLQ¶VFRQVHQVXDO
style of policy making. This is especially the case in scientific debates 
surrounding questions of risk. Writing in the mid 1980s both Vogel and 
-DVDQRII VDZ DGYDQWDJHV LQ%ULWDLQ¶V FORVHG FRQVHQVXDOSROLF\PDNLQJ VW\OH
For Jasanoff (1986), the closed policy environment allowed scientists to 
HIIHFWLYHO\ µFORVH WKH ERRN¶ RQ VFLHQWLILF FRQWURYHUV\ 7KH FRQWURYHUV\ ZDV
resolved by means of negotiation and agreement rather than the establishment 
of some standard which could later be open to judicial challenge as was the 
American experience. Furthermore, the closed nature of the British system 
gave the public fewer reasons to challenge expert opinions. Writing at the time 
of the BSE crisis, Jasanoff (1997) contrasts the different bases of public trust in 
regulatory and expert decisions in the United States and Britain. In the United 
6WDWHV µ>7@UXVW LV UHSRVHG LQ IRUPDO SURFHVVHV VXFK DV UXOH-making and 
litigation, and in styles of reasoning that ensure the transparency and 
objectivity, if not the wisdom, of governmental decisions. In this policy 
environment, no expert or official can be counted on to exercise discretion 
honestly unless subjected to continual supervision and challHQJH¶ -DVDQRII
1997, p.228). By contrast, in Britain,  
 
µ>7@UXVW LV FUHDWHG WKURXJK HPERGLPHQW LQ WUXVWZRUWK\ SHRSOH«
0DQ\KDYHNQLJKWKRRGV«>DQG@7KHPRVWHPLQHQWDUHHOHYDWHGWR
the (unelected) House of Lords, where they are in a position to 
LQIOXHQFH VRPH RI WKH QDWLRQ¶V PRVW VLJQLILFDQW OHJDO DQG SROLF\
GHFLVLRQV« ,Q WKH %ULWLVK UHJXODWRU\ SURFHVV WKHQ SXEOLF
confidence in governmental advisers is secured through testing the 
reliability of persons rather than (primarily) the rationality of their 
YLHZV¶-DVDQRIIS- 228). 
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These features of the British policy making style can be argued to be 
PDQLIHVWDWLRQV RI ZKDW KDV EHHQ YDULRXVO\ FDOOHG µWUDGLWLRQDO SXEOLF
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶µSXEOLFVHFWRUHWKRV¶RUµSXEOLF VHUYLFHHWKRV¶'XQVLUH
SDUDSKUDVHV 6WHZDUW DQG :DOVK¶V  VL[ SULQFLSOHV RI WUDGLWLRQDO SXEOLF
administration.  
 
µ SXEOLF SURYLVLRQ RI D IXQFWLRQ LV PRUH HTXLWDEOH UHOLDEOH DQG
democratic than provision by a commercial or voluntary body; 
2. where a ministry or other public authority is responsible for a 
function, it normally carries out that function itself with its own 
staff; 
3. where a public body provides a service, it is provided uniformly 
to everyone within its jurisdiction; 
4. operations are controlled from the headquarters of the public 
body through a hierarchy of unbroken supervision; 
HPSOR\PHQWSUDFWLFHV«DUHVWDQGDUGLVHGWKURXJKRXWHDFKRIWKH
SXEOLFVHUYLFHV« 
6. accountability of public servants to the public is via elected 
reSUHVHQWDWLYHERGLHV¶'XQVLUHS 
 
For this discussion, the key points are numbers two and six. Services are 
SURYLGHG E\ WKH GHSDUWPHQW¶V RZQ VWDII DQG DFFRXQWDELOLW\ LV DORQJ WKH
bureaucratic hierarchy and finally to elected representatives. While this is 
clearly an idealised characterisation, particularly points three, four and five, it 
is not an unreasonable description of the public service ethos after the Second 
World War. The major change that occurred since then has been the increasing 
professionalization of government. More experts became drafted in to 
government departments, or rather, government departments employed directly 
more experts, including scientists and engineers. This is not to say that 
government never previously employed scieQWLVWV EHIRUH 0$))¶V &HQWUDO
Veterinary Laboratory, for example, dates from 1914, but it is to say that the 
supremacy of the generalist within the civil service came into question and that 
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the increasing numbers of professionals brought with it changes in working 
SUDFWLFHDQGFXOWXUH'XQOHDY\DQG2¶/HDU\ 
 
The consequence for the public service ethos of greater professionalisation is 
WKDWµin areas where expertise is important, issues are pulled out of the general 
political arena into the more privaWH SROLWLFV RI µSROLF\ FRPPXQLWLHV¶¶ +LOO
 S )RU 'XQOHDY\ DQG 2¶/HDU\ (1987, p.302) µ3URIHVVLRQDO
communities act as a key forum for developing and testing knowledge, setting 
standards, and policing the behaviour of individual policy makers and policy-
implementers.¶ This increasing professionalisation of government combined 
with the tradition of consultation and negotiation, contributes to expert groups 
being insulated from public accountability. It enables the expert, or group of 
experts, to become de facto policy makers free from professional conflict and 
scrutiny via the exclusion of outsider opinion. In addition, they are free from 
direct public scrutiny as a result of the doctrine that public servants are 
shielded from public scrutiny and are accountable only to representative 
bodies.  
 
%ULWDLQ¶V µROG¶ SROLF\ VW\OH LV EDVHG RQ LQVWLWXWLRQDO DUUDQJHPHQWV LQ ZKLFK
departments are responsible for particular policy areas. In the case of animal 
health, this was the responsibility of MAFF. MAFF employed its own staff, 
both administrative and scientific. Departments enjoyed close relationships 
with key players in their policy sphere and some have argued that departments 
could become captured by particular interest groups. MAFF, in particular, has 
been subjected to this charge. Policy making was consensual, with negotiation 
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between government and affected parties. Increasing professionalisation 
worked within that culture of consultation, and was shielded by notions of a 
public sector ethos from close scrutiny. The public was expected to trust the 
system because of the trustworthiness of those who headed it. In comparison 
with the United States policy making style, it was far less conflict laden. Yet, 
for all the conflict over regulation that characterises the American style, for 
9RJHOµon balance American workers, consumers, and investors are no better 
SURWHFWHGWKDQWKHLUFRXQWHUSDUWVLQ*UHDW%ULWDLQ¶9RJHOS,QVKRUW
the system was believed to work effectively. It is now time to consider the 
factors which placed this consensual system under pressure. 
 
SYSTEM UNDER CHALLENGE 
 
,Q WKLV VHFWLRQ WZR W\SHV RI SUHVVXUH XSRQ %ULWDLQ¶V SROLF\ PDNLQJ VW\OH DUH
considered. Firstly, political pressures are examined. Most importantly here is 
the desLUHRIWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHJRYHUQPHQWVRIWKHVDQGµVWRLQWURGXFH
market type reforms into the way the public service operated. These measures 
are collectively known as New Public Management (NPM). However, also 
LPSRUWDQWLV%ULWDLQ¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWh its European partners, and the pressure 
IRU FKDQJHV WR %ULWDLQ¶V SROLF\ VW\OH HPDQDWLQJ IURP WKH ((& LV H[DPLQHG
briefly.  
 
Secondly, animal health problems which caused difficulties for the MAFF-
centred policy network are examined. These problems are: the salmonella in 
eggs controversy of 1988, BSE and Foot and Mouth Disease. Each of these 
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GLVHDVHV UHYHDOHG VKRUWFRPLQJV LQ WKH 8.¶V PDQDJHPHQW RI DQLPDO KHDOWK
policy.  
Political pressures 
 
µ130OLNHPRVWDGPLQLVWUDWLYHODEHOVLVDORRVHWHUP¶+RRG, p.3). It is 
also rather difficult to obtain a consensus within the literature on its precise 
components. Dunsire (1999) sees NPM as an attempt to stand on their heads 
the six principles of traditional public administration discussed above. Hood 
(1991 and 1995) discusses NPM under seven headings, while Jordan (1994) 
makes little mention of NPM directly, but does discuss extensively two 
features of NPM; the expanded role for the private sector and the Next Steps 
$JHQFLHV:KDWGRHVVHHPFOHDULV WKDWµ130Ls emphatically not a uniquely 
%ULWLVKGHYHORSPHQW¶+RRGS,WPLJKWEHWKRXJKWWKDWWKLVFRXOGEH
H[SODLQHG E\ QRWLQJ WKDW LGHDV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH µ1HZ 5LJKW¶ HQMR\HG
international success at the time, but Hood (1994) offers convincing argument 
against this idea (Hood 1994 p. 101 ±102). However, in the case of Britain, the 
ideological preferences of the Thatcher governments of the 1980s clearly 
played a role in creating a political environment in which NPM ideas could 
flourish. Boden et al (2004) quote Ridley (1996) as finding that ideology 
played a role in NPM in Britain. 
 
In Britain, NPM can be seen to have a number of important characteristics. 
Firstly, there was WKH PRYH WR FUHDWH GHSDUWPHQWDO DJHQFLHV ,Q 0$))¶V
responsibility for animal health, the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) was 
first given agency status in 1990 and subsequently merged with the network of 
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regional diagnostic laboratories to produce the Veterinary Laboratories Agency 
(VLA) in 1995. At its creation, there was some concern within the regional 
laboratories that they would lose their traditional autonomy and would become 
swamped by CVL management practices. The Veterinary Medicines 
'LUHFWRUDWH 90' ZDV DQRWKHU HDUO\ DJHQF\ ZLWKLQ 0$))¶V UHPLW, also 
coming into being in 1990. Very closely related to the creation of agencies is 
the idea that certain services would be subjected to market testing. Thus 
privatisation, or the threat of privatisation hung over many civil servants. 
Thirdly, a more contractual basis of service provision was introduced. In 
MAFF, the Agricultural Development and Advisory Service (ADAS) was 
separated from the SVS in August 1990 and became an agency in 1991. ADAS 
carried out both research and advisory / consultative functions. The majority of 
ADAS was privatised in 1997, being sold to a management and employee 
buyout. Fourthly, management practices common in the private sector were 
imported into the public sector. This resulted in the removal of national pay 
rates with agencies negotiating with their staff VHSDUDWHO\IURPµFRUH¶0$))
Interestingly, the personnel who remained in core MAFF were mostly 
administrative staff. Scientific and technical functions were mostly transferred 
to the new agencies and given a measure of autonomy from MAFF central 
control. These features clearly overlap to some extent. Thus agencies were 
created in such a way that they had the potential at least to be transferred as 
viable businesses into the private sector. The most important aspects of NPM 
for animal health were the creation of agencies and the introduction of 
management ideas from the private sector, including a reliance on service level 
agreements and a focus on value for money.  
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Kjaer (2004) has identified six characteristics of NPM. These are the transfer 
of private sector management principles to the public sector, privatisation, 
DJHQFLILFDWLRQ FRPSHWLWLRQ GHFHQWUDOLVDWLRQ DQG FLWL]HQV¶ HPSRZHUPHQW
(DFK LVGLVFXVVHGEHORZZLWK WKHH[FHSWLRQRIFLWL]HQV¶HPSRZHUPHQWZKLFK
had little role in animal health policy at this time. 
 
The transfer of private sector management principles into the public sector is 
often referred to as a focus upon the three Es of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. Kjaer cites Rhodes (1997) as the originator of the term whereas 
Boden et al (2004) omit the reference to Rhodes. Economy can be seen simply 
as the desire to limit spending. On her election in 1979, Mrs. Thatcher, under 
the influence of Conservative Party intellectuals such as Keith Joseph, and 
independent New Right Think Tanks such as the Institute of Directors, was 
committed to the monetarist explanation of inflation associated with Milton 
Friedman and the Chicago School of economists. Part of the prescription of 
this group of thinkers was to reduce public spending. Thus the economy 
element of NPM appealed to the government. In addition, it fitted in well with 
KHUJHQHUDOLGHRORJLFDOFRPPLWPHQWWRFKDOOHQJHWKHµ%LJ6WDWH¶ 
 
Efficiency relates to the relationship between inputs and outputs. The greater 
the quantity of outputs for each unit of input, the greater the efficiency of the 
organisation. Within animal health, one way to become more efficient is to 
UHGXFHWKHH[WHQWRIDQ\UHDORUSHUFHLYHGµVODFN¶LQWKHV\VWHP6HUYLFHVFDQEH
rationalised, capacity can be reduced. Capacity was reduced in part by closing 
a number of Veterinary Investigation Centres (VICs), and placing recruitment 
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bans and limitations on those that remained. Within the Veterinary 
Laboratories Agency the quest for further efficiency savings continued. 
Services once offered at all regional laboratories such as blood biochemistry, 
became rationalised into a small number of laboratories serving a number of 
others. For blood biochemistry, for example, some labs became little more than 
posting services to those centres which retained their biochemistry 
departments. In general, the problem in animal health with seeking to improve 
efficiency by reducing capacity is that sudden events may cause overload in 
the system as the capacity has been reduced. For MAFF, the Foot and Mouth 
epidemic of 2001 can be seen as an example of such overload. NPM can 
therefore be seen as a rejection of an administrative design which favours the 
values of security and resilience highly, and the attendant capacity to continue 
in situations of worst case. Hood (1991, p.10 ± 15) characterises these values 
DV µODPEGD-W\SH YDOXHV¶ DQG FRPSDUHV WKHP ZLWK µVLJPD-W\SH YDOXHV¶ RI
leanness and efficiency which are the characteristics of the NPM approach to 
administrative design.  
 
µ(IIHFWLYHQHVV KDV DOZD\V EHHQ D GLIILFXOW FRQFHSW IRU SXEOLF RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶
(Boden et al, p.50). Public bodies do not, on the whole, operate at a profit, nor 
DUHWKHRYHUZKHOPLQJPDMRULW\H[SHFWHGWR,QSODFHRIDµERWWRPOLQH¶PHDVXUH
of effectiveness, NPM initiatives included assessing public organisations 
according to their performance measured against targets. In addition to 
organisational level targets, NPM reforms also introduced performance related 
pay for civil servants. This was based upon the established practice of each 
civil servant undergoing an annual review. Previously, so long as performance 
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was considered adequate, a civil servant would progress along their pay scale 
until they reached the top. Under performance related pay, the speed at which 
any particular civil servant would get to the top of their scale would become 
dependant upon their overall performance evaluation. Staff marked as 
µH[FHOOHQW¶ RU µER[ ¶ ZRXOG PRYH XS WKH VFDOH IDVWHU WKDQ WKRVH ZKRVH
performance was considered only satisfactory. 
 
Privatisation 
 
Private sector management practices were thus introduced into the public 
sector. Targets, performance measures, and an emphasis upon economy were 
intended to introduce the perceived benefits in terms of efficiency of the 
private sector into the public sector. However, this was not the sole 
manifestation of NPM. Privatisation was another assault upon the traditional 
public sector ethos. Perhaps more than any other measure that constituted the 
NPM agenda, privatisation is the element most obviously and closely 
associated in Britain with the ideological attack of the New Right on the idea 
RIWKHµELJVWDWH¶ 
 
The Thatcher government was an enthusiast for privatisations. British Gas, 
British Telecom, British Rail and other state owned companies were sold off 
E\PHDQVRIPDVVLYHVKDUH LVVXHV7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRPPLWPHQW WRD VKDUH
owning democracy was indicated by making a significant proportion of the 
shares available to individual investors with a low minimum investment 
required. The process came to be seen as a safe investment for individuals as 
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the offer price of the shares was below the market level. Prices rose, sometimes 
considerably, within hours of the launch enabling many people to obtain a 
significant cash windfall by selling their small stakes to institutional investors 
quickly. In addition, local government was required/encouraged to transfer 
services from directly run in-house providers to private companies running 
services under contract. This was common for refuse collection, and, by the 
PLG µV WKH WUDQVIHU RI FRXQFLO KRXVLQJ WR PDQDJHPHQW E\ +RXVLQJ
Associations was also starting to take off. This was in addition to the creation 
of a right of tenants to purchase their council house from the local authority at 
considerable discount. There was thus a great diversity of ways in which 
services could be privatised. Ashford (1993, p. 39) quotes Madsen Pirie as 
identifying forty different ways to effect privatisation. In the wider public 
sector, privatisation in its many guises served to increase the complexity of the 
state and to reduce the capacity of ministers to give a strategic steer to policy 
(Flinders 2005). Within the animal health policy arena, however, privatisation 
did not play a major role save for the privatisation of a significant section of 
ADAS. In animal health, the next subject, agencies, were much more 
important. 
 
Agencification 
 
In the NPM agenda, agencies could be seen as one of two things. Firstly, they 
could be a first step towards outright privatisation by serving to delineate a 
particular service from its wider departmental context, or, secondly, agencies 
could be seen as good in themselves offering greater autonomy from central 
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departmental control and thus the possibility of greater efficiency. It has been 
the second of WKHVH ZKLFK KDV EHHQ GRPLQDQW µ>%@\  WKHUH ZHUH 
DJHQFLHVHPSOR\LQJSHUFHQWRIWKHFLYLOVHUYLFH¶.MDHUSDQGE\
1998 138 agencies employing over 75% of civil servants (Boden et al 2004, 
p.55). Within animal health, two agencies were established in 1990 under the 
µ1H[W 6WHSV¶ SURJUDPPH 7KHVH ZHUH WKH 9HWHULQDU\ 0HGLFLQHV 'LUHFWRUDWH
(VMD) and the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL). CVL was merged in 
1995 with the network of regional laboratories known as Veterinary 
Investigation Centres (VIC) to form the Veterinary Laboratories Agency 
(VLA).  
 
Each agency is headed by a Chief Executive, accountable to a minister. Each 
agency operates under a framework of a document setting out its objectives 
and its performance targets. µ$JHQFLILFDtion means that implementation 
becomes more distinct from policy-PDNLQJ EHFDXVH WKH DJHQF\¶V H[SOLFLW
JXLGHOLQHV DUH WR LPSOHPHQW SROLF\ DOUHDG\ GHFLGHG E\ JRYHUQPHQW¶ .MDHU
2004, p. 28). Boden et al (2004) argue that agencies emerging from the Next 
Steps process were met with some resistance by the Treasury. The reason for 
this being that agencies were supposed to devolve down to Chief Executives 
VRPHIOH[LELOLW\RYHUSD\DQGFRQGLWLRQV7KLVFKDOOHQJHGWKH7UHDVXU\¶VORQJ
established control over pay anG H[SHQGLWXUH µWKH VRXUFH RI LWV DXWKRULW\ LQ
:KLWHKDOO¶ 7KDLQ DQG :ULJKW  TXRWHG LQ %RGHQ HW DO  S
However, central agency budgets continued to be set by the Treasury limiting 
the room available to agency Chief Executives to pay staff more than core 
departmental staff. In the VLA for example, working hours for regional 
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laboratory staff were reduced by one hour to 37 hours per week at the creation 
of the agency to bring these laboratories into line with CVL (Personal 
experience).  
Competition 
 
This element of the NPM programme was addressed in a number of ways. 
Privatisation is the obvious way, but also the creation of quasi-markets in the 
public sector, and by competitive tendering for private contractors to provide 
public services. Within animal health, there was little scope for direct 
competition. The nature of the work including its public health role, allied to 
the impossibility of charging economic rates for a number of tests offered little 
room for competition for services. However, the VLA was expected to 
compete with the private sector in small measure by bringing products to 
market, for example. In addition, profitable areas of diagnostic work such as 
blood biochemistry which could be mechanised to deal with large sample 
numbers, and bacterial growth media production had encouraged a small 
number of private providers into the marketplace. Faced with this competition, 
the VLA sought efficiency gains by concentrating its biochemistry, histology 
and media production in a smaller number of places to obtain economies of 
scale savings. 
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Decentralisation 
 
Kjaer distinguishes carefully between two types of decentralisation. In 
deconcentratation policy continues to be made at the centre, while 
implementation is devolved down. In devolution all authority is devolved 
downward. Kjaer states that NPM was mostly about devolution (Kjaer 2004, 
p.29). However, in Britain in the animal health field, deconcentratation has 
been more common. The VLA has been charged with implementing elements 
of animal health policy. However, its freedom to do this could be questioned. 
On the one hand, a number of disease surveillance programmes have been set 
centrally E\ 'HIUD DV WKH 9/$¶V PDLQ FXVWRPHU 9/$  S and local 
laboratories implement them in accordance with rigid protocols to comply with 
NAMAS accreditation. On the other hand, the necessary artistry in the 
diagnostic process, inevitably results in personal autonomy for individual 
Veterinary Investigation Officers to initiate a wide range of tests which incur a 
FRVWWRWKHDJHQF\¶VVXUYHLOODQFHEXGJHW 
 
,Q DGGLWLRQ WR WKH SUHVVXUHV IURP WKH 130 FULWLTXH RI %ULWDLQ¶V WUDGLWLRQDO
SROLF\ VW\OH LW LV ZRUWK QRWLQJ WKDW %ULWDLQ¶V FRQVHQVXDO DSSURDFK DOVR FDPH
XQGHU SUHVVXUH IURP %ULWDLQ¶V PHPEHUVKLS RI WKH ((& Vogel, writing about 
environmental regulation, notes that the American system of regulation with its 
emphasis on norms and upon an adversarial relationship between the regulator 
and the regulated had found support among consumer groups. In addition, this 
model also seems to be the model followed by the European Community.  
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µ>7@KH UXOHV DQG UHJXODWLRQV HPDQDWLQJ IURP WKH (XURSHDQ
Community over the last decade increasingly resemble those 
adopted by the United States in the early 1970s. Their standards are 
uQLIRUP UHODWLYHO\ VWULFW « 7KH\ KDYH EHHQ WKH VRXUFH RI
considerable tension between Britain and WKH &RPPXQLW\¶V RWKHU
members¶9RJHOS 
 
Writing about BSE, Gerodimos (2004, p. 924) also recognises the importance 
of the EU in British policy decisions.  
Summary 
 
%ULWDLQ¶VFRQVHQVXDOSROLF\VW\OHZDVVXEMHFWHGWRFRQVLGHUDEOHSUHVVXUHLQWKH
V DQG µV IURP &RQVHUYDWLYH JRYHUQPHQWV VHHNLQJ HIILFLHQF\
improvements that NPM offered, combined with an ideological preference for 
the private over the public sector. NPM measures had a significant impact in 
MAFF. The closure of a number of VICs served to reduce the capacity of the 
state to directly manage animal health. The drive for greater efficiency 
removed any surplus capacity in the system. Gerodimos, a critic of the changes 
represented by NPM, DUJXHV WKDW µ&RQVHFXWLYH %ULWLVK JRYHUQPHQWV KDYH
VRXJKW WR GLPLQLVK WKH FHQWUH¶V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU PDQDJLQJ SXEOLF SROLF\
without putting an effective mechanism in SODFH¶ *HURGLPRV  S 
However, he advocates transparency and open government and thus cannot be 
seen as a supporter of the old policy style either. These political changes alone 
cannot explain why the consensual model came to be replaced by a policy style 
based on a discourse of openness, transparency and stakeholder participation. 
 88 
3ROLF\ SUREOHPV FDVWLQJ GRXEW RQ WKH V\VWHP¶V DELOLW\ WR KDQGOH FKDOOHQJH
also played a considerable, indeed decisive role. It is to these problems that 
attention now turns. 
 
POLICY PROBLEMS 
 
Three policy problems in animal health are considered. Each contributed, in 
part, to undermining the consensual policy style within animal health and 
contributed to the changed institutional architecture and tone of the policy 
documents that are the subject of the next chapter. These problems were: 
salmonella in eggs, BSE and FMD. 
 
Salmonella in eggs 
 
In chapter one it was shown how the agricultural policy community came into 
being and how it was able to subsume the separate food policy community 
under the institutional arrangements of MAFF in the immediate post war drive 
for increased food production. For Smith (1991), the 1988 policy problem of 
salmonella in eggs represents evidence showing that the post war consensus 
over food policy had fractured. Smith argues that food became a political issue, 
and that the policy network around food changed from a policy community to 
an issue network (Smith 1991, p.235). If Smith is correct in this argument, 
important consequences follow. The very close association between 
agricultural and food policy means that actors outside the agricultural policy 
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community gain freedom by virtue of their position in an issue network to 
criticise agricultural policy. Neither food nor agricultural policy networks can 
completely isolate themselves from each other; the connection inevitably is too 
close. The consequence of this for the position of science in debate is that it 
must surely become harder for the agricultural policy community to be 
immune from scientific criticism from outside, when actors within the food 
issue network have resources to publicise scientific opinion which may differ 
IURP WKH µRIILFLDO¶ SRVLWLRQ RQ WKH VFLHQFH HPDQDWLng from the agricultural 
policy community.  
 
The political problems from salmonella in eggs emerged in 1988. Yet, the fact 
of salmonella LQ%ULWDLQ¶VSRXOWU\LQGXVWU\ZDVNQRZQPXFKHDUOLHUWKDQWKLV
MAFF and the Department of Health found that 80% of frozen chickens 
contained salmonella in 1980, and the Lancet reported that salmonella 
enteritidis cases had risen from 1,087 in 1981 to 6,858 by 1987 (Smith 1991, p. 
240). The view of the agricultural policy community, according to Smith, was 
that salmonella in chickens was inevitable and that it was the duty of the 
consumer to minimise the possibility of human infection rather than farmers or 
the government (Smith 1991, p. 241). Smith does not say why this was the 
view of the policy community, but it is likely that they knew that the 
conditions in which both broiler and laying chickens were kept rendered the 
birds susceptible to a number of diseases including salmonellosis that would 
spread rapidly through the farm. 
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Because salmonella was not just an animal health policy problem, MAFF did 
not enjoy unchallenged supremacy in dealing with it. The public health 
implications of salmonella in eggs meant that the Department of Health was 
also an important institutional actor. Smith (1991) reported that John 
MacGregor, then Minister for Agriculture, was aware of a growing problem 
with salmonella DQG HJJV E\  +RZHYHU µ[B]etween 1987 and 1988 
discussion of the problem was limited to the policy community as MAFF and 
'R+DWWHPSWHGWRGHWHUPLQHWKHH[WHQWRIWKHSUREOHP¶6PLWKS 
Thus, with clear similarities with WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DSSURDFK WR
communicating the risks of BSE to the public, the agricultural policy 
community attempted to keep discussion within itself until science had 
provided hard evidence of a link between salmonella infection and eggs. 
)XUWKHUPRUHµ7KH\>WKHSROLF\FRPPXQLW\@GLGQRWEHOLHYHLWnecessary to take 
SUHFDXWLRQV ZKLOVW HYLGHQFH ZDV JDWKHUHG¶ 6PLWK  S 2QFH D OLQN
was apparent by May 1988, the question of what information to issue to the 
public inevitably arose. Smith (1991) noted a number of meetings between the 
two ministries and representatives of the egg industry, the NFU and the British 
Egg Industry Council (BEIC), through the summer of 1988. It was not until 
November 1988 that a press release warning the general public of the potential 
dangers posed by eggs was issued. µ7KHVWUDWHJ\RIWKHFRPPXQLW\ZDVWRWU\
to retain the information and the control of the issue within their own 
QHWZRUN«7KH\WKXVGLVFXVVHGZKDW LQIRUPDWLRQVKRXOGEHUHOHDVHGZLWKWKH
producers ± the NFU and the BEIC ± who saw the advice before it was made 
SXEOLF¶6PLWKS 
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The agricultural SROLF\FRPPXQLW\¶VDWWHPSWVWRUHWDLQFRQWURORIWKHLVVXHDQG
to keep it out of the political arena were fatally wounded on 3 December 1988 
when the junior minister at the DoH, Edwina Currie, in response to an 
invitation by a journalist to comment on the increasing incidence of 
salmonella, stated (correctly according to van Zwanenberg and Millstone 
2005, p.66) that the majority of egg production in Britain was contaminated 
with salmonella. This statement was the culmination of conflicts that had been 
growing between the DoH and MAFF through the summer of 1988 (Smith 
1991). Smith argues that the DoH considered that MAFF was too protective of 
producer interests and had succeeded both in delaying and toning down the 
SXEOLFZDUQLQJLQUHVSHFWRIHJJV6PLWKS0UV&XUULH¶VVWDWHPHQW
brought into the public arena debates which hitherto had been retained within 
the policy community. Farming interests responded both with a defence of the 
safety of eggs, and with demands that Mrs. Currie be obliged to resign. Within 
two weeks the resignation was obtained, both Smith (1991, p.244) and van 
Zwanenberg and Millstone (2005, p.66) citing threats by the NFU to take legal 
action against the DoH for loss of revenue as part of the reason for the forced 
UHVLJQDWLRQ &XUULH¶V FODLP DERXW WKH salmonella status of British egg 
production was not challenged, she did not after all claim that most eggs were 
infected with salmonella, but her words, though accurate, were taken to imply 
this and egg sales dropped significantly. Mrs. Currie must surely go down in 
history as one of a very small number of ministers who have resigned for 
telling the truth. 
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Smith argues that to see her resignation as evidence of the power of the 
IDUPHUV¶OREE\ZRXOGEHDPLVWDNH6PLWKS+HVHHVWKHIDFWWKDW
the issue became political at all, in the sense of generating public controversy, 
as a sign of the weakness of WKHIDUPHUV¶OREE\0$))VDZVDOPRQHOOD as an 
industry problem, the 'R+DVDSUREOHPRISXEOLFKHDOWK µ&RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH
community no longer had a shared world view and the issue became political 
DVD UHVXOWRI WKLV LQWHUGHSDUWPHQWDOFRQIOLFW¶ 6PLWKS1RUZHUH
farming interests successful in preventing new regulation. A number of 
measures, including a Food Safety Act, were introduced soon after Mrs. 
&XUULH¶VUHVLJQDWLRQWRGHDOZLWKWKHSUREOHP6HYHUDOIDFWRUVFRXOGEHFLWHGWR
explain the decline in the power of the farmers such as a greater interest in 
heDOWK\HDWLQJDQG%ULWDLQ¶VPHPEHUVKLSRIWKH(8+RZHYHU6PLWKVHHVWKH
rising power of the retail sector, especially supermarkets as particularly 
LPSRUWDQW+HVHHVUHWDLOHUVµ>$@SSHDOLQJLQFUHDVLQJO\WRFXVWRPHUVDQGKDYH
used their position to challenge the policy community on behalf of the 
FRQVXPHU¶6PLWKS(VVHQWLDOO\ZKDW6PLWKLVVD\LQJKHUHLV WKDW
supermarkets have been able to force themselves into the policy community 
and control sufficient resources so as to be able to challenge the previously 
dominant position of the NFU representing the interests of producers.  
 
)URP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI %ULWDLQ¶V SROLF\ VW\OH WKH salmonella in eggs story 
may be as important as BSE. The policy community tried to keep the issue 
within its own confines, science was deployed to examine the risks but, 
crucially, there was reluctance to issue guidelines of a precautionary nature 
while the evidence was being gathered. It marked the end of the consensus 
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around the idea that production was more important than other considerations 
in agriculture, and saw the fracturing of the unity between the agriculture and 
food policy networks. The conservative use of science, and the insistence that 
food was safe to eat until proven otherwise was also to be seen in the next 
case, that of BSE. 
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is one of a class of diseases known 
as Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs). TSEs are invariably 
fatal diseases affecting the brain. Spongiform refers to the characteristic 
spongy holes that can be observed in stained histopathalogical preparations of 
infected brain tissue. In general, TSEs are not new diseases. Scrapie in sheep 
and goats has been known to exist for some two hundred years in the UK. 
TSEs have also been found in farmed mink, first identified in 1947 in the US 
(Phillips 2000, Volume 2, para. 2.16), and in deer. In humans, TSEs include 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), Kuru, Fatal Familial Insomnia (FFI), and 
Gerstmann-Sträussler Syndrome (GSS). Kuru is a disease which affected tribes 
in Papua New Guinea which practised cannibalism on the dead as a mark of 
respect. As that practice declined within the tribes, so did the incidence of 
Kuru. GSS is a very rare disease affecting movement and speech, progressing 
to dementia. FFI is an inherited disorder. Interestingly, discoveries in these two 
diseases followed the identification of BSE in cattle. The most common, 
though still rare, and best understood human TSE  is CJD. By 1986, three 
forms of the disease had been identified (Phillips 2000, Volume 2, para. 2.22); 
sporadic, that is, randomly occurring, familial, and iatrogenic (as a 
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consequence of medical intervention, for example, treatment with infected 
human growth hormone). Of these three forms sporadic was the most common, 
and iatrogenic the rarest with only 40 cases worldwide by 1986 (Phillips 2000, 
Volume 2, para. 2.25). 
 
The first case of BSE in the UK was confirmed in March 1987, although Carol 
Richardson, a veterinary pathologist at the M$))¶V Central Veterinary 
Laboratory (CVL), had identified a Spongiform Encephalopathy in the brain of 
one of the dead cows in September 1985 (Rowell 2003, p. 21). Earlier, in late 
1984, vets had been called to a farm in West Sussex to investigate an unusual 
set of symptoms in cows. The delay in obtaining a definitive diagnosis from 
the onset of symptoms in late 1984 to the final confirmation of BSE in March 
1987 seems a long time. Yet, can we really be surprised at the delay? Faced 
with a disease situation, the natural reaction of both doctors and vets is to try to 
ILW LW LQWR WKHLU H[LVWLQJ IUDPHV RI UHIHUHQFH 7KLV ILWV LQ QLFHO\ ZLWK .XKQ¶V
(1970) description of the workings of science during periods RI µQRUPDO
science.¶  
 
Once BSE became recognised, MAFF vets and scientists were able to 
successfully routinise its diagnosis. These routines became steadily more 
efficient. Originally, the whole brain of the suspect animal needed to be 
UHPRYHGLQRQHRI0$))¶V9HWHULQDU\,QYHVWLJDWLRQ&HQWUHV9,&VSODced in 
formalin and transported to CVL for histopathalogical examination. This was a 
physically difficult and time consuming process. Later it was discovered that 
diagnosis required only the brain stem of the animal, allowing the use of an 
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instrument to remove the brain stem, rather than having to saw through adult 
bovine skull. This was a significant advantage, particularly following Stephen 
'RUUHOO¶VDQQRXQFHPHQWWKDW%6(FRXOGSRVHDWKUHDWWRKXPDQKHDOWKDV
aerosol creation from sawing through bone was eliminated. Histopathology 
was also devolved out from CVL to VICs, with state vets employed as 
Veterinary Investigation Officers (VIOs) from the VICs being trained at the 
CVL in recognising the typical lesions in stained brain preparations. As the 
disease became routinised, the identification of the typical lesions at 
histopathology was a task that became well within the grasp of a trained 
laboratory technician, although final diagnosis was always left to the VIO. 
Down on the farm, clinical diagnosis became easier with familiarity. The 
symptoms which had puzzled vets back in 1984, head tremors, aggression even 
from usually docile cows, and staggering and loss of co-ordination, became 
recognised as the typical symptoms of a BSE case. Farmers too became expert 
at the recognition of the symptoms of BSE in the live animal. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a few farmers benefited once 100% compensation was 
introduced for infected animals by buying suspect animals from other farmers 
who wished to retain BSE free status at discount prices and then claiming the 
market rate in compensation once the disease was confirmed.   
 
The precise cause of BSE was, and remains, a matter for debate. The early 
favourite, that BSE was scrapie which had passed directly into bovines was 
rejected by epidemiological evidence (Phillips 2000, Volume 2 para. 3.16). 
The focus then shifted to the infection of cattle by scrapie via scrapie 
contaminated Meat and Bone Meal (MBM). A similar TSE in wildlife park 
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animals added evidence to MBM being the vector of infection in cattle 
(Phillips 2000, Volume 2, para. 3.19). While it became accepted that MBM 
was the vector of infection, BSE as scrapie in cattle has been questioned due to 
differences between the two TSEs in terms of host range, transmission 
properties and pathogenesis (Phillips 2000, Volume 2, paras. 3.49 to 3.61 for 
detailed discussion). So far as the possibility of transmission to humans was 
concerned, this was regarded as remote. Lord Phillips wrote: 
 
µ7KH IDFW WKDW VFUDSLHGRHVQot affect humans was relied upon by 
officials in their risk assessment from 1988 right up until March 
1996, despite events in 1989 and 1990 which seriously questioned 
WKHVFUDSLHRULJLQWKHRU\¶3KLOOLSV9ROSDUD 
 
The aetiology of BSE and its potential for infection of humans were, and 
remain somewhat uncertain. Policy makers were therefore operating in a 
situation in which the scientific knowledge was unknown. Barker and Peters 
(1993, p. 2) writing about health policy, devised a six-tier schema based upon 
the level of difficulty in understanding for the non-expert policy maker. These 
range from areas amenable to non-expert understanding and study, to those 
requiring some expert training, through to those where either there are 
competing scientific views on offer or where the question is scientifically 
XQNQRZQ,QWKH%DUNHUDQG3HWHUV¶VFKHPD%6(LVFOHDUO\DW\SHvi policy case 
LQWKDWOLWWOHZDVNQRZQDERXWWKHGLVHDVH,QVXFKFDVHVµ$Q\SROLF\EDVHGRQ
some particular view or guess as to the facts of the matter would be 
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VSHFXODWLYH¶%DUNHUDQG3HWHUVS7KLVZDVFHUWDLQO\WKHFDVHZKHQ
policy makers were faced with the challenge of BSE. 
 
The *RYHUQPHQW¶V UHVSRQVHZKHQIDFHGZLWK%6(ZDV WRVHWXSDQDGYLVRU\
committee chaired by Lord Southwood. This was established by the Chief 
Medical Officer, Donald Acheson, as a joint committee of MAFF and the 
Department of Health (DH) in April 1988 and was to examine the implications 
of BSE for both animal and human health.  Southwood was a Professor of 
Zoology at Oxford University; he was not an expert in farming, human health 
or TSEs. Rowell (2003, pp. 32 ± 36) criticises the failure to appoint Alan 
Dickinson to the committee, or to ask him to give evidence to it. Dickinson, in 
contrast to Southwood, was an acknowledged expert in scrapie. However, the 
appointment of Southwood to chair the Advisory Committee does reveal 
something significant about British use of expert opinion; that trust is vested in 
the people rather than in a rules-based approach (Jasanoff 1997 quoted earlier, 
p.32). ,QWKH8.WKH86¶VDGYHUVDULDOSROLF\FXOWXUHLVUHMHFWHGLQIDYRXURID
culture of consensus, and largely private deliberations. For Jasanoff, the UK 
DSSURDFKLVHVVHQWLDOO\WKDWEHFDXVHWKHµULJKW¶SHRSOHKave been appointed to 
the committee its conclusions are seen as deserving of public support and 
µ)RUPDO MXVWLILFDWLRQ RI LWV UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV WKHQ VHHPV XQFDOOHG IRU¶
(Jasanoff 1997, p. 228). This relationship between expert bodies and public 
trust in their recommendations was to break down when Stephen Dorrell 
announced in March 1996 that BSE was the most likely cause of new variant 
&-' LQKXPDQV -DVDQRII FDOOV WKLV ORVVRI WUXVW LQJRYHUQPHQW H[SHUWV µFLYLF
GLVORFDWLRQ¶-DVDQRIIS
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The policy response by government to BSE was guided by the advice it 
received from the Southwood Committee and its two successors, the Tyrell 
Committee and the permanent Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory 
Committee (SEAC) established in April 1990 originally under the 
chairmanship of David Tyrell and still operational today. The government was 
keen to be seen to act on the basis of available scientific advice. Indeed, 
µUHOLDQFH RQ VFLHQWLILF HYLGHQFH KDV EHHQ D IHDWXUH RI WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V
PDQDJHPHQWRIWKHFULVLV¶Winter 1996, p. 553). 
 
What, then, were the actions taken by the government in response to BSE? 
µ>7@KHLVVXHZDVZLGHO\GLVFXVVHGZLWKLQJRYHUQPHQW«>DQG@3HUKDSVPRUH
important, policy development was primarily influenced initially by the 
conviction thaW LWZDVDQDQLPDOKHDOWKSUREOHP¶*UHHUS*LYHQ
WKLVIUDPLQJRIWKHSUREOHPµ>7@KHWKUHDWWRWKHOLYHVWRFNLQGXVWU\WKHGHVLUHWR
provide reassurance to the general public about the safety of British beef and 
an unwillingness to increase public expenditure were also key influences on 
SROLF\ IRUPXODWLRQ¶ *UHHU  p. 600). Another consequence of framing 
BSE as an animal health problem, and from the belief that BSE was derived 
from scrapie, was that BSE was unlikely to have serious implications for 
human health. This view was reinforced by the Southwood Report published in 
February 1989 (Department of Health 1989). 
 
Early action taken by government was therefore consistent with the framing of 
the problem in terms of animal health. In June 1988 BSE became a notifiable 
disease which required vets and farmers to inform MAFF if they suspected the 
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disease on their farm. In July 1988 the decision was taken to slaughter affected 
cattle and a ban on MBM from ruminant sources came into force. The ban on 
MBM reflected the then view that BSE had infected cattle via MBM. 
However, the decision to introduce slaughter of affected cattle was, in 
hindsight, handled badly. Initially, in August 1988, compensation levels were 
VHWDWRQO\RIWKHDQLPDO¶VYDOXH if it proved positive. Full compensation 
was only given in the event of the tests proving negative. This decision has 
been criticLVHGDV µ7KH PRVW VHULRXV HUURU¶ *UDQWS  ,Q DGGLWLRQ
µ7KHUH FDQ EH OLWWOH GRXEW WKDW WKH ORZ UDWH RI FRPSHQVDWLon provided an 
incentive to less scrupulous farmers to conceal the disease by marketing 
suspect animals at an early stage before the symptoms of the disease were 
LPPHGLDWHO\REYLRXV¶:LQWHUS0DQ\VXFKDQLPDOVZRXOGKDYH
found their way into the human food chain in this manner, increasing human 
H[SRVXUH WR LQIHFWHG IRRG$JDLQ KRZHYHU0$))¶V IUDPLQJRI WKHSUREOHP
explains the decision. As Winter points out, 100% compensation is not 
automatically available for culls for other notifiable diseases such as 
brucellosis and tuberculosis (Winter 1996, p. 552). Although clearly a mistake, 
given the framing of the problem as one of animal health alone, the action is 
understandable. Full compensation became available in February 1990 and the 
number of confirmed cases continued to rise until 1992, the peak year for 
diagnoses (Defra 2004e). 
 
Although the prevailing view was that BSE posed no risk to human health, the 
Southwood Committee recognised that if it SURYHG WR EH LQFRUUHFW µWKH
implications would EHH[WUHPHO\VHULRXV¶3KLOOLSV9ROume 4, p. 36). This 
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uncertainty led to a number of measures intended to remove infected material 
from the human food chain. In addition to the slaughter policy described 
above, specified bovine offals (SBOs) were banned from the food chain from 
cattle over six months old. SBOs were those offals such as thymus, spleen and 
spinal cord thought to pose the greatest (theoretical) risk of infectivity. By 
1990, the problem had acquired a European dimension. In March of that year 
the Commission restricted the export of cattle from the UK to those under six 
months old, and in April, the disease was made notifiable to the European 
Commission. Fears about the possibility of human infection refused to go 
away. Humberside Council withdrew British beef from its school menus in 
April 1990 (Phillips 2000 Volume 1, para. 648). Also in the early 1990s, the 
BSE agent was found in domestic cats (Phillips 2000 Volume 1, para. 649), 
and there was an increase in the number of cases of CJD in farmers and young 
people. While the increase in CJD cases may in part be explained by doctors 
looking more for the disease, public concern was heightened. The policy 
response was to tighten up the controls on the use of bovine offals. In June 
1994 the ban on the use of thymus and intestines was extended to cover 
animals under six months of age. 
 
However, in March 1996, Stephen Dorrell announced to the House of 
Commons that the most likely cause of the new variant CJD was exposure to 
BSE infected bovine materials before the ban on the use of offals in 1989. 
8QGHUSUHVVXUHIURPWKH(8WKHJRYHUQPHQWLQWURGXFHGWKHµRYHUWKLUW\PRQWK
FXOO VFKHPH¶ 2706 LQ 0D\  7KH LGHD ZDV WR UHPRYH ROGHU FDWWOH
thought to pose the greatest risk to human health from the food chain and thus 
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to restore public confidence in British beef. The EU meanwhile had taken 
stronger measures, banning all export from Britain of beef products to other 
member states on 27 March 1996. 
 
Foot and mouth disease 
 
In contrast with BSE, FMD has been long understood. Also in contrast with 
BSE, FMD poses no threat, real or theoretical, to human health. It is an animal 
health problem, and an economic problem for the farming industry. The 2001 
epidemic was the first major outbreak in the UK since 1967. 
 
FMD is a viral disease of cloven footed animals, cattle, sheep, goats, and pigs. 
The initial presentation is pyrexia, followed by blistering on the feet and/or 
mouth. Symptoms are easily spotted in pigs and cattle, but are much more 
subtle in sheep. Mortality is low, although animals can become lame, suffer a 
loss of milk yield and loss of condition significantly reducing their market 
value. Infected but recovered animals can continue to act as reservoirs of 
infection. The virus is highly infectious by contact with an infected animal, or 
by aerosol contamination. Being a viral infection, antibiotic therapy is useless. 
Before the 2001 outbreak, experience of the disease among veterinary surgeons 
was limited. As the last major outbreak had occurred in 1967, vets younger 
than their mid-fifties would have been most unlikely to have seen a case in a 
farm setting. 
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Again, unlike with BSE, measures for controlling FMD were well established 
in 2001. That policy was essentially to slaughter all FMD affected animals and 
their contacts. This has been the favoured approach in the UK since the 1920s. 
In mainland Europe vaccination was a tool used as a control measure or to 
throw a ring around an outbreak. This strategy was rejected for the UK 
following a report into an outbreak in 1951 ± 52, where vaccination was 
seriously argued for. However, leading vets and farming leaders united to 
reject these calls (Woods 2004b, p.534) and the post-epidemic report 
concluded that slaughter remained the right option for the UK (Anderson 2002, 
p. 22).  
 
A subsequent serious epidemic of FMD occurred between October 1967 and 
June 1968 GXULQJZKLFK WKHUHZHUHRXWEUHDNV$W WKHHSLGHPLF¶VSHDN
MAFF vets were seeing up to eighty new cases each day (Woods 2004b, 
p.536). The 1967 ± 68 epidemic was overwhelmingly centred on the north-
west midlands and north Wales. However, unlike the 1951-52 case, public 
demands for vaccination and outcry against the policy of slaughter did not take 
place. Within MAFF vaccination was being taken seriously as an option by 
vets as concern grew that slaughter may not succeed in bringing the disease 
under control. MAFF, in the person of minister, Fred Peart, was careful to 
emphasise that this would be only as a last resort and that anyway they 
continued to believe that slaughter remained the best policy (Woods 2004a, 
p.117). In the event vaccination was not required and MAFF remained largely 
opposed to vaccination. In the 2001 outbreak, debates again raged in public 
DERXWWKHFRUUHFWQHVVRIWKHµQRYDFFLQDWLRQ¶SROLF\ 
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The 2001 outbreak of FMD began in February 2001 with identification and 
confirmation of FMD in pigs and cattle from an abattoir in Brentwood, Essex 
(Bickerstaff and Simmons 2004, p. 397). Essex was not the origin point of the 
disease, however. Investigations revealed the source of the outbreak to be a pig 
farm in Northumberland, infection having apparently been contracted from 
some contaminated swill (Woods 2004a, p.138). Exports of animals were 
banned within twenty-four hours of the confirmation of the disease on 20 
February, but a national restriction on animal movements did not take place 
until the twenty-third (Bickerstaff and Simmons 2004, p. 397). By the time 
these control measures had been implemented, the disease had already spread 
to at least 57 farms (Anderson 2002) via livestock movements through markets 
and dealers with sheep a common vector of the infection. The fact that sheep 
acted as the vector of infection helps explain why the disease spread so far 
before appropriate control measures were put in place as symptoms are far less 
obvious in sheep than in other species.  
 
:LWK WKH GLVHDVH FRQILUPHG 0$))¶V SODQ VZXQJ LQWR DFWLRQ DQG DQLPDOV
began to be slaughtered to control the disease. However, in this early phase of 
the disease, all did not run smoothly. Animals on infected premises were 
supposed to be killed within 24 hours yet this was often not adhered to. 
)XUWKHUPRUH WKHUH ZDV µ>$@Q XQZLOOLQJQHVV WR LQLWLDWH DGGLWLRQDO FXOOLQJ
policies that would have halted the disease earlier LQ WKH FDPSDLJQ¶
(McConnell and Stark 2002, p. 665). One reason for this was the need to have 
each case confirmed at the Pirbright laboratory, a process which took several 
days contributing to delay in having animals slaughtered. MAFF had other 
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problems. Firstly, there was a shortage of vets as NPM inspired reforms had 
resulted in a 50% reduction in the State Veterinary Service over the previous 
WZHQW\ \HDUVDQG0$))¶VGDWDEDVHRI IDUPVZDV IRXQG WREH LQDFFXUDWHDQG
out of date (Woods 2004a, p.138).  
 
These problems provoked a strong reaction by policy makers, labelled as 
µRYHUNLOO¶E\0F&RQQHOODQG6WDUNSBy mid March MAFF had 
instructed its vets to slaughter on suspicion. This resulted in a huge rise in the 
QXPEHU RI FDVHV GLDJQRVHG DV µ,Qexperienced veterinarians, who feared the 
consequences should they misdiagnose FMD, began to see the disease 
HYHU\ZKHUH¶ :RRGV D S $OVR E\ PLG 0DUFK the Prime Minister 
assumed control of the crisis in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (McConnell 
and Stark 2002, p. 665), effectively removing MAFF as the lead department in 
handling the FMD epidemicµ)URPODWH0DUFKWKH0LQLVWU\HIIHFWLYHO\
FHDVHGWRPDNHSROLF\,WVUROHZDVWRGHOLYHULW¶7D\ORUS&XOOLQJ
was stepped up and a policy of contiguous culling, that is the culling of 
animals on farms within 3km of an infected premises, introduced. Troops were 
employed to provide logistical help with the culling strategy.  
 
This policy followed from the JRYHUQPHQW¶Vreliance on a model of the disease 
developed by a team of epidemiologists at Imperial College. This model made 
no allowance for local topography (Bickerstaff and Simmons 2004) and was 
XVHG E\ JRYHUQPHQW LQ SUHIHUHQFH WR LWV RZQ HSLGHPLRORJLVWV¶ PRGHO
developed by John Wilesmith at the CVL which did seek to account for local 
variances. The policy of contiguous culling, and the vast funeral pyres that it 
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created led to much public disquiet and debate about the merits of vaccination 
as an alternative control policy. In addition, the effective closure of the 
countryside was hitting the tourist industry hard in heavily affected areas such 
as Cumbria. Both Taylor, and McConnell and Stark assert that by this stage the 
government had accepted the case for vaccination, but that this policy was 
rejected because of the objections of the National Farmers¶ Union (NFU). 
Woods (2004a) also states that opposition to vaccination remained the policy 
of MAFF who were unwilling to act without NFU support for vaccination.  
 
The vaccination debate was complex. Those opposed to it, such as MAFF and 
the NFU, argued that if Britain vaccinated then the resumption of the export 
trade would be delayed as a consequence of Organisation Mondiale de la Santé 
Animale (OIE) rules. However, supporters of vaccination argued that MAFF 
focussed its arguments on mass vaccination, ignoring the fact that EU laws 
permitted the use of so-FDOOHG µULQJ YDFFLQDWLRQ¶ D SROLF\ ZKLFK ZDV DOVR
recommended by the Northumberland Committee in 1968 following the 1967 
epidemic. Furthermore, it was argued, vaccination would remove the need to 
cull animals that were perfectly healthy and assist in opening up the 
countryside once more (Woods 2004a, p.143). Ultimately, the NFU position 
held the day and vaccination never occurred. 
 
Contributing to this decision was undoubtedly the fact that by the end of April 
the peak of new cases had been passed and, with a general election looming, 
the government moved to relax some controls on movement and to open up the 
countryside once more. In addition, by now vets had acquired better expertise 
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LQGLDJQRVLQJWKHGLVHDVH2QH&XPEULDQYHWUHPDUNLQJWKDWµ;D0$))YHW
UDUHO\JHWVLWZURQJ¶,QWHUYLHZ&XPEULDQYHW%&DVHVFRQWLQXHGWKURXJKRXW
the summer, but the General Election went ahead, delayed by a month from its 
likely date to 7 June. The last new case occurred as late as 30 September. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has identified the main features of the traditional British policy-
making style and analysed the reasons why this style came to be undermined. 
It was shown that both political factors and policy problems, running in 
parallel, contributed to an undermining of this style. The implementation of 
NPM reforms contributed to reducing 0$))¶VFDSDFLW\WRPDQDJHDFULVLV LQ
animal health. This was shown most clearly in the 2001 FMD epidemic. 
Membership of the EU, with its rules-based regulatory system, posed a 
challenge to the British way of consensus, compromise and negotiation. The 
salmonella in eggs episode represents the point at which the interests of the 
agriculture and food policy networks diverged. BSE, in particular, led to a loss 
of public trust in government pronouncements about the science in animal 
health. FMD, and the debates around vaccination and slaughter showed with 
great clarity that animal health breakdowns affected the livelihoods of more 
than just farmers, but the wider rural economy too. FMD also revealed MAFF 
as not equipped to deal any longer with a major challenge and was in need of 
reform. 
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The combined effect of these political and policy pressures was thus to reveal 
the institutional apparatus of policy-making for animal health to be inadequate 
for the task. The science was not trusted by the public and the strategies for 
dealing with animal health were not working. Changes in both policy and 
approach were urgently required. It is to these institutional and policy 
responses to this crisis that attention now turns. 
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Chapter 4: The New Settlement 
 
BSE and FMD were the most challenging, high profile and controversial 
animal health policy problems faced by MAFF in the last years of its existence. 
However, to conclude that these animal health problems alone were 
UHVSRQVLEOH IRU 0$))¶V VXEVHTXHQW GHPLVH ZRXOG EH WR RYHUVWDWH WKH FDVH
Running alongside concerns over the handling of animal health policy was a 
broader set of ideas about the changing nature of the countryside. These 
concerns reflected the declining importance of agriculture within the rural 
economy. So, while the management of the 2001 FMD outbreak was M$))¶V
last major act, to understand the creation of Defra it is important to identify the 
other policy concerns that were driving government toward institutional 
change, change which may have occurred anyway even without the FMD 
outbreak of 2001. It should be noted that Defra itself was not, initially, 
universally welcomed. Some in the farming lobby thought that agriculture was 
not given a sufficiently high priority, while some in the environmental lobby 
saw it as not being sufficiently engaged with the demands of 
environmentalists. 
 
This chapter has three aims. First, it identifies and discusses the main drivers 
for departmental change, other than the specific policy problems discussed in 
chapter three. Second, Defra, the successor department, is looked at in terms of 
its range of responsibilities and approach to its work. Finally, bringing the 
chapter back to focusing on animal health, the new set of policies for animal 
health are discussed in detail with the aim of teasing out from them the goals 
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of policy and ways of delivering those policies. This examination reveals these 
policies to be strongly in keeping with the new governance agenda, reflecting 
the wider reform agenda that characterised the New Labour project. 
 
DRIVERS FOR CHANGE 
 
One element of MAFF¶VKDQGOLQJRIWKH)0'RXWEUHDNWKDWEURXJKWLWV
weaknesses as a department into sharp focus was its failure to consider the 
wider rural economy. As discussed in chapter three, MAFF framed FMD 
solely as an animal health problem and dealt with it as all previous FMD 
outbreaks, by culling infected animals until the crisis was over. The over-
ULGLQJREMHFWLYHZDVWRUHJDLQ%ULWDLQ¶V)0'IUHHVWDWXVWKXVDOORZLQJLWEDFN
into lucrative export markets. Using an actor network theory approach, 
Donaldson et al argue that for MAFF the only actors involved in the FMD 
crisis were: 
 
µWKH GLVHDVH K\EULG DQG WKH 0$)) DQG 6WDWH 9HWHULQDU\ 6HUYLFH
(SVS) officials. All other actors in play are reduced to the status of 
intermediaries who either aid MAFF in the eradication, or aid the 
GLVHDVHLQLWVVSUHDG¶'RQDOGVRQ/RZHDQG:DUGS 
 
One of the consequences of this approach was to overlook the problems that 
FMD posed for the rural economy, and especially the tourism industry, by not 
just the disease but by the measures employed to control the disease. The 
losses incurred by agriculture from the 2001 FMD epidemic were estimated by 
the Centre for Rural Economy (CRE) at Newcastle University to be around 
£150m, while those of tourism were estimated at £400m (Winter 2003, p. 50). 
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It was not the case that MAFF deliberately chose to harm the tourist industry, 
or that it was ignorant of the effects of its policy on that industry. Rather, 
0$))¶V DSSURDFK WR )0' VKRZHG LW WR EH XQDEOH WR DFFRPPRGDWH WKRVH
concerns in its decision making processes. MAFF was revealed, once and for 
all, as the ministry for farming interests. 
 
This was a significant outcome given that the responsibilities of MAFF had 
been steadily broadened over the previous decades. Winter (2003) identifies 
WZRVWUDQGVRIWKLQNLQJWKDWKDGEURDGHQHG0$))¶VUROH 
 
One strand was as a consequence of reforms to the Common Agricultural 
Policy. For Carmichael (2008 S%ULWDLQ¶VHQWU\WRWKH((&LQRIIHUHG
QRSDUWLFXODUSUREOHPVIRU0$))VLQFHµ&$3HPSKDVLs on production and self 
sufficiency was, essentially, an extension of the 1947 Agriculture Act and 
WKHUHIRUH HQWLUHO\ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH µORRNLQJ DIWHU IDUPHUV¶ UDWLRQDOH¶
However, as food mountains and wine lakes entered the public consciousness 
reforms were inevitable. Nevertheless, there were different ways in which 
these reforms could go. For some, liberalisation of the agriculture market was 
the way while, for others, continuing protectionism was the goal. Franz 
Fischler, European Agriculture Commissioner, sought in 1996 to steer a 
middle path between these two competing goals.  
 
µ:KDW )LVFKOHU ZDV RIIHULQJ ZDV OLEHUDOLVDWLRQ RI DJULFXOWXUH
alongside support for fragile rural (as opposed to agricultural) 
economies and environments, with the CAP becoming a rural 
GHYHORSPHQWSROLF\WRVXVWDLQWKHTXDOLW\DQGDPHQLW\RI(XURSH¶V
rural landscapes and the social and economic vibrancy of rural 
FRPPXQLWLHV¶:LQWHUS-51).  
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In doing this, Fischler was signalling a broadening of the agenda to include a 
recognition of valid rural interests beyond agriculture. 
 
These reforms were welcomed by the new Labour Government elected in 
1997. The government was faced with further problems with farm subsidies. In 
addition to farming payments made through the CAP, the new Labour 
Government took office at a time of falling farm incomes. The farming unions 
pressed the government for additional help for farmers experiencing 
difficulties. Government paid an additional £85m in one off payments to 
livestock farmers between 1997 and £50m to cereals farmers in 1998. Given 
the tight financial constraints that Chancellor Gordon Brown had imposed 
upon the government, ministers were concerned that these extra demands from 
farming meant that less was available for the new governPHQW¶VNH\SULRULW\
areas of health and education (Ward and Lowe 2007, p. 413). Thus the Labour 
government was an enthusiastic supporter of CAP reform and welcomed the 
outcome of the Fischler discussions, proposals which came to be known as 
Agenda 2000. It ZDV)LVFKOHU¶VµVHFRQGSLOODU¶RIWKH&$3WKHLGHDRIVXSSRUW
for rural development and environmental projects that particularly appealed to 
the government. 
 
The interface between agriculture and the environment is the other strand of 
policy identified by Winter. MAFF had acquired new responsibilities during 
the 1980s, including a responsibility under the Agriculture Act 1986 to 
SURPRWHFRQVHUYDWLRQ:LQWHU¶VHDUOLHUZRUNVKRZHGKRZ0$))ZDVUHOXFWDQW
WRDFFHSWWKHVHQHZUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV0$))µKDGWREHencouraged and cajoled 
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E\ WKH 1)8 WR SLFN XS WKH JDXQWOHW RI D QHZ DQG H[SDQGLQJ SROLF\ DJHQGD¶
:LQWHUS0$))¶VUHOXFWDQFHWRDFFHSWQHZUROHVZDVDGHIHQVLYH
reaction to protect itself against the threat of loss of existing responsibilities to 
the Department of the Environment (DoE) (Winter 1996, p.227).  
 
The NFU had concerns of its own. First, it feared that there was a possibility 
that agriculture may lose its minister with cabinet status. Second, it was 
determined that if there were to be environmental regulations then these should 
EH RYHUVHHQ E\ ZKDW WKH 1)8 VDZ DV µLWV¶ PLQLVWU\ 7KLUG WKH 1)8 ZDV
concerned to ensure that farmers should receive compensation in the event of 
being forced to accept environmental restrictions and regulation. These three 
concerns led the NFU to press MAFF for a positive response to accepting 
responsibility for environmental policy areas (Winter 1996, p.227). 
 
For Labour there were other policy concerns which served to increase its 
interest in wider rural polic\7KHUHZDV WKHQHHG WRGHIHQG WKHSDUW\¶V
manifesto commitment to a vote on the issue of fox hunting against charges 
that it simply did not understand the countryside. The Countryside Alliance 
had enjoyed some success, aided by the Conservative opposition, in creating a 
sense that Labour was somehow anti-countryside. In its landslide victory of 
1997, the Labour Party had won a significant number of seats in rural and 
semi-rural areas. These new MPs also pressured the government to take action 
on a rural agenda (Ward and Lowe 2007, p.414). 
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7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVSRQVHZDVWRLQVWLJDWHDPHDVXUHRILQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDQJH
It set up Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) which brought together a 
number of bodies including part of the Rural Development Commission 
(RDC). The research function of the RDC was merged with the Countryside 
Commission to form a new body, the Countryside Agency replacing the 
Countryside Commission. The Countryside Agency, a powerful quango was, 
for Ward and Lowe, merely a by product of the creation of the RDAs (Ward 
and Lowe 2007, p.413). The RDAs themselves had a much wider remit than 
the rural, covering urban areas too. It is worth noting that the RDAs have been 
criticised for not being effective in promoting economic development in rural 
areas (Lowe and Ward 2007, p.311). 
 
7KHVHFRQGHOHPHQWRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVSRQVHZDVDJRRGUHIOHFWLRQRILWV
EURDGHUµPRGHUQLVLQJ¶DJHQGD7KLVZDVWRDQQRXQFHWKHSUHSDUDWLRQRIDZLGH
ranging Rural White Paper. This was announced in November 1998 and the 
work was carried out by the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU), a body 
based in the Cabinet Office reporting to the Prime Minister rather than to a 
GHSDUWPHQWDO PLQLVWHU 7KH 3,8¶V ZRUN ZDV EDFNHG XS E\ ZLGH UDQJLQJ
consultations organised by both MAFF and the new Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) headed by the Deputy Prime 
Minister, John Prescott. The PIU reported to the Prime Minister in July 1999 
and in September that year Tony Blair addressed the Labour Party conference 
and delivered an uncompromising New Labour message outlining his idea of 
the battle between what he termed the new radicals and the forces of 
conservatism. Perhaps unaware that he meant, at least in part, them, Labour 
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delegates and trades union leaders clapped enthusiastically as their idea of the 
forces of conservatism, the Countryside Alliance and farming interests, 
protested outside the conference building. 
 
The White Paper itself finally saw the light of day in November 2000, fully 
two years after its initial announcement. Writing before the FMD outbreak, 
/RZHDQG:DUGGHVFULEHGWKH:KLWH3DSHUDVµEHVWVHHQDVDZRUNLQSURJUHVV
ZLWK TXLWH D ORW RI ORRVH HQGV GDQJOLQJ¶ /RZH DQG :DUG  S 7KH
foreword to the White Paper itself was fully consistent with the New Labour 
SURMHFWHPSKDVLVLQJWKHQHHGIRULQFOXVLYHQHVVµ,QWKHSDVWVRPHYRLFHVKDYH
EHHQORXGHUWKDQRWKHUV*RYHUQPHQWPXVWOLVWHQWRHYHU\RQH¶'(750$))
 S 7KH SDSHU LWVHOI FRQVWUXFWHG µUXUDO¶ LQ PXFK EURDGHU WHUPV than 
simply farming, although there was a separate chapter on agriculture. The 
:KLWH 3DSHU LGHQWLILHG D QHHG WR ORRN DW PDUNHW WRZQV DV µIRFL RI ORFDO
HFRQRPLF UHJHQHUDWLRQ « DJDLQVW D EDFNFORWK RI DJULFXOWXUDO GHFOLQH¶ /RZH
and Ward 2001, p.387), and in the chapter on farming, diversification and 
environmental schemes were highlighted (DETR/MAFF, 2000 p.91). 
 
Looked at as a whole, the White Paper presented what was, arguably, a 
nuanced understanding of the problems faced in rural areas. It examined the 
issues of employment and business, including the particular difficulties faced 
by village shops, Post Offices and pubs, of dependency on the car for transport 
and of the problems faced by the younger generation of rural people in 
affording homes in their local communities. This identification of a wider rural 
agenda can be seen as important for a Labour government under pressure from 
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organised rural pressure groups such as the Countryside Alliance. In their 
foreword, John Prescott and Nick Brown perhaps had these groups in mind 
ZKHQ WKH\ ZURWH µ6RPH SHRSOH ZDQW WR GULYH D ZHGJH EHWZHHQ WRZQ DQG
FRXQWU\«>ZHEHOLHYH@WKDWUXUDODQGXUEDQDUHDVDUHLQWHUGHSHQGHQW¶'(75
MAFF, 2000, p.5). 
 
So rural policy was in the process of being recast well before vets examined 
animals and wondered if they really were seeing their first clinical case of 
FMD. These underlying drivers for change were the gradual overlap of 
environmental and agricultural policy areas, the process of CAP reform and the 
creation of the second SLOODUDQGWKHQHZ/DERXUJRYHUQPHQW¶VPXFKEURDGHU
modernisation agenda and desire to challenge what it saw as the forces of 
reaction. However, without the key event of FMD we cannot know how these 
debates would have eventually worked out in institutional terms. If, as Winter 
(2003, p.55) argues, FMD speeded up the process of change, what FMD made 
certain was that MAFF would be no more. FMD thus offered the possibility of 
a radical restructuring of the department with responsibility for farming. What 
were the features of this new department? 
 
DEFRA ± A NEW DEPARTMENT 
 
The new department came into being after the 2001 general election. The sense 
WKDWLWFDPHDERXWDVDFRQVHTXHQFHRI0$))¶VIDLOXUHVZDVJLYHQE\WKHQHZ
GHSDUWPHQWLWVHOIµ'HIUDZDVFUHDWHG to improve the delivery of what Ministers 
DQG VWDNHKROGHUV H[SHFW RI XV¶ 'HIUD  TXRWHG LQ ()5$  S ,Q
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addition to absorbing all of the functions of the now defunct MAFF, Defra also 
acquired responsibilities for environmental protection and the Wildlife and 
Countryside Directorate from the former Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions (DETR), plus some animal welfare responsibilities 
and responsibility for hunting with hounds from the Home Office (EFRA 
2002, p.5). However, DefUD¶VSURVSHFWXVVDZWKHQHZGHSDUWPHQWDVPRUHWKDQ
that: 
 
µ'HIUD LV PRUH WKDQ MXVW D PHUJHU RI IXQFWLRQV IURP WKH IRUPHU
MAFF, Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions 
'(75 DQG +RPH 2IILFH LW UHIOHFWV WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V
determination to exploit the synergies that exist between 
sustainable development, environmental protection, rural affairs, 
DQGIRRGIDUPLQJDQGILVKHULHV¶'HIUDS 
 
The prospectus also had a vision statement of a green Britain existing in a 
world in which the threat of climate change was recognised and addressed by 
all nations. In the UK, the vision was of a diverse range of economically and 
environmentally viable communities enjoying high quality public services. 
Biodiversity was protected, and food produced to high animal welfare 
VWDQGDUGV WKDW FRQWULEXWHG WR D KHDOWK\ QDWLRQ µ7KURXJK WKH SUDFWLFH RI
sustainable development, economic, environmental and social, we will achieve 
RXUYLVLRQ¶'HIUDSL 
 
7KHDLPRI'HIUDDFFRUGLQJWRWKHSURVSHFWXVZDVµ6XVWainable development, 
which means a better quality of life for everyone, now and for generations to 
FRPH¶ 'HIUD  SLL )RU 'HIUD VXVWDLQDEOH GHYHORSPHQW PHDQW D
combination of economic prosperity with an improving environment. In 
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evidence to the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee 
(EFRA) Defra confirmed that this was, indeed, its principal aim and that it 
would take sustainable development as a philosophy across government 
(EFRA 2002, p.6). Underneath this main aim, the new department had set itself 
seven strategic objectives including promoting biodiversity, tackling social 
exclusion and promotion of an attractive countryside for all. Fifth among these 
REMHFWLYHV ZDV WR µSURPRWH VXVWDLQDEOH GLYHUVH PRGHUQ DQG DGDSWDEOH
IDUPLQJ¶ 'Hfra 2001, p.ii), a placement which caused alarm in the farming 
press (EFRA 2002, p.8) even though there was no suggestion that the 
numbering of these objectives carried with it any notion of prioritisation. The 
NFU also expressed concerns about the new department. In its evidence to 
EFRA, the NFU submitted: 
 
µ:HUHPDLQGHHSO\ FRQFHUQHG WKDW'HIUD LV IDLOLQJ WRJLYHSURSHU
weight to the future of farming. Defra is the sponsoring 
Government department for farming (emphasis added) at a time 
when farmers are in D ORQJ HVWDEOLVKHG ILQDQFLDO GHSUHVVLRQ¶
(EFRA 2002, Ev112, para 9). 
 
What was not stated explicitly in either the aim or objectives of Defra was a 
mention of climate change, although the fact of climate change was recognised 
later in the prospectus (Defra 2001, p.6). Climate change subsequently became 
an explicit concern of Defra such that its web site has tackling climate change 
as part of its mission and as the first of eight strategic objectives. Farming 
remained at number five (Defra 2007b). 
 
The scope of the new department was thus very wide, including sustainable 
development, rural development and pollution as well as animal health. 
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Indeed, it is important to recognise that animal health was a relatively small 
DUHDRIWKHGHSDUWPHQW¶VUHVSRQVLELOLWLHs. How might this new department carry 
out its work? 
 
The new department would carry out much of its work in a manner consistent 
with the new governance approach. This was, in part, because it was not the 
only department with responsibilities that impacted on its territory of 
sustainable development and rural affairs. Defra was not an old governance 
department with powers to do things directly, as MAFF had appeared to be, 
nor would it be the department for farming interests. Lord Whitty, minister at 
Defra described the MAFF approach of being responsible for just a single 
LQGXVWU\ DV KDYLQJ µD FHUWDLQ 6RYLHW-OLIH RYHUWRQH WR LW« 7KDW NLQG RI
relationship is not appropriate to the modern age and there have been painful 
changes needed to the relationship between the department and the farming 
VHFWRU¶ ()5$  (Y SDUD  $V DQ DOWHUQDWLYH 'HIUD ZRXOG ZRUN
with other government departments. However, on environmental issues, there 
ZHUH FRQFHUQV WKDW 'HIUD ZRXOG EHFRPH µD SROLF\ JKHWWR IRU JUHHQ LVVXHV¶
(R63% DQG WKDW WKH HQYLURQPHQW SRUWIROLR KDG EHHQ µPDUJLQDOLVHG DQG
GLVWDQFHG IURP WKH ELJ GHFLVLRQV¶ )ULHQGV RI WKH (DUWK ERWK TXRWHV IURP
EFRA 2002, p.6).  
 
The focus for Defra, in terms of means of delivery, was very much on the 
language of new governance and New Labour, with references to modernising 
and to a new agenda (Defra 2001, p.33). Defra would also work in 
partnerships, and would work with stakeholders (Defra 2001, p.34 -35). EFRA 
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UHFRJQLVHG WKDW µ7KH 'HSDUWPHQW LV FHUWDLQO\ PDNLQJ VWUHQXRXV Hfforts to 
FKDQJH¶()5$S+RZHYHU()5$ZDVFRQFHUQHGWKDWWKHSURFHVVRI
FKDQJHZDVVORZµ,WLVDSSDUHQW«WKDWVLJQLILFDQWFKDQJHWRWKHFXOWXUHRIWKH
department is far from complete ± LQGHHG LW KDV EDUHO\EHJXQ¶ ()5$
p.20).  
 
Looking at farming and animal health, the new governance approach was 
FRQWLQXHG,QGHHGWKHUHZDVOLWWOHFKRLFHVLQFHDVWKH1)8SRLQWHGRXWµPDQ\
RI WKHNH\ UHVRXUFHV VXFKDV ODQGDUHSULYDWHO\RZQHG¶ ()5$(Y
SDUD  DQG IDUPHUV¶ YHWV DUH LQ SULYDWH practice. In addition, many delivery 
bodies for animal health such as the VLA were at arms length from Defra as 
agencies, and had suffered from budgetary constraints for some years prior to 
the 2001 FMD crisis, significantly reducing their capacity.  
 
Indeed, the 2002 spending review further cranked up the pressure on the 
GHSDUWPHQW&KRLFHVKDGWREHPDGHµ:HFDQQRWGRDOOWKDWZHRUWKHSXEOLF
DQGRXUFXVWRPHUVDQGVWDNHKROGHUVPLJKWZDQW¶ZDV WKH6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH¶V
downbeat assessment (Defra 2003b, p ,Q DQLPDO KHDOWK SROLF\ 'HIUD¶V
priorities at this time were about catching up on the work following BSE and 
FMD, such as improving tracing of animals, identifying offspring of BSE 
cases and catching up with the bTB testing programme that had been in 
abeyance during the FMD crisis (Defra 2003b, p.26). In the future, and 
UHIOHFWLQJ D QHZ JRYHUQDQFH DSSURDFK 'HIUD ZRXOG VHHN WR VWULNH µWKH ULJKW
balance between the partners in animal health and welfare as to how the costs 
DUH PHW¶ 'HIUD E S Chapter five looks in more detail at how this 
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approach, which became part of the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy, 
played out. 
 
In 2004, Defra launched yet another strategy, the Five Year Strategy, which 
continued the new governance approach to farming and animal health. The 
VWUDWHJ\GRFXPHQWHFKRHGWKH$+:6WKHPHVRISDUWQHUVKLSDQGRIµEDODQFLQJ¶
the costs and benefits between industry and the taxpayer. Furthermore, the 
SVS was to become a new agency from 1 April 2005 (Defra 2004f p. 74-75). 
In fact, this was not finally accomplished until 1 April 2007. This new 
department, Defra, also issued new policies on animal health; policies which 
would reflect what Defra saw as its new way of doing business. 
 
NEW ANIMAL HEALTH POLICIES 
 
From within Defra, new policies on animal health emerged. Three of them, the 
Animal Health and Welfare Strategy and its two daughter strategies for 
veterinary surveillance and bovine tuberculosis are discussed in detail as case 
studies in later chapters. In this section the policy documents themselves are 
examined, themes drawn out and an attempt made to show how they fit in with 
the new governance agenda. Although there is analysis in this section, an 
important aim is to examine the policy documents on their own terms, as they 
were written. In the case study chapters the limits of how far the new 
governance agenda is taken in practice is considered much more critically. 
Before looking at these policies, however, a brief mention is required of a 
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policy which pre-dated them, the Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food: 
Facing the Future, which was published in 2002. 
 
The strategy for sustainable farming and food, facing the future 
 
This emerged from the Curry Commission. It included a foreword by the then 
Prime Minister in which he identifies some of the problems facing farming, 
DGGLQJ WKDW µ:HFDQQRWJRRQ OLNH WKLV«,W LVZK\ ,FUHDWHG'HIUD WREULQJ
WRJHWKHUIRRGIDUPLQJUXUDODQGHQYLURQPHQWDOSROLF\XQGHURQHURRI¶'HIUD
2002, p.5). Defra is thus portrayed in this document aV WKH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V
own creation rather than that of the government as a whole. The foreword to 
the strategy emphasises one significant element of new governance, noting that 
µ*RYHUQPHQWFDQ¶WGRLWDORQH¶'HIUDS 
 
In this policy document theUHLVDVWURQJUHIOHFWLRQRIWKH&XUU\&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
ILQGLQJVLQSDUWLFXODUWKDWµ7KHZKROHRIWKHIRRGFKDLQKDVWRUHFRQQHFWZLWK
LWVFXVWRPHUVWKHZRUOGHFRQRP\WKHFRXQWU\VLGHDQGWKHHQYLURQPHQW¶'HIUD
2002, p.11). In this quote, echoes of the drivers for change, discussed above, 
may clearly be heard.  
 
If one word could sum up the message of the strategy it would be 
sustainability. The word is everywhere. And with it are further reminders of 
those drivers for change with short sections on rural communities and 
enhancing our environment. Some proposals designed to bring these desirable 
objectives about included assurance schemes, regional food branding and farm 
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diversification. Farm Assurance Schemes and labelling are discussed in greater 
detail in chapter five when looking at the work of the England Implementation 
Group in these areas. Important as it is, from an animal health policy 
perspective there is no need to dwell too long within its pages. Animal health 
and welfare are accorded just one and a half pages in this strategy and so it 
cannot say too much by way of detail. But what is in these one and a half pages 
PDNHV FOHDU WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DSSURDFK WR DQLPDO KHDOWK SROLF\ LQ WKH
future would be firmly along the lines of new rather than old governance. 
7KHUHDUH UHIHUHQFHV WRZRUNLQJ LQSDUWQHUVKLSZLWK LQGXVWU\ LGHQWLI\LQJµWKH
UHVSHFWLYH UROHV RI *RYHUQPHQW DQG RWKHU SDUWLHV« >DV ZHOO DV D QHHG WR@
consider how costs should be shared between government and industry; and 
seek the right balanFHEHWZHHQSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHSURYLVLRQRIVHUYLFHV¶'HIUD
S:LWKQHZJRYHUQDQFHDWWKHKHDUWRI/DERXU¶VDSSURDFKZKDWGLG
the new policies on animal health look like? 
 
Animal health and welfare strategy 
 
Planned originally to be published in 2003, the Animal Health and Welfare 
Strategy eventually saw the light of day in 2004. The scope of the strategy is 
huge, covering all keepers of animals, including domestic pets and wildlife. In 
this strategy the important priorities for government in thinking about animal 
health can be found. 
 
Then Secretary of State at Defra, Margaret Beckett, wrote in the Foreword to 
WKH 6WUDWHJ\ µ7KLV VWUDWHJ\«SURYLGHV D URXWH PDS IRU UHJDLQLQJ SXEOLF DQG
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consumer confidence in the food we produce and the restoration of our 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOUHSXWDWLRQIRUWKHKLJKHVWVWDQGDUGVRIDQLPDOKHDOWKDQGZHOIDUH¶
'HIUDDS7KHLPSOLFDWLRQRIWKLVLVFOHDUO\WKDWLQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
view, consumer confidence in the food we produce was lost together with 
%ULWDLQ¶VUHSXWation for animal health and welfare in the aftermath of both BSE 
and FMD.  
 
0UV%HFNHWW¶VIRUHZRUGFRQWDLQVVHYHUDOH[SUHVVLRQVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHYLHZ
that this new strategy would be firmly in line with a new governance 
SHUVSHFWLYH µ:H UHFRJQLVHG WKDW the new approach had to be built from the 
bottom up¶ µ$OO LQWHUHVWHGSDUWLHVKDG WRKDYHDQ LQWHJUDO UROH LQVKDSLQJ WKH
strategy and a sense that they had a real stake LQWKHRXWFRPH¶µ:HFDQRQO\
take the strategy forward on a partnership EDVLV¶ $OO 'efra 2004a, p.5 
emphasis added). In addition, however, is another clear consideration for 
JRYHUQPHQWFRVWµ:HQHHGWRZRUNWRJHWKHUWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHVHEHQHILWVDUH
DFKLHYHG DQG WKDW WKH DVVRFLDWHG FRVWV DUH SURSHUO\ EDODQFHG¶ 'HIUD D
p.5). No longer would government be proffering blank cheques to the farming 
industry, but industry itself could expect to bear some of the costs of animal 
KHDOWK,QGHHGDVWKHVWUDWHJ\LWVHOIPDGHFOHDUµ7D[SD\HUVFDQQRWEHH[SHFWHG
to foot the bill when the industU\¶VRZQSUDFWLFHVOD\LWRSHQWRGLVHDVHWKUHDWV¶
(Defra 2004a, p.11). 
 
Chapter one of the strategy states clearly the aim of this new approach.  
 
µ7KLVVWUDWHJ\DLPVWR'HYHORSDQHZSDUWQHUVKLSLQZKLFKZHFDQ
make a lasting and continuous improvement in the health and 
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welfare of kept animals while protecting society, the economy, and 
WKHHQYLURQPHQWIURPWKHHIIHFWRIDQLPDOGLVHDVHV¶'HIUDD
p.11). 
 
New governance themes can be seen in this chapter. The old ways are 
GLVFDUGHGµ,QWKHSDVW WKH roles and responsibilities of Government, industry 
and animal owners have been based on a set of assumptions which have not 
FRQVLVWHQWO\ HQDEOHG XV WR ZRUN WRJHWKHU¶ 'HIUD D S 1HZ
governance, as developed in this strategy would be based upon partnership and 
DQ LQVLVWHQFH WKDW µ7KH SULPDU\ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH KHDOWK DQG ZHOIDUH RI
DQLPDOVUHVWVZLWKWKHLURZQHUV¶'HIUDDS 
 
After that strong indication that things would not be the same again, the 
strategy moves on to outline what the new approach would look like. The 
µYLVLRQ¶ IRU WKH VWUDWHJ\ LV EXLOW DURXQG ILYH NH\ VWUDWHJLF RXWFRPHV HDFK RI
which is the subject of its own chapter. These are: 
 
1. A partnership approach 
2. That prevention is better than cure 
3. A clear understanding of costs and benefits 
4. Understanding and accepting roles and responsibilities 
5. Effective delivery and enforcement. 
 
A partnership approach reflects the loss of state capacity and the enhanced 
need to recruit non-state actors to contribute to good animal health. There is a 
mention of the need for partners to work together to identify new disease 
trends. The Veterinary Surveillance Strategy is identified by the AHWS as 
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important in bringing this about. Reflecting new governance, these 
partnerships need not always involYH JRYHUQPHQW µ*URXSV ZLWK D FRPPRQ
interest such as farmers, vets and retailers need to work together to achieve 
VKDUHG JRDOV¶ 'HIUD D S 6RPH H[DPSOHV RI SDUWQHUVKLSV VRPH
involving government, some not, are given in this chapter of the strategy. 
Together with this, partnership is also construed to include acceptance of 
responsibility. Biosecurity, for example, is one area highlighted. Partnership 
thus does not mean that government will sort everything out, but that partners 
and stakeholders have their roles to play too. 
 
Prevention of disease is better than cure is the second key strategic outcome. 
Benefits of this approach include animals that are less likely to contract or 
spread disease, and are likely to be better economically for the farmer. For the 
$+:6SUHYHQWLRQUHTXLUHVµDQLPDORZQHUVWRKDYHWKHQHFHVVDU\VNLOOVWRFDUH
for their animals, exercising good practice and using veterinary services and 
PHGLFLQHV DSSURSULDWHO\¶ 'HIUD D S 3UHYHQWLRQ WKHUHIRUH DJDLQ
places a responsibility upon owners for their animals. The most important tool 
for owners to promote disease prevention is animal health planning. This 
element of the strategy does not explicitly use new governance language. It is 
mostly sensible advice for owners about disease prevention. However, the 
means through which animal health plans came to be promoted through the 
EIG is typical of a new governance approach, and this is discussed more fully 
in chapter five of this thesis. 
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Understanding and accepting roles and responsibilities is an interesting 
strategic goal. Defra is keen that everyone involved in the food chain, from the 
owners of animals to the food industry know what may reasonably be expected 
RI WKHP µ$OO DQLPDO RZQHUV KDYH D UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR EH YLJLODQW report any 
suspicion of disease and maintain good disease prevention and control 
ELRVHFXULW\ SUDFWLFHV LQFOXGLQJ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK UHJXODWLRQV¶ 'HIUD D
SLVRQHLQVWDQFHRIDµOD\LQJGRZQRIWKHODZ¶LQWKLVUHVSHFW7KHVWUDWHJ\
sees an enhanced role for vets, with a focus on disease prevention and 
education rather than the traditional approach of just treating diseases as they 
FRPH WR EH SUHVHQWHG DV FOLQLFDO FDVHV )XUWKHUPRUH YHWV µVKRXOG DOVR EH
prepared to support the veterinary surveillance strategy and other locally run 
LQLWLDWLYHV¶ 'HIUDDS7KLVHPERGLHV WKHQHZJRYHUQDQFHDSSURDFK
in so far as the resources of vets are seen as something to be utilised in a 
common purpose of improving animal health and welfare. Data and input from 
vets are seen as having a use to government, reflecting, in part, years of 
capacity reduction in the SVS and VLA as a consequence of NPM inspired 
reforms. 
 
In addition to this, Defra is very keen to set out reasons for government 
intervention in animal health and welfare. The strategy lays out four reasons: to 
protect human health, to protect and promote the welfare of animals, to protect 
the interests of the wider economy, environment and society and for reasons of 
international trade (Defra 2004a, p.29). However, as the Bovine Tuberculosis 
(bTB) Strategy subsequently made clear, these are criteria for determining 
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ZKHWKHULQWHUYHQWLRQVKRXOGWDNHSODFHµQRWZKRVKRXOGIXQGWKHLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶
(Defra 2005a, p.39). 
 
The fourth key strategic outcome, understanding and accepting roles and 
responsibilities is, arguably, the most important chapter of the whole strategy. 
Under this heading, principles for government decision making are given. To 
quote the whole passage would be too long, but it is full of the language of 
openness and transparency and new governance. Policy will be made in 
partnership with key stakeholders and be based on risk assessment. Costs and 
benefits will be assessed and action taken will be proportionate to that 
assessment. Policy will be guided by the precautionary principle and based on 
VRXQGVFLHQFH,QGHHGµ6FLHQFHLVERWKDGULYHUIRUSROLF\UHVSRQVHVDQGIRUPV
part of the evidence base for ensuring that policy options can be effectively 
GHWHUPLQHG¶'HIUDDS 
 
$µVWHHULQJ¶UROHIRUJRYHUQPHQWLVDOVRHQYLVDJHGZKHQFRQVLGHULQJFRVWVDQG
EHQHILWVµ*RYHUQPHQWLVRIWHQEHVWSODFHGWRSURPRWHWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIEHVW
practice within industry, and co-ordinate research into animal health and 
ZHOIDUH¶ 'HIUD D S *RYHUQPHQW¶V UROH WKHUHIRUH LV QRW DOZD\V WR
do, but to bring together partners and stakeholders. 
 
In this strategy, government makes it clear that it is not going to be the only 
party paying for the benefits that accrue from better animal health and welfare. 
CRVWVDQGEHQHILWVPXVWEHVKDUHGµ7KHVHFRVWVVKRXOGRYHUWLPHDQGZKHUH
DSSURSULDWH EH PXFK PRUH IXOO\ VKDUHG¶ 'HIUD D S +RZHYHU WKH
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strategy is clear that this will not happen quickly. Chapter five discusses how 
this debate has played out in practice. The costs and benefits section of the 
strategy reflects a move toward making the farming industry more responsible 
for its own health. It may also reflect a changing balance within the rural 
economy away from agriculture and a desire on the part of government to 
interpret rural issues in a wider context.  
 
Finally, the section in the strategy that deals with delivery and enforcement 
seeks to emphasise the economic benefits that fall to farmers from good animal 
health and welfare practices. Effective delivery, for the strategy, depends upon 
setting priorities. Non-governmental actors have an important role to play in 
this process as partners and stakeholders. Farmers need to understand the 
patterns of disease in their sector of the industry. 
 
Despite being a strategy that is all encompassing, a reading of it confirms the 
RSLQLRQ WKDW LW LV IDUPHG DQLPDOV WKDW DUH YHU\ PXFK WR WKH IRUH LQ 'HIUD¶V
thinking. Farm Health Plans, for example, are of little use to the pet owner 
with a couple of cats. What comes through in this strategy is the desire to avoid 
future animal health crises like FMD through disease prevention measures 
such as FHPs and an exhortation to farmers to use good biosecurity, and a 
desire to keep the costs of animal health to the government under control. This 
VWUDWHJ\ VHWV WKH WRQH LW µVWHHUV¶ SROLF\ ZKLOH VHHLQJ D VWURQJ UROH IRU WKH
industry to assume responsibilities for itself. In its frequent use of words like 
partnership and stakeholder and the claims made for evidence based policy 
making, the language is very new governance. This is supported by the 
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creation of the EIG to oversee the implementation of the strategy. The Animal 
Health and Welfare Strategy is thus very much in keeping with the ideas of 
new governance. 
 
Government strategic framework for the sustainable control of bovine 
tuberculosis (bTB) in Great Britain 
 
The bovine tuberculosis framework strategy is not a stand alone policy 
GRFXPHQW,WVIXOOWLWOHGHVFULEHVLWDVµDVXE-strategy of the Animal Health and 
WelfarH 6WUDWHJ\ IRU *UHDW %ULWDLQ¶ $V VXFK LW VKDUHV WKH FHQWUDO VWUDWHJLF
outcomes of the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy discussed above.  
 
In the context of bovine TB, a partnership approach entails both a recognition 
that wildlife transmission of TB is an important concern for farmers in heavily 
affected areas, and the need for such farmers to understand the importance of 
cattle movements in disease transmission. Prevention entails the understanding 
WKDW µ$OO LQWHUHVWHGSDUWLHVPXVWSOD\ WKHLUSDUW LQSUHYHQWLQJ VSUHDGRIE7%¶
(Defra 2005a, p.15). The understanding of the costs and benefits of TB control 
means both that government has an interest in protecting the public from the 
potential harm from bTB, but that also the government takes the view that 
farmers will also benefit directly from an effective TB policy. Consequently, 
HQVXULQJWKDWµFRVWVDUHVKDUHGIDLUO\LVWKHUHIRUHDORQJ-WHUPDLP¶'HIUDD
p.15). This suggests, and is supported by other paragraphs in the document, 
that government was no longer prepared to accept the ever escalating costs of 
TB control alone. The farming industry would be expected to pick up a greater 
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share of the bill for any policy to control the disease. This aspect of the 
strategy offers the potential for conflict between Defra and farmers.  
 
Understanding and accepting roles and responsibilities includes the 
requirement on farmers to be vigilant and follow good disease prevention 
practices and to report suspicion of disease to their vet. Both the Animal 
Health and Welfare Strategy and the bTB strategy include a clearly defined set 
RIFULWHULDIRUMXVWLI\LQJJRYHUQPHQWLQWHUYHQWLRQµZKHUHWKHPDUNHWRQLWVRZQ
FDQQRWGHOLYHUVRPHRUDOORIWKHREMHFWLYHV¶'HIUDDS7KHUHDVRQV
which may justify government intervention are: to protect animal health, to 
protect and promote the welfare of animals, to protect the interests of the wider 
economy, environment and society and, international trade (Defra 2004a. p.29; 
Defra 2005a pp.39-40). However, the bTB strategy is clear that these are 
FULWHULD IRU GHWHUPLQLQJ ZKHWKHU LQWHUYHQWLRQ VKRXOG WDNH SODFH µQRW ZKR
VKRXOG IXQG WKH LQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ (Defra 2005a, p.39). In the bTB case, the 
protection of the interests of the wider economy and society is seen as 
understanding the value that society places on the conservation of badger 
populations, and on the understanding of the public of the humaneness of any 
measures used to implement a cull of badgers in particular areas. Government 
has already commissioned work at Reading University into societal values in 
respect of badgers (Defra 2005a, p.35). The acceptability to the wider public of 
badger culls is clearly an important consideration for government.  
 
Delivering and enforcing standards effectively is also seen as a partnership 
HQWHUSULVH µ,W UHTXLUHV FRQWLQXLQJ FRPPLWPHQW IURP KHUG RZQHUV
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veterinarians, wildlife conservation interests and food businesses, as well as 
*RYHUQPHQW DQG LWV DJHQFLHV DQG ORFDO DXWKRULWLHV¶ (Defra 2005a). In the 
context of bTB, government roles include generating policies in partnership 
with agencies and those directly affected by the policies (Defra 2005a), 
presumably mostly farming interests but also wildlife, notably pro-badger, 
groups. In addition, the formal machinery of government was to be improved, 
according to the strategy, by the State Veterinary Service (SVS) becoming an 
executive agency from 1 April 2005 [However, note that it did not achieve 
agency status as Animal Health until 2007]. This, it was thought, would enable 
the SVS inter alia WRµGHYHORSIXUWKHULWVH[SHUWLVHDQGSURIHVVLRQDOLVP«DQG
EXLOGFORVHUOLQNVZLWKRWKHURSHUDWLRQDOSDUWQHUVHJWKH9/$¶(Defra 2005a, 
p.41). One potentially significant change once the SVS becomes an agency is 
that bTB testing provided by private vets for the SVS may be put onto a 
contractual basis and that lay testing for bTB has been supported by the 
government with a pilot project to begin in the spring of 2005.  
 
The policy document has forewords by Margaret Beckett and the agriculture 
ministers of the devolved Welsh and Scottish governments. While all three 
emphasise the importance of partnerships, there are interesting variations in the 
tone of each of the forewords. Mrs. Beckett focuses on the possible role of 
badgers in the transmission of bovine TB, perhaps reflecting the fact that the 
badger question is an important one in England, especially the South West. Mr. 
Jones focuses particularly on the partnership aspects of the process, but notes 
that farmers will have to bear a share of the costs of any policy that emerges 
from the framework strategy. Scotland is a very low incidence area for bovine 
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7% ,W LV WKHUHIRUHQR VXUSULVH WKDW IRU0U )LQQLH µ2XUSULRULW\ LQ6FRWODQG
where TB breakdowns most commonly result from imported animals, is to 
NHHSERYLQH7%RXW¶ (Defra 2005a, p. 9). The introduction of pre-movement 
testing in Scotland was seen by Mr. Finnie to assist in this goal. Pre-movement 
testing in England only came in later, as discussed in chapter six. 
 
The strategic framework is the result of a consultation exercise on a previous 
GRFXPHQW µ3UHSDULQJ IRU D QHZ *% 6WUDWHJ\ RQ ERYLQH WXEHUFXORVLV¶ (Defra 
2004d). The Executive Summary is careful not to set out nationwide disease 
control policies, seeing these as being regionally based reflecting the different 
GLVHDVH SURILOHV RI GLIIHUHQW DUHDV +RZHYHU LW GRHV VWDWH WKDW µWKH FDWWOH WHVW
DQG VODXJKWHU VFKHPH ZLOO UHPDLQ FHQWUDO WR FRQWUROOLQJ WKH GLVHDVH¶ (Defra 
2005a, p.11). Key to the development of new policies in the strategy are the 
effectiveness of badger culling (as determined by the Randomised Badger 
Culling Trial (RBCT)) and the value of the gamma interferon diagnostic test 
(thought by some to be more reliable than the skin test).  
 
The Randomised Badger Culling Trial was organised by the Independent 
Scientific Group (ISG). The ISG was set up in 1998 following publication of 
the Krebs Report in 1997. Following the Krebs Report the government set out 
a five point plan of action in respect of bovine TB. This plan included 
measures to protect public health including liaison with the Department of 
Health to monitor M. bovis infection in humans, research into developing a 
vaccine for M. bovis, research into knowledge of disease transmission both 
within and between cattle and across species, the continuation of the cattle 
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testing programme for TB, and a randomised badger culling trial to test the 
effectiveness of badger culling in reducing TB in cattle. The ISG was to 
oversee the RBCT and was to advise the government on other aspects of bTB 
policy. The ISG reported regularl\DQGWKHVHUHSRUWVFDQEHIRXQGRQ'HIUD¶V
website. The new strategy envisaged that the results of this trial would be 
available to ministers in early 2007. Furthermore, government is careful not to 
H[FOXGH WKH SRVVLELOLW\ µRI FRQWLQXLQJ WR VHHN WR FRQWUol bTB through cattle 
EDVHGPHDVXUHVDORQH¶(Defra 2005a, p. 29)7KH,6*¶VILQDOUHSRUWWRPLQLVWHUV
was delivered in June 2007. Chapter six discusses this in greater detail 
 
Partnership, priorities and professionalism: A strategy for enhancing 
veterinary surveillance in the UK 
 
In comparison with Defra¶V VWUDWHJ\ Rn bovine tuberculosis, its veterinary 
surveillance strategy was a much more developed policy. In part, this may be 
because surveillance, unlike TB had not attracted significant public 
controversy. The consequences of failed surveillance have been plain to see, 
but developing a new strategy has remained largely an elite endeavour with 
little public participation other than by directly affected stakeholders. By 
contrast, bovine TB attracted much interest from badger groups. Published in 
October 2003, the surveillance strategy pre-dates the final version of the 
Animal Health and Welfare Strategy, and reflects a pattern of change in the 
animal surveillance sphere that had been underway for some years prior to the 
publication of this formal strategy. Divided into seven chapters, this strategy is 
short (twenty-eight pages), but contains much of interest.  
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 µ$QLPDOGLVHDVHRXWEUHDNVFDQKDYHDPDMRULPSDFWRQDQLPDOZHOIDUHKXPDQ
health, farmers, the wider rural economy and the environment. Experience has 
also demonstrated how expensive they can prove tR WKH WD[SD\HU WRR¶ 'HIUD
2003a, p.2). This has echoes of a number of policy problems that had afflicted 
Defra¶V SUHGHFHVVRU 0$)) %6( )0' VDOPRQHOOD LQ HJJV ( &ROL 2-157 
had all had an impact on at least one of these constituencies as shown in 
chapter three. In addition, the bill for dealing with BSE and FMD ran into 
millions of pounds and was significantly paid by government. These crises 
served to undermine confidence in British agricultural policy and to highlight 
the need for new policy making in that area. The Surveillance Strategy is an 
integral part of the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy and shares with it the 
five key strategic goals discussed above. 
 
The five strategic goals form the basis of five of the chapters of the strategy. 
7KH RYHUDOO DLP RI WKH VWUDWHJ\ LV WR µGHOLYHU D WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ LQ FXUUHQW
veterinary surveillance practice over WKH QH[W  \HDUV¶ 'HIUD D S2). 
This activity will be more open than previously, justified, transparent, 
prioritised, and founded on quality data. An important tool in the delivery of 
this vision is a new computer-based system, what Jim Scudamore, then CVO 
called µDQHZ,7VROXWLRQ¶ (Defra 2003a, p.1) to help identify new diseases and 
prioritise surveillance activity.  
 
In the introductory chapter of the strategy the scope of surveillance is defined. 
This refers to early warning and detection of animal disease problems, not just 
common infectious diseases, but also toxicities and new disease conditions. 
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Conditions which might affect human health also fall within the scope of 
surveillance. ThLV LQFOXGHV FRQGLWLRQV ZKLFK µare inapparent in the animal 
LWVHOI¶ 'HIUD D S4). This is clearly a reference to E.coli O-157, a 
bacterium causing no ill effects in cattle, but serious disease in humans, with 
fatalities among the usual groups (the very young, the very old and the 
immuno-compromised). Animal disease problems such as BSE and the 
subsequent inquiries demonstrated the need for a strategy to enhance 
veterinary surveillance. It is also thought that increased travel, changed 
OLYHVWRFNV\VWHPVDQGJOREDOZDUPLQJLQWHUHVWLQJO\UHIHUUHGWRDVµWKHLVVXHRI
JOREDO ZDUPLQJ¶) mean that similar threats are likely to occur again in the 
IXWXUHSµ7KHSXUSRVHRIWKHstrategy is to improve the speed and accuracy 
with which such threats can be identified and assessed, so that their cost and 
impact can be reduced, by allowing prompt and suitable inteUYHQWLRQ¶ 'HIUD
2003a, p. 4). 
 
The information derived from veterinary surveillance is seen as being of 
benefit to many groups. Government needs the information in order to devise 
policy on animal and human health protection. Although the strategy does not 
say so explicitly, there is clearly a desire to create an evidence base on which 
to determine policy. This also comes across in the chapter on the quality of 
surveillance information. Farmers are seen to benefit by the information gained 
through surveillance as their veterinary surgeons can use this information to 
help decide on a course of treatment or protection. Wildlife conservationists 
can also benefit as surveillance can make them aware of the threats posed to 
wildlife from animal disease conditions. 
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The strategy was developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders 
and interested parties. Initial consultation took place in 2000, with the first 
draft of a strategy published in 2002, and the current policy document 
published in October 2003. The strategy fits in to the wider policy landscape, 
being a component of the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy and relating to 
policies that are intended to promote a sustainable livestock sector of the rural 
economy. 
 
This introduction chapter also describes, although somewhat briefly, the 
governance arrangements for the surveillance strategy. The strategy is 
presented as being in three phases with governance arrangements gradually 
evolving as time goes on. The three phases are strategy development, strategy 
implementation and ongRLQJ VXUYHLOODQFH DFWLYLWLHV µonce new working 
SUDFWLFHVDUHLQSODFH¶S 
 
While the strategy was in development, governance was directed by a Project 
Board which included the minister responsible for animal health. As 
implementation gets underway, governance will be by a Programme Board 
which will be small and include senior officials. This board will have power 
over budget, target dates and quality standards. In addition to the Programme 
Board there will be an Advisory Board and business assurance groups which 
ZLOO LQFOXGH µFORVHO\ LQYROYHG SDUties from inside and outside government 
[and] will have an opportunity to influence the way the strategy is 
LPSOHPHQWHG¶S$QHYHQEURDGHUUDQJHRIJURXSVZLOOEHµNHSWLQIRUPHG¶
using a variety of methods, although only the proposed Animal Health and 
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Welfare Strategy conference is mentioned specifically. The first such 
conference took place in 2006. 
 
One similarity of this strategy with that for bovine TB is the insistence that 
government will not necessarily be prepared to bear the costs of the policy. 
The veterinary surveillance strategy makes clear that government intervention 
will continue for public health work, the interests of the wider economy and 
society, to secure opportunities for trade and to promote the welfare of 
animals. However, it is clear that government will expect other interested 
parties, especially the farming industry to bear a share of the costs where they 
benefit from the policy. Partnership comes at a price. 
 
Chapter two of the strategy looked at the provision of surveillance data. It 
recognised that there is a broad range of contributors to veterinary surveillance 
from individual observations by farmers or private veterinary practitioners 
through to large scale, contract based studies into particular disease conditions, 
or into enumeration of livestock information. Currently, this diverse range of 
contributors to surveillance information is poorly co-ordinated according to the 
strategy. A key goal is WKXVWREULQJWKHPWRJHWKHUµas a functional network of 
surveillance partners aQGFROODERUDWRUV¶ S In this goal, a new governance 
approach is clearly identifiable. 
 
The benefits of greater collaboration were seen as greater efficiency in the use 
of resources, including directing surveillance work to the most appropriate 
provider, less duplication of work, and an ability to spot gaps in surveillance 
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coverage more quickly. In addition, data sharing becomes a possibility, with 
data about animal populations being used for a variety of surveillance projects 
carried out potentially by different data providers. However, to create a 
VXFFHVVIXO FROODERUDWLRQ SRWHQWLDO SDUWQHUV UHTXLUH µPRWLYDWLRQ « WR HQVXUH
WKH\UHPDLQHQJDJHG¶S 
 
Chapter three looks at prioritisation of surveillance activities. This is thought to 
lead to more efficient use of public money, and the reduction in surveillance 
gaps. An effective system of prioritisation is intended to be transparent and 
LPSDFWEDVHG'LVHDVHFRQGLWLRQVZLOOEHµSURILOHG¶DOORZLQJFRPSDULVRQDFURVV
diseases. 
 
The strategy identifies a lack of clarity in how surveillance projects are 
prioritised and identified as a weakness of current policy. To help resolve this 
weakness, a central objective of the strateJ\ LV WR µdevelop a transparent and 
justifiable prioritisation mechanism by which diseases and conditions can be 
UDQNHGIRUVXUYHLOODQFHSXUSRVHV¶S 
 
In order to aid comparison, the strategy suggests that diseases will be profiled 
using data and tabulated using particular (unspecified in this document) 
information. The assessment criteria include impact on human health, animal 
welfare and economic impact. Profiles will be grouped for consideration by 
specialist groups which will include government advisory groups but also other 
government and non-governmental bodies. An as yet unspecified ranking 
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V\VWHPZLOOEHXVHGWRDVVLJQDµULVNDQGLPSDFWVFRUH¶IRUWKHFRQGLWLRQ7KHVH
scores permit comparison across specialist groups. 
 
These developments appear to be at an early stage. The precise governance 
arrangements are not yet set in concrete, nor is the mechanism for comparison 
across areas. However, the strategy does propose one innovation, a UK 
Surveillance Advisory Committee, which will examine prioritisation. 
Specialist groups would then recommend priorities within their area. Once 
these are proposed, government funding would be allocated to the various 
surveillance topics. Again, the strategy is silent on how this would be done. 
What the strategy does say, however, is that once government money is 
FRPPLWWHG µthere would be an opportunity for others with an interest to 
contribute resources to areas of particular concern to their sector, so 
EURDGHQLQJRUDGGLQJWRWKHVXUYHLOODQFHFDUULHGRXW¶S7KLVDOVRDWWUDFWV
funding from other stakeholders for surveillance activity.  
 
Outside funding has been a part of animal health policy for some time. 
Pedigree sheep breeders, for example, funded a DNA testing programme to 
allow them to selectively breed scrapie resistant sheep (Observation at VLA 
North). The proposed prioritisation within the new strategy may be an attempt 
to contribute to a partnership approach to overall veterinary surveillance. 
 
Potentially useful surveillance observations occur at many points within the 
animal health field. Observations by farmers, clinical assessments by vets, 
laboratory test results, targeted surveillance programmes, meteorological 
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observations and population studies all have utility. The difficulty, according 
to the strategy, is in analysing these diverse sources of information. By 
analysing data together with data from other sources, and with information 
DERXW DQLPDO SRSXODWLRQV WKHVH VXUYHLOODQFH HYHQWV FDQ EH µWUDQVODWHG LQWR
NQRZOHGJH¶S 
 
The strategy sees this analysis process as a pyramid with the separate data 
collection events at the bottom being collated and integrated with others, and 
then analysed to produce knowledge. To achieve this objective, observations 
and results must be of a known quality (which is addressed elsewhere in the 
strategy). In addition, the strategy identifies a need for a new information 
management system called RADAR (Rapid Analysis and Detection of Animal-
UHODWHG 5LVNV 5$'$5 ZLOO EHFRPH WKH µFHQWUDO PDQDJLQJ KXE RI
VXUYHLOODQFH UHODWHG LQIRUPDWLRQ LQ WKH 8.¶ S DQG ZLOO HQDEOH HDUO\
detection of potential animal health problems.  
 
RADAR is also essential to achieving the goal of sharing information more 
ZLGHO\ 7KH VWUDWHJ\ IRUHVHHV WKDW 5$'$5 ZLOO HQDEOH µH[SHUW XVHUV¶ EXW LW
does not say who the expert users will be) to disseminate surveillance reports 
to stakeholders in an efficient manner. Benefits in the early detection of 
potential risks to human health are also envisaged. Other (i.e. non-expert) users 
and stakeholders will have access to reports over the internet. Access to the 
portal will vary from user to user. While the strategy does not make this 
explicit, it may be that private vets may be able to access their lab results 
directly over the internet saving time over posting. In addition, surveillance 
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profiles and other useful information will be available subject to the user 
having the appropriate access rights. However, the strategy does not explain 
who will be granted access rights to this surveillance data. RADAR will 
comply both with the Data Protection Act and the Freedom of Information Act. 
The strategy states that a balance between encouraging stakeholders to share 
information by assuring them of its security and deriving the benefits from 
transparency is required. The strategy is enthusiastic about the benefits of 
information sharing. µ7KHQet effect [of sharing information] will be to deliver 
a step-change in evidence-EDVHGSROLF\PDNLQJLQWKLVDUHD¶S 
 
The next chapter of the strategy looks at surveillance outputs. Outputs of 
known quality are important, the strategy argues, for the success of partnership 
ZRUNLQJ LQYHWHULQDU\ VXUYHLOODQFH)RU WKLV UHDVRQRXWSXWVZLOO EH µIODJJHG¶
with a quality statement. Inputs to the system come from many sources from 
observations by farmers and clinical assessments by vets through to laboratory 
tests performed to an exacting standard. The date of the data also needs to be 
known. The strategy envisages a system where some outputs will need 
laboratory accreditation, but that value for money considerations may mean 
that other tests may not need to meet such a standard. 
 
The strategy sees a central role for practising veterinary surgeons both as 
providers of data and consumers of it. As the quality of vets¶ inputs improves, 
so the quality and consequently usability of outputs for the vet improves. The 
strategy argues that veterinary training needs to include an element of 
epidemiology and surveillance training. The question of quality assurance in 
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the strategy is being considered by one of the business assurance groups 
involving stakeholders. One aim of this group is to consider if surveillance 
projects meet users¶ requirements including cost and time targets. 
 
µ7KH 9HWHULQDU\ 6XUYHLOODQFH 6WUDWHJ\ LV D NH\ FRPSRQHQW RI D ZLGHU
Government drive to improve the health and welfare of animals kept by man 
anGWRSURWHFWSXEOLFKHDOWKIURPDQLPDOGLVHDVH¶S7KLVVWDWHPHQWSODFHV
the strategy within the context of the wider Animal Health and Welfare 
Strategy. The surveillance strategy aims for rapid detection of threats, open 
prioritisation of surveillance activities and a clear evidence base for activities 
and reports. Together, the strategy argues, disease control and prevention 
policies will be better facilitated. 
 
The strategy argues that the benefits of such a strategy can be considerable. 
These benefits range from greater stakeholder engagement in various ways 
through to better disease detection and utilisation of a wide range of data 
VRXUFHV /DVWO\ WKH VWUDWHJ\ DUJXHV WKDW LW ZLOO OHDG WR µRSHQ DQG WUDQVSDUHQW
*RYHUQPHQWSROLF\PDNLQJ¶S, part of a new approach to policy. 
 
The Veterinary Surveillance Strategy proposed a transformation of UK 
practice in this area. It involves engaging more with other actors in animal 
health to generate a partnership approach, where government and non-
government participants both contribute to the evidence base and benefit from 
its outputs. Reading between the lines, it may be the case that government 
support for surveillance may become more tightly focussed on important 
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animal diseases ± those with large economic cost and those with human health 
implications. Searching for new diseases, µVFDQQLQJ VXUYHLOODQFH,¶ ZLOO QR
longer be a process dominated by passive findings from chance observations, 
but rather will rely upon more open reports from practising vets and farmers 
themselves. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has identified and discussed a number of drivers for change that 
led to the demise of MAFF and its replacement by a new department, Defra. 
While the particular facts of the policy problems of salmonella, BSE and 
FMD, discussed in chapter three, were clearly significant, this chapter has 
placed those problems within a wider policy discourse characteristic of, but not 
H[FOXVLYH WR1HZ/DERXU¶VPRGHUQLVDWLRQDJHQGDDVPDQLIHVWHG LQ WKH5XUDO
White Paper, and to changes within the framework of the CAP. 
 
Second, this chapter has looked at Defra as a new department, and the range of 
responsibilities that it inherited from MAFF and others. The new department 
brought together responsibility for the environment and for rural areas defined 
broadly, not just in terms of farming. Given the impact of agriculture on the 
HQYLURQPHQW WKH DWWHPSW WR H[SORLW WKH µV\QHUJLHV¶ EHWZHHQ WKHP TXRWHG
DERYHZDVUHDVRQDEOH'HIUD¶VDLPRISURPRWLQJVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWOHQW
it strategic objectives that covered economic and social goals as well as 
concern for protection of the environment. Protection for the environment, 
HVSHFLDOO\WKHFKDOOHQJHRIFOLPDWHFKDQJHKDGULVHQLQ'HIUD¶VSULRULWLHVDVWKH
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threat posed by climate change became better understood. In the field of 
animal health, Defra sought to make clear that it was not the department for 
farmers in the way that MAFF was held to be. Defra would be different and 
would work differently. In future, policy would be more open and transparent, 
LQSDUWWRPHHWWKHFULWLFLVPVOHYHOOHGDW0$))¶VKDQGOLQJRI%6(DQG)0'
Furthermore, Defra would work in a decidedly new governance way, recruiting 
private sector actors and stakeholders into partnerships to deliver policy 
objectives. Farming VKRXOGQR ORQJHUH[SHFW'HIUD WR µGR¶ WKLQJV WRRU IRU LW
but would be required to be an active participant. It should be recognised that a 
desire to control expenditure also impacted on the move towards this collegiate 
approach. 
 
Finally, this chapter has looked, in detail, at three animal health policies that 
emerged from Defra. It was shown that in sharing five common strategic 
outcomes, the new governance ethos of the department would be carried into 
the policy-making arena. Having looked at what the policies said about 
themselves, it is now time to see how they were implemented in practice. This 
forms the subject of the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 5: Animal health and welfare strategy 
 
In the previous chapter the development of animal health policy in the 
aftermath of the 2001 FMD crisis was discussed and the broad features of the 
new regime examined. In addition, three important policy documents - the 
Animal Health and Welfare Strategy, the Veterinary Surveillance Strategy and 
the Government Strategic framework for the sustainable control of bovine 
tuberculosis (bTB) in Great Britain: a sub-strategy of the Animal Health and 
Welfare Strategy for Great Britain - were analysed to highlight themes which 
fit into the new policy making regime.  
 
This chapter focuses on the implementation of two of these policies and 
presents the findings of empirical work into the Animal Health and Welfare 
Strategy and the Veterinary Surveillance Strategy. The next chapter looks at 
the special case of bTB. The argument of this chapter is that in its composition 
and method of working, the EIG is an example of new governance that can, on 
occasion, demonstrate its independence from Defra. In delivering the AHWS 
WKH(,*¶VUROHLVRQHRISHUVXDVLRQDQGHQFRXUDJHPHQWWR LQGXVWU\ to assume 
more responsibility for itself. In promoting partnership working, the EIG can 
claim some success for itself and, by extension, for the efficacy of the new 
governance. It is aided in this by the separation from this process of the main 
disease of contention, bTB, as this prevents EIG meetings from becoming 
µERJJHGGRZQ¶ZLWKWKHE7%LVVXH2QH(,*PHPEHUWKRXJKWWKDW7%ZRXOG
EHµDOOZHWDONHGDERXW¶LILWZDVFRYHUHGE\WKH(,*DQGGLGQ¶WKDYHDVHSDUDWH
body (observation made at EIG meeting). An important driver for the whole 
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approach of the AHWS is cost. This is reflected in the importance attached to 
cost and responsibility sharing and also to the targeting of Defra scientific 
resources to industry priorities in return for greater cost transference. 
 
The chapter begins by looking at the England Implementation Group (EIG), 
the body set up under the AHWS to oversee and implement it. This section is 
divided into two; first a discussion of processes ± how the EIG was appointed 
and how it works, and, second, what the EIG has done. The majority of the 
data used in this chapter comes from interviews with Defra officials and with 
Helen Browning, Chair of the EIG, the published minutes of meetings of the 
EIG, and additional observations made at six meetings of the EIG that I was 
able to attend. In considering the role of science, fieldwork undertaken at two 
Veterinary Laboratory Agency labs has also been used. 
 
ENGLAND IMPLEMENTATION GROUP 
 
The England Implementation Group (EIG) is a body independent of 
goYHUQPHQW DQG VHW XS WR µGULYH IRUZDUG GHOLYHU\ RI WKH YLVLRQ DQG VWUDWHJLF
DLPVRIWKH$QLPDO+HDOWKDQG:HOIDUH6WUDWHJ\¶(,*LQ(QJODQGRQO\
Similar bodies have been established by the devolved administrations. 
Although setting up a devolved parliament in Scotland and an assembly in 
:DOHVZHUH LPSRUWDQW SODQNVRI WKH /DERXU3DUW\¶VHOHFWLRQPDQLIHVto, 
reflecting an early enthusiasm for constitution reform and finally enacting what 
the late Labour OHDGHU -RKQ 6PLWK FDOOHG µWKH VHWWOHG ZLll of the Scottish 
SHRSOH¶ %%& , devolution may, in itself, be seen as a sign RI µQHZ
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JRYHUQDQFH¶VWUXFWXUHV in so far as they seek to bring decision making closer to 
the people that decisions affect and act as a way of engaging with important 
stakeholders they do meet some of the criteria for new governance discussed in 
chapter two. For Defra, the EIG website claims that the EIG performs its 
IXQFWLRQVE\ µZRUNLQJ LQSDUWQHUVKLSZLWKJRYHUQPHQW WKH IDUPLQJDQG IRRG
industries, animal owners, the veterinary profession, consumers and other 
stakeholders to foster wide ownership of the strategy and a shared commitment 
WR LWVRXWFRPHV¶ 'HIUD . In addition, the group may give advice to the 
CVO or to ministers on animal welfare, and it may investigate any animal 
KHDOWK WRSLF DQG SXEOLVK µDGYLFH DQDO\VLV DQG FRPPHQWDU\ DV LW FRQVLGHUV
DSSURSULDWH¶'HIUD7c). 
 
People, powers and practice 
 
In keeping with its terms of reference the membership reflects those groups 
with whom the EIG is mandated to work in partnership. It is worth a brief 
examination of the membership of the EIG. 
 
Helen Browning OBE, the Chair of the group, is an organic farmer in Wiltshire 
and presently the Food and Farming Director at the Soil Association where she 
is also a former Chair. The remaining members can be divided into groups; 
farming interests, veterinary interests, academics, and others. All biographical 
GHWDLOVKDYHEHHQWDNHQIURPµ(QJODQG,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ*URXS± PHPEHUVKLS¶
(Defra 2005c). 
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Farmers are represented, by Tim Brigstocke, a former Chief Executive of 
Holstein UK who, on appointment to the EIG, was chairman of the Royal 
British Association of Dairy Farmers. Neil Cutler is a dairy farmer and former 
chair of the NFU Animal Health and Welfare committee. He was also a 
member of the advisory group that developed the AHWS. Stewart Houston is a 
pig farmer and, on appointment to the EIG was chair of the National Pig 
Association. It should be noted that these farmers are drawn from the dairy and 
pig industries. There are no representatives drawn from the poultry or sheep 
sectors. 
 
The veterinary profession has three of its number as members of the EIG. Peter 
Jinman is a past president of the BVA, and a veterinary surgeon from 
+HUHIRUGVKLUH RQH RI WKH E7% µKRWVSRW¶ DUHDV 6RPH WLPe after his 
appointment to the EIG he was also appointed to chair the Bovine Tuberculosis 
Advisory Group. Jinman was also involved in the development of the AHWS. 
Dick Sibley is also a vet and has served on the British Cattle Veterinary 
Association committees for Farm Assurance, Health Planning and TB, three 
important areas of concern for the EIG. Finally, Bill Swann has experience of 
animal health improvements in three continents and a longstanding interest in 
promoting animal welfare. 
 
The academics are Richard Bennett, an agricultural economist at Reading 
University, and Sarah Wolfensohn, the Head of the Veterinary Services 
department at Oxford University. Dr. Wolfensohn has written on animal 
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welfare, including the welfare of animals used in laboratory experimentation 
(Wolfensohn and Lloyd 2003, Wolfensohn and Honess 2005). 
 
The remaining members are Chris Brown, Agriculture Development Manager 
with ASDA, and previously a cattle specialist with MAFF and ADAS. Nigel 
Durnford comes from local government, a key delivery agent for the strategy, 
and is an Animal Health and Welfare Inspector with Gloucestershire County 
Council. Diana McCrea is the representative of consumers and is an 
independent consultant on food and consumer affairs. Previously she has 
worked IRU WKH &RQVXPHUV¶ $VVRFLDWLRQ DQG KDV VHUYHG RQ WKH 6SRQJLIRUP
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee. 
 
Taking these broad categories gives a balance on the EIG of four farmers, three 
vets, two academics, and three other members from the retail, local 
government and consumer sectors. The structure of the group was determined 
before the actual members were appointed (Interview HB). Interviewees were 
NHHQWRKLJKOLJKWWKDWWKHJURXSGRHVQRWµUHSUHVHQW¶SDUWLFXODULQWHUHVWVEXWWKDW
care was taken to ensure that the EIG did have members from a variety of 
stakeholder groups. Members of the EIG were appointed because of their 
LQGLYLGXDO DWWULEXWHV µ7KH (,* PHPEHUVKLS ZDV FKRVHQ EHFDXVH RI WKH
individual attributes that we thought eDFK FRXOG GHOLYHU¶ ,QWHUYLHZ 'HIUa 
official 1). The spread of expertise available is acceptable to Defra. Asked if 
producer interests dominated the membership, the civil servant in charge of the 
strategy replied,  
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µ,WKLQNLW¶VTXLWHPL[HG<RXVD\NH\SURGXFHUV:H¶YHJRWVRPH
key interests in there, but there are a lot of key producer interests 
not directly represented on the EIG. And in fact quite a few of the 
PDMRUDVVRFLDWLRQVVHFWRUDODVVRFLDWLRQVDUHQ¶WUHSUHVHnted on the 
ERDUG¶,QWHUYLHZ'HIUDRIILFLDO). 
 
And later in the intHUYLHZµ,WKLQNZHKDYHDJRRGHQRXJKVSUHDGRQWKH(,*
WKDW WKHUH¶V HQRXJK FKDOOHQJH LQ WKHUH DQG WKDW LW LVQ¶W OLYHVWRFN SURGXFWLRQ
dominateG¶,QWHUYLHZ'HIUDRIILFLDO). 
 
The appointment of Helen Browning as chair is an appointment with some 
symbolic power as she is a member of the Soil Association, surely a decisive 
µEUHDN¶ ZLWK WKH SDVW +RZHYHU LQWHUYLHZHHV ZHUH NHHQ WR GHQ\ WKDW WKLV
V\PEROLVP SOD\HG DQ\ UROH LQ KHU DSSRLQWPHQW µ, GRQ¶W WKLQN LW¶V D FDVH RI
Helen being there and representing the Soil Association or looking after the 
6RLO$VVRFLDWLRQLW¶V+HOHQEHLQJWKHUHDV+HOHQ¶,QWHUYLHZ'HIUDRIILFLDO). 
Browning herself also denied that her position with the Soil Association was of 
any help in securing her appointment to the EIG, in fact she thought that it 
ZRXOG KDYH WKH RSSRVLWH HIIHFW DOWKRXJK VKH GLGQ¶W GHQ\ WKDW WKHUH PD\ EH
some symbolism in her appointment: 
 
µ:KHQ,ZHQW IRU WKLV , WKRXJKW LWPLJKWEHDKDQGLFDSDFWXDOO\ ,
WKRXJKW WKDW SRVVLEO\ ,¶G EH VHHQ DV TXLWH D VRUW RI UDGLcal figure 
that had quite strong views about certain things, certainly about 
DQLPDO ZHOIDUH LQ WKH SDVW DQG WKDW , GLGQ¶W WKLQN WKDW WKLV ZRXOG
necessarily wear in my favour. So, and I think a lot of other people 
thought that as well, there were some eyebrows raised from various 
SHRSOHZKHQWKH\IRXQGWKDW,¶GJRWWKHMRE6RLWPD\KDYHEHHQ
there may have been some, erm, they may have been keen to, for it 
to be seen that Defra was looking in a slightly different way at 
WKHVHWKLQJV,MXVWGRQ¶WNQRZ¶,nterview HB). 
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It is in how the EIG works that a major difference can be seen between it and 
the TB Advisory Group. 7KH(,*¶VZRUNWHQGVWREHFDUULHGRXW in public, with 
PHHWLQJVRSHQWRDQ\VWDNHKROGHU:RUNLQJLQSXEOLFILWVLQZHOOZLWK'HIUD¶V
aim to be more open and transparent and this is a commitment very dear to 
Helen Browning: 
 
µ:KHQZHILUVWVWDUWHG,ZDVYHU\NHHQDQGVWLOODP,ZRXOGUDWKHU
GRDOORIRXUZRUNLQSXEOLF¶µ%XWZKDWZHDUHWU\LQJWRGRLVPDNH
sure that all evidence, all interesting topics are done publicly and I 
have a really, personally strong commitment to that and feel 
SDVVLRQDWHO\DERXWLW¶ (Interview HB). 
 
+RZHYHU QRW DOO RI WKH JURXS¶V ZRUN LV GRQH LQ SXEOLF DQG VRPH UHVLVWDQFH
was experienced at the idea of open meetings: 
 
µ%XW ,KDYH WRVD\DW WKHRXWVHW ,KDGDKXJHDPRXQWRIGLIILFXOW\
trying to maintain the open stance ± people feeling very nervous 
about being viewed, about being on stage, about saying the wrong 
thing and it being picked up by a journalist or something. Real 
QHUYRXVQHVV¶,QWHUYLHZ+% 
 
It should be added that this resistance was not a consequence of there being 
something to hide but, by and large, normal human concern about speaking in 
public combined with a fear that the media may pick up on a stray remark and 
make a story out of it (Interview HB). However, Browning explained, µ$OOWKH
nervousness that my members have had about working in public, I think are 
EHLQJZRUQDZD\E\WKHSURFHVVRIGRLQJLW¶,QWHUYLHZ+% 
 
While it is the case that much RIWKH(,*¶VZRUNLVSXEOLFQRWDOORILWFDQEH
Some is carried out in private sessions for various reasons: 
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µ7KHUHDUHKRZHYHUVRPHLQVWDQFHVZKHUHZH UHDOO\ZLOOQRWJHW
anything straight out of Defra, sometimes out of industry, if we do 
it in publLFEHFDXVHWKH\¶UHQRWSUHSDUHGWRPDNHDFHUWDLQSROLF\
SXWLWLQWRWKHSXEOLFGRPDLQ\HW«$QGZLWKLQGXVWU\VRPHWLPHV
WKHUH¶VUHDOFRQFHUQVDERXWµRKP\*RGLIWKLVJHWVRXWLW¶VJRLQJ
to cause all sorts of problems.¶6RWKHUHLVDFHUWDLQGHPDQGIRU us 
to do some work in closed session and my view is that that has to 
EHDEVROXWHO\PLQLPL]HG¶,nterview HB). 
 
Observations of EIG meetings, and analysis of the agendas of the meetings 
suggest that Defra officials are happy to give update reports, or to ask for a 
steer from the EIG on the direction of policy in public. However, there does 
appear to be a reluctance to discuss contentious issues in public, bTB for 
example, was rigorously kept off the agenda, until Defra was close to a 
departmental view on it IROORZLQJ WKH SXEOLFDWLRQ RI WKH ,6*¶V ILQDO UHSRUW 
This is supported by interview data: µ:KHUH WKHUH DUH FOHDU LVVXHV ZKHUH
VRPHWKLQJZKLFKLVRYHUO\VHQVLWLYHDQGZHQHHGWRWDNHDEULHILQJDQGFDQ¶WEH
SXEOLF \HW ZH ZLOO GR SULYDWHO\¶ ,QWHUYLHZ +% This is not to say that EIG 
meetings are wholly sterile with pre-agreed policy announcements being read 
out. There are times when debate is quite heated and conflict and disagreement 
do break out. These, as will be shown, tend to be on issues of process rather 
than on policy. It is the case that so far the EIG has yet to take a position that is 
ZKROO\DWRGGVZLWK'HIUD¶VYLHZRUZLWKWKDWRIWKHIDUPLQJLQGXVWU\ 
 
While civil servants will address meetings of the EIG, ministers have so far not 
done so. However, it is not an impossibility that a minister may address the 
group. While the chair may see the minister in private the circumstances in 
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which a minister would make a public presentation to the group seem limited. 
Asked if the minister would come and speak in public, Helen Browning said, 
 
µ:KDW\RXPHDQKDYHKLPFRPHDQGJLYHHYLGHQFHDVLWZHUHLQD
SXEOLF VHVVLRQ" , WKLQN LW¶V OHVV OLNHO\ >WKDQKDYLQJDFLYLO VHUYDQW
FRPH@EXWQRW LPSRVVLEOH:HKDYHQ¶WPDGHD UHTXHVW IRUKLPWR
do that and I think WKDWLW¶VSUREDEO\OHVVOLNHO\WKDWKH¶GZDQWWRGR
that. But at the same time I think government is generally trying all 
the time to open up and not be doing things behind closed doors 
ZLWKVPRNHDQGPLUURUV6RLWZRXOGQ¶WVXUSULVHPHLIZHKDGDUHDO
issue around something and felt it important to have him in, as it 
ZHUH WKDW KH PLJKW DWWHQG EXW LW¶V PXFK HDVLHU WR GR LW ZLWK WKH
FLYLOVHUYLFH¶,QWHUYLHZ+% 
 
It seems unlikely then that a minister would present to the group. Indeed 
%URZQLQJLVµQRWFRQYLQFHGWKDWLWZLOOKDSSHQ¶,QWHUYLHZ+% 
 
What are the powers of the EIG? After all, it is the body with responsibility for 
implementing the AHWS, and so it is surely the case that it has a range of 
powers available to it in order to do this task. However, this is not the case. 
The EIG has no formal powers at all, and nor do its members, or at least its 
chair, seem to want any. The civil servant then in charge of the AHWS had this 
to say about the powers of the EIG: 
 
µ,W FDQ QDPH DQG VKDPH DQG RI FRXrse, the chair can write to 
ministers, to heads of departments, whoever just to say what the 
GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQ LV DQG WKDW¶V ZKHUH WKH FKDOOHQJH FRPHV LQ $QG
WKHUHIRUH QR SRZHUV DV VXFK VR LW¶V DOO GRZQ WR LQIOXHQFH¶
(Interview Defra official 1). 
 
Influence then is the primary power of the EIG. This is in keeping with ideas 
of new governance. The EIG has no powers to insist, merely to persuade and 
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encourage. Helen Browning is comfortable with this position. Asked if she 
would like some formal powers she replied, 
 
µ1R , GRQ¶W WKLQN , ZRXOG SDUWLFXODUO\ , GRQ¶W IHHO SDUWLFXODUO\
KDPVWUXQJE\WKHIDFWWKDWZHGRQ¶WKDYHDQ\SRZHU6RPHJURXS
members were very nervous about this at the outset, given all this 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ DQG WKDW¶V RQH RI WKH UHDVRQV ZH KDG a quite 
extensive discussion over our terms of reference, that we cannot 
take this responsibility without authority and I very much accept 
that in many ways. But I think there is nothing more powerful than 
the ability to stand up and say, you know, we are advising and 
challenging in this area and we do not think this is good enough. 
6R,WKLQNLW¶VDERXWXVFUHDWLQJRXURZQDXWKRULW\DQGWKDWFRPHV
IURP GRLQJ VHQVLEOH WKLQJV DQG EHLQJ UHVSHFWHG IRU KRZ \RX¶YH
DSSURDFKHG WKLQJV DQG KRZ \RX¶YH UHVROYHG WKLQJs, rather than 
because we can legislate or we can advise on regulation or 
whatever it might be. I think we have to create our own authority 
DVHYHU\ERG\GRHVLQWKLVZRUOGUHDOO\¶,QWHUYLHZ+% 
 
So once more, power is very much the soft power of position and persuasion. 
Part of this power is vested in the position of the chair who has the right to see 
ministers or the CVO about issues of concern, the other part is in the collective 
DELOLW\ RI WKH (,* WR µQDPH DQG VKDPH¶ 7KLV ODWWHU SRZHU LV QRW RQH WKDW, 
through its chairman, it is in any hurry to use: µ2QH ZRXOG DOZD\V HVFDODWH
WKURXJKD VHULHVRISURFHVVHVDQ\ZD\¶ ,QWHUYLHZ+%3XEOLFFRQIOLFWZRXOG
be the very last resort, and the group prefers to use its powers of persuasion 
and facilitation in order to direct in the right way. In an interview it was 
suggested that going public and putting a matter in the press would be the 
(,*¶VµQXFOHDURSWLRQ¶%URZQLQJDJUHHG: 
 
µ$EVROXWHO\ ,Q WHUPV RI XV UHDOO\ VWDQGLQJ XS HLWKHU DJDLQVW WKH
industry or go against government and saying µhang about guys 
\RX¶YHJRWWKLVZURQJIXQGDPHQWDOO\ZURQJ¶ ,W¶VQRWDJRRGWKLQJ
IRUXVWREHGRLQJZLWKWKHSHRSOHZH¶UHWU\LQJWRZRUNZLWKHLWKHU
in partnership within the industry or within the companion animals 
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sector or whatever. If we go out and say µ7KH'RJV¶7UXVWLVUHDOO\
up the creek on this¶ without having previously discussed it and 
WU\LQJ WR JHW PRYHPHQW LQ RWKHU ZD\V ZH¶UH JRLQJ WR DOLHQDWH
stakeholders. We are best, I think, trying to resolve as much as we 
can by bringing people together in a sensible setting and trying to 
ILQGFRPPRQJURXQGDQGDZD\IRUZDUGUDWKHUWKDQJRLQJQXFOHDU¶
(Interview HB). 
 
From this quote it can be seen that, for the EIG, alienating stakeholders is 
something to be avoided. Progress is achieved by discussion and agreement. 
However, this approach does have the consequence of preventing the group 
from driving policy forward at a pace faster than stakeholders are prepared or 
can be persuaded to go.  
 
Definitions 
 
The task of the EIG is to drive forward the Animal Health and Welfare 
Strategy. The EIG itself is a child of new governance and, as such, is supposed 
to broaden participation by stakeholders in an open and transparent process of 
working in partnership. The limits to what can be made public have already 
been discussed. Here, consideration is given to understanding some of the 
various terms used in the strategy: health, welfare, stakeholder and partnership 
working and how they have come to be understood by the EIG. 
 
The very name of WKHVWUDWHJ\LQFOXGHVERWKWKHZRUGVµKHDOWK¶DQGµZHOIDUH¶
It is thus reasonable to suppose that these must be distinct concepts. Yet 
research for this chapter suggests that, for the EIG, forming a distinction 
between them is problematic. This may not be a problem confined to the EIG. 
$WWKHYHU\ILUVW(,*PHHWLQJWKHTXHVWLRQZDVSRVHGµZKHWKHUWKHFRQVXPHU
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(note the use of the word consumer rather than the public) really understands 
µZHOIDUH¶ DV D VHSDUDWH FRQFHSW WR µKHDOWK¶ (,*  PLQXWHV ,QWHUYLHZ and 
observation of meetings of the EIG suggests both that within the group there 
are various understandings of the terms and, importantly, health is seen as 
more important when speaking about farmed animals, while welfare is a bigger 
consideration in respect of animals kept for purposes other than food such as 
companion animals (pets) and laboratory animals.  
Asked about the distinction between health and welfare EIG Chair Helen 
Browning replied, 
 
µ2KGHDU:HGHFLGHG DW WKH ILUVWPHHWLQJ WKDWZH¶G WU\ DQG nail 
this because it was such a potentially contentious thing that was 
going to haunt us forever. We never have actually got round to 
QDLOLQJLW¶,QWHUYLHZ+% 
 
So within the EIG there is no shared understanding of exactly what the 
distinction might be. %URZQLQJ ZDV FOHDU WKDW µ$Q XQKHDOWK\ DQLPDO GRHVQ¶W
KDYHJRRGZHOIDUH¶EXWZDVHTXDOO\FOHDUWKDWIRUKHUZHOIDUHH[WHQGHGwell 
beyond just being healthy: 
 
µ,WLVDERXWDPXFKPRUHSRVLWLYHPHQWDODWOHDVWPDNLQJVXUHWKDW
WKHUH¶VQRPHQWDOVXIIHULQJand the ability of the animal to have a 
degree of autonomy and to exhibit its natural behaviours and all 
that kind of stuff. So, you can see it as health being completely 
VXEVXPHG ZLWKLQ ZHOIDUH :HOIDUH LV WKH WHUP ZH FRXOG XVH¶
(Interview HB). 
 
Browning DOVR WRRN WKHYLHZ WKDW µ<RXFDQXVXDOO\PDNHDEXVLQHVVFDVHRQ
KHDOWK¶ 7KLV ZDV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW WKH YHWV LQ SDUWLFXODU RQ WKH (,* RIWHQ
emphasised at observed meetings. For farmers to act in ways that the EIG 
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would like them to act required that the benefits could be shown in increased 
SURGXFWLYLW\7KHµERWWRPOLQH¶ZDVIRUYHWVDNH\GULYHURILPSURYHGDQLPDO
health. In short, a healthy animal is a profitable animal. 
 
Looking further at the distinction between health and welfare it appears as 
though they are definitely related concepts yet a tension can be observed 
between them in respect of farmed animals. Browning sees health and welfare 
DVµRYHUODSSLQJFLUFOHV¶+HDOWKLVVHHQDVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWDVDEXVLQHVVFDVH
can be made for health. Welfare, in so far as that moves beyond health, is a 
vaguer concept encompassing the sorts of things that Browning spoke about, of 
keeping animals happy, of letting animals express their natural behaviours. 
Here the tensions become clear. Better welfare does not necessarily lead to a 
more productive, and consequently more profitable animal. For Browning, 
µ7KDW¶V >ZHOIDUH@ WKH DUHD ZKHUH LW is much harder to make a cost benefit 
DQDO\VLV ZLWKRXW JRLQJ WR WKH PDUNHW SODFH IRU VXSSRUW 7KDW¶V WKH ZD\ LW¶V
breaking down LQUHDOLW\,WKLQN¶,QWHUYLHZ+% 
 
The sort of market support that she has in mind covers various labeling 
VFKHPHVRIZKLFKPRUHODWHU)RUQRZVFKHPHVVXFKDVWKH6RLO$VVRFLDWLRQ¶V
RUJDQLFODEHORUWKH563&$¶V)UHHGRP)RRGVODEHODWWUDFWDSULFHSUHmium for 
higher standards of welfare. Strictly speaking, the Soil Association scheme is 
not a welfare-based scheme but organically reared meat is perceived by 
consumers to have a higher welfare status. For welfare to assume a higher 
profile in the general regulatory framework of animal health in the context of 
intensively farmed animals could, potentially, amount to a challenge to the 
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whole basis of intensive agriculture. Browning acknowledges that progress on 
welfare is likely to be slower than progress on health: 
 
µ*LYHQ WKHFRQVWUDLQWVRIZKHUHZHDUHDQGZKDWPHFKDQLVPVDUH
JRLQJ WR EH XVHG WR WDNH XV IRUZDUG ZH¶UH QRW JRLQJ WR HQG XS
UXQQLQJ DKHDG RI WKH UHJXODWRU\ EDVH WKDW¶V SURYLGHG WKURXJK
(XURSH LW¶V MXVW QRW JRLQJ WR KDSSHQ«%XW «LQ RUGHU WR PDNH 
SURJUHVVZH¶UHJRLQJWRKDYHWRVWLFNLQ WKDWEDVLFDOO\KHDOWKER[
making sure we allow and give a structure whereby welfare can be 
LPSURYHGWKURXJKPDUNHWVXSSRUW¶,QWHUYLHZ+% 
 
The conclusion that can be drawn is that improvements are more likely to be 
seen in health, with welfare improvements coming either as the EU regulatory 
regime alters or as a consequence of more people being able and willing to pay 
a premium price for meat produced to a higher welfare standard. Demand for 
premium products can sometimes be increased. At one EIG meeting, Chris 
Brown of Asda noted that his supermarket sells a lot of premium beef and very 
OLWWOHRILWVµYDOXH¶EHHI<HWZLWKFKLFNHQDOPRVWDOOWKHFKLFNHQ$VGDVHOOVLV
from its cheapest ranges and very little premium chicken is sold. The reasons 
IRU WKLV PD\ EH FRPSOH[ DQG SRVVLEO\ UHIOHFWV WKH GHPRJUDSK\ RI $VGD¶V
customers; perhaps the situation is not replicated in Waitrose. However, one 
possibility is that the health scare associated with BSE in beef has prompted 
customers to move to a premium product in the belief that it is less likely to be 
positive for BSE. Yet, from a welfare perspective, chickens experience far 
worse farm conditions than beef cattle. It appears that, for Asda customers at 
least, they are prepared to pay a higher price for perceived reduction in health 
risk, but not for an improvement in animal welfare standards, a process likely 
to continue should the economy move into recession despite high profile 
 159 
campaigns by celebrity chefs to highlight the plight of the intensively farmed 
bird. 
 
Stakeholder is another term that, in the context of animal health policy, has no 
clear, agreed definition. Respondents asked how they understood the term 
WHQGHGWREHJLQE\VD\LQJµHUP¶DQGWKHQSDXVLQJIRUDEit of a think. The usual 
order in which stakeholders are named begins with various farming industry 
bodies, then professional bodies such as the British Veterinary Association. 
Wildlife groups such as the Badger Trust were mentioned in the context of 
bTB. The public was sometimes mentioned or, if not, was readily agreed to be 
a stakeholder when prompted.  
 
However, the public is usually understood to be a rather passive stakeholder. It 
is assumed to have an interest in animal health in so far as that overlaps with 
human health. This interest does not require the public to actually do anything; 
E\LPSOLFDWLRQWKLVLQWHUHVWLVWDNHQFDUHRIE\WKHVWUDWHJ\¶VDFFHSWDQFHRIWKH
need for government to intervene in order to protect public health. For most 
stakeholders, the public is taken to mean consumers. The ways in which the 
public may engage in debates on animal health issues through membership of 
campaign groups did not appear to be recognised. Indeed, with the exception 
of mainstream groups such as the RSPCA, animal welfare and certainly animal 
rights groups that challenge intensive agricultural methods were not accepted 
as stakeholders by interview respondents. 
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It is as consumers that the public is constructed in the field of animal health 
policy. That is not to say that the public is absent from EIG considerations. 
Concern was expressed at an EIG meeting about the role that the media played 
in generating public concerns. In addition, the minutes of the very first meeting 
note that in respect of public opinion there may be a role in identifying 
priorities for the EIG. 
µ7RZKDWH[WHQWGRHVWKLV>SXEOLFRSLQLRQ@GHWHUPLQHRXUSULRULWLHV
how do we reconcile the different assessments of priorities that 
PD\ RFFXU EHWZHHQ SXEOLF RSLQLRQ WKH LQGXVWU\ DQG WKH (,*"¶ 
(EIG 1 para. 33). 
 
But, this apart, it is as consumers that the public is understood. At the EIG 
conference there was a session on consumers. Discussion in that workshop 
centred around emphasising the quality and the high standards that farming 
groups claimed pertained in the production of British meat. The clear objective 
for the workshop was to promote ways of getting people to buy more meat and 
getting them to buy British rather than imported meat.  
 
However, the public were not regarded by the EIG as being the primary 
stakeholder. Again at their first meeting the group discussed how they could 
PDNH D GLIIHUHQFH DQG PDNH DQ LPSDFW ,Q WKH JURXS GLVFXVVLRQ µ7KH JURXS 
recognised the need to develop the confidence of producers generally and in 
turn win theLUWUXVW¶(,* para 21). So, to be successful, the EIG requires the 
confidence and trust of producers. Consequently, the EIG is not set up to be, 
and can never become, a critical voice outside the realm of stakeholder 
opinion. This reinforces the role of the EIG within a network context as one of 
building relationships with producer interests rather than with critical voices. 
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The final concept that poses problems of definition is partnership working. The 
necessity of there being a partnership between Defra and producer interests has 
already been alluded to in the fact that the EIG is reluctant to engage in a 
criticism of intensive agriculture. Partnership was also put forward as an 
DOWHUQDWLYHWRPRUHIRUPDOPHWKRGVRIPDQDJLQJDJULFXOWXUHµ''VHQLRU'Hfra 
RIILFLDO DJUHHG WKDW SDUWQHUVKLS ZDV PRUH HIIHFWLYH WKDQ UHJXODWLRQ¶ (,* 
SDUD ,QWHUHVWLQJO\ DQG UHIOHFWLQJ WKH ODQJXDJH RI WKH $+:6 µ''
observed that partners need not be equals; it was a matter of clarifying roles 
and responsibilities from WKHRXWVHW¶(,*SDUD 
 
Partnership working is such an important idea within the AHWS and therefore 
also for the EIG that a report on it was discussed by the groupµ3ULQFLSOHVRI
3DUWQHUVKLS¶ ZDV SUHVHQWHG WR WKH (,*¶V WKird meeting. This report took its 
definition of partnership working from an earlier report of the Public Services 
Productivity Panel in 2002. There, partnership was defined as: 
 
µ>$@ JURXS RI VWDNHKROGHUV EURXJKW WRJHWKHU IURP D UDQJH RI
organisations, to be responsible for tackling mainly long-term 
FKDOOHQJHV DQG RSSRUWXQLWLHV LQ ZKLFK WKH\ KDYH VKDUHG LQWHUHVW¶
(PSPP report quoted in DP7). 
 
Crucially, the EIG report notes that partnership requires agreement on common 
goals. Clearly, therefore, without such agreement on an agreed common goal 
there cannot be partnership working. Groups who may have an interest in an 
animal health problem can be excluded from a partnership if they do not share 
the goals common to the other partners. The report was also keen to emphasise 
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that a partnership PXVWKDYHµWKHULJKWSHRSOH¶WKDW FRXOGXWLOLVHHDFKSDUWQHU¶V
particular strengths. Trust among the partners was also highlighted as an 
important factor in securing a successful partnership, including recognition that 
some situations would require a willingness to compromise and to accept 
solutions where any one partner would achieve only a proportion of their 
goals. This approach was broadly welcomed by EIG members and, at one 
meeting, by stakeholders present. However, at a previous EIG meeting, one 
stakeholder raised a concern IURPWKHDXGLHQFHDERXW*RYHUQPHQW¶VDSSURDFK 
 
µ>)@DUPHUVILQG*RYHUQPHQW¶VVXJJHVWLRQVIRUSDUWQHUVKLSGLIILFXOW
although Government espouses partnerships their policies go 
against this, for example, the impact of bovine TB policy on their 
OLYHOLKRRGV¶(,*SDUD 
 
It is not possible from the data collected in this project to give a definitive 
assessment of how typical that response was of farmer attitudes to 
partnerships. However, it is interesting that this participant explicitly raised the 
question of bTB. As will be shown in the next chapter bTB represents the 
biggest barrier to success of the AHWS, and continuing Government 
reluctance to approve a cull of badgers has served to undermine the trust that, 
according to Defra and the EIG, is essential for the successful working of a 
partnership. When looking at partnerships, there appears to be broad agreement 
in Defra and on the EIG, about what, in practice, a partnership should be. 
Defra was not an essential partner in all cases and when it is, it does not always 
have to be the lead partner. In addition, Defra does not always have to be the 
partner who supplies the financial resources to a partnership. Important 
characteristics of a partnership include good management and trust between 
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partners. Most importantly, a shared common goal is required. Stakeholders at 
an EIG meeting noted that management was the key to success and that poorly 
managed partnerships could aggravate a situation (EIG 3, para. 107). 
 
THE WORK OF THE EIG 
 
Having looked at the composition of the EIG and its ways of working, and 
discussed some of the problems of defining key terms used in the AHWS, it is 
time to consider how the EIG has operated in practice on a number of issues to 
which it has given its attention. The issues discussed in this section are by no 
means an exhaustive list of topics that have come before the EIG. Performance 
Indicators are frequently used by Government as a management tool and so it 
is important to look at this tool of 1990s NPM in the context of a structure that 
represents an evolution from NPM managerialism. In addition it is an example 
of where the EIG staged something of a rebellion and sought to establish a 
degree of independence from Defra. Cost sharing is a key theme in the AHWS 
DQG KDV EHHQ RQH RI WKH (,*¶V most frequent topics of discussion. Regional 
difference was chosen as the EIG is the body responsible for the AHWS in 
England alone. In addition, because different regions of England have different 
farming profiles, they also have different disease priorities. Bovine TB is an 
important problem in the South West whereas this is not the case in North 
Yorkshire beyond the obvious point of wishing to prevent its introduction into 
the region. Farm Health Planning was chosen as it is one of the main 
mechanisms to deliver improved animal health. Finally, labeling was chosen 
for various reasons. It illustrates the extent to which progress on animal health 
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and welfare is unlikely to proceed at a pace faster than that accepted by the 
industry. In addition, the variety of schemes in place has resulted in a confused 
picture for the consumer, and finally, labeling is a means by which British 
farmers seek to differentiate their product from what they see as inferior 
imported meat. 
 
Performance Indicators 
 
The first appearance of performance indicators as an agenda item for the EIG 
was at its fourth meeting, held in York in November 2005. Eddie Routledge 
SUHVHQWHGWKHJURXSZLWKDWKLUWHHQSDJHUHSRUWDUJXLQJWKDWµ7KH(,*QHHGVWR
agree how it will measure progress towards the Vision set out in the AHW 
6WUDWHJ\ ,Q HIIHFW WKH (,* ZLOO QHHG WR µRZQ¶ WKH LQGLFDWRUV DW OHDVW ZLWK
UHJDUGWRSURJUHVVLQ(QJODQG¶3DSHU'3SUHVHQWHGWR(,*S7KLVZDV
because the indicators coulGEHVHHQDVSURYLGLQJµDIUDPHZRUNIRUPHDVXULQJ
SURJUHVV >RI WKH $+:6@ DQG FRXOG ZHOO EH VHHQ DV D PHDVXUH RI WKH (,*¶V
SURJUHVV¶(,*SDUD'HVSLWHVXFKZDUQLQJVWKDWWKHLQGLFDWRUVFRXOGEH
VHHQDVDPHDVXUHRISURJUHVVµ7KH\>LQGLFDWRUV@DUHQRW meant to be used for 
FRPSOHWHSROLF\HYDOXDWLRQQRUWRGHPRQVWUDWHFDXVHDQGHIIHFW¶3DSHU'3
S ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH\ VKRXOG QRW µEHFRPH RXWFRPHV LQ WKHLU RZQ ULJKW HJ
+RVSLWDOZDLWLQJOLVWV¶3DSHU'3S 
 
This presentation seemed to cause a degree of confusion among the EIG 
members. On the one hand indicators had to be owned by them as they 
represented the means by which their progress would be measured and on the 
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other they were not to be used as a means of policy evaluation, nor were they 
to be indicators used in the sense of targets, returning again to the hospital 
waiting list model. Further difficulty was caused as profitability was proposed 
as an indicator. Stuart Platt (Defra) who presented with Eddie Routledge, said 
that this indicator was included as rising animal health and welfare would lead 
to rising profitability (observation made at the meeting and also noted in EIG 4 
para 38). The desire to include profitability arose from consultation with 
'HIUD¶V$QLPDO+HDOWK'LUHFWRUDWH*Hneral. 
 
EIG members were not happy with the presentation. In particular members 
were critical of having indicators which supposedly measured their progress 
when they had no formal powers to control anything. Bill Swann and Dick 
Sibley, both vets, made this point; Sibley arguing that to have ownership of a 
thing requires responsibility also (observation made at the meeting). In 
addition, Richard Bennett noted that few of the indicators could be seen as 
indicators of the success of the strategy itself let alone of the EIG (EIG 4 para 
43). Furthermore, some of the disease indicators were for diseases for which 
little surveillance data was available. Dick Sibley again, noting that mastitis 
was included when no surveillance for the condition was available. He could 
also have mentioned that it is a condition with a varied aetiology, although 
often introduced via poor parlour hygiene. Other contributors mentioned the 
lack of indicators for companion animals. This lack, in a document with 11 
µKHDGOLQH¶LQGLFDWRUVDQG µFRUH¶LQGLFDWRUVZDVWKRXJKt surprising but may 
simply be a reflection that for all the supposed scope of the AHWS to cover all 
animal health and welfare questions from farmed to companion animals, the 
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main focus of work was always and necessarily going to be on the farmed 
sector. 
 
At the end of the debate the Chair suggested that the EIG discuss the matter 
further. A one day workshop was held and, although the workshop was 
mentioned as a matter of report at a subsequent EIG meeting (EIG 5, para 4) 
thHPDWWHUGLGQ¶WFRPHEHIRUHDQRWKHUPHHWLQJKHOGLQRSHQVHVVLRQ7KHILQDO
SXEOLVKHG LQGLFDWRUV DFFHSWHG PDQ\ RI WKH (,*¶V FULWLFLVPV 7KH QXPEHU RI
headline indicators was reduced to seven, reflecting the six strategy visions 
plus another headline indicator concerning partnership working and the 
number of core indicators reduced to 18. Furthermore, the document makes 
clear that the indicators are not targets. 
 
µ7KHVHLQGLFDWRUVDUHQRWLQWHQGHGDVWDUJHWVIRUDFWLRQEXWUDWKHUWR
JLYH D VQDSVKRW RI WKH ³VWDWH RI WKH QDWLRQ´ RI DQLPDO KHDOWK DQG
welfare in England such that people can see if the country is on 
track towards the world described by the Strategy. These indicators 
do not take the place of detailed evaluation of policies nor provide 
³FDXVH-and-efIHFW´H[SODQDWLRQVIRUFKDQJHVLQ WKHVWDWHRIDQLPDO
KHDOWKDQGZHOIDUH¶(,*ZHESDJH 
 
One problem that remains with the indicators is that of populating them with 
GDWD1LQHRI WKHFRUH LQGLFDWRUVDUHPDUNHGDV µXQGHUGHYHORSPHQW¶DV LV
the seventh headline indicator on partnership working. Helen Browning is 
clear that populating the indicators is a problem (Interview) but does not seem 
clear how progress towards that goal will be achieved. The lack of further 
agenda items on indicators suggests that Defra too is unsure how to obtain data 
for some of these questions. 
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,QEHLQJXQZLOOLQJWRDFFHSW'HIUD¶VRULJLQDOSURSRVDOVRQLQGLFDWRUVWKH(,*
can be seen to have staked a claim to a degree of independence from Defra. 
What has emerged is that the EI*LVQRZQRWµUHVSRQVLEOH¶VKRXOGDQ\RIWKH
indicators not be met. Indeed, one Defra official took the view that in fact the 
indicators should be used by the EIG µWRMXGJHRWKHUV¶,QWHUYLHZ'HIUDRIILFLDO
1). In general, indicators as a whole seem to have been reduced in importance 
for both the EIG and Defra so far as animal health is concerned. The focus has 
been much more on Farm Health Planning and Responsibility and Cost 
Sharing than on indicators. This is almost certainly caused by a combination of 
EIG reluctance to go down the indicator route as a measure of performance and 
difficulties in obtaining sufficient data on disease conditions that would give 
DQ\PHDQLQJIXOEDVLVIRUGLVFXVVLRQ7KLV ODWWHUGLIILFXOW\VWHPVIURP'HIUD¶V
approach to veterinary surveillance and collection of this data of which more 
later when the Veterinary Surveillance Strategy is observed in operation in two 
Defra laboratories. 
 
Farm health planning 
 
Both Defra and the EIG believe that changing behaviours is the primary means 
to ensure improved animal health and welfare. One tool which it is hoped will 
promote changed behaviour is the Farm Health Plan (FHP). Defra sees FHPs 
as an example of partnership working (Paper IP 7 presented to EIG 5, para 1). 
A Working Group was established which included a wide representation from 
the farming industry to progress FHPs.  
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)RU 'HIUD µ)DUP KHDOWK SODQQLQJ LV D SURDFWLYH DSSURDFK WR SRVLWLYH DQLPDO
KHDOWK LQFRUSRUDWLQJ DQLPDO GLVHDVH SUHYHQWLRQ DQG FRQWURO¶ 3DSHU ,3 S
This approach incorporates recognizing disease risks, biosecurity and the 
identification of cost effective measures to contribute to farm business 
planning. A significant element of FHP is the use of vets to advise farmers on 
good practice. For this reason vets are very keen on FHPs as they could 
provide a valuable income stream in the context of a profession where large 
animal practice is being reduced across the country and there are fears that the 
number of practices offering large animal medicine could continue to fall. 
 
The key selling point of FHPs is that they are held to deliver an economic 
benefit to farmers. This benefit arises through good biosecurity and other 
practice which reduces the incidence of disease in the first place. In theory 
FHPs are already commonplace as the various Animal Health Schemes and 
Farm Assurance Schemes already require farmers to have a plan. 
 
However, there are two problems with this approach. Firstly, farmers tend to 
see FHPs as a cost to themselves rather than as a means to better economic 
SHUIRUPDQFH&RQVHTXHQWO\WKH\WHQGWREHGRQHDVDPHUHµWLFNER[¶H[HUFLVH
as required by the various schemes come inspection rather than as Defra would 
like to see, as a living document. This story from a Cumbrian vet on being 
asked about FHPs is typical: 
 
µ:H WHQG WR JHW SKRQH FDOOV VD\LQJ ³, QHHG D +HDOWK 3ODQ WKH
$VVXUDQFH$VVHVVRU¶VFRPLQJRQ:HGQHVGD\´>ODXJK@6RZHZKLS
out the laptop and try and put something together. The success of 
P\DSSURDFKRIVD\LQJ³5LJKWFRPHLQKHUHZH¶OOVLt at a desk and 
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ZH¶OOJRWKURXJKLW´ I would think I might have had five do that. 
The rest seem to expect you to do it from their own memory of 
their situation. And they just want something to keep the assessor 
KDSS\¶,QWHUYLHZ3UDFWLFH9HW). 
 
As is this story from a different vet on being asked if he was involved in 
preparing farm health plans: 
 
µ2K\HV\HVZHXPWZRRUWKUHHRIWKHSUDFWLFHKDYHEHHQRIIRQ
the appropriate courses and so we do a lot of the herd health plan 
ILOOLQJ LQ , GRQ¶WSHUVRQDOO\ ,¶YHPanaged to avoid that one, but  
Vet and Vet and Vet do a lot of it and it is quite time consuming, 
but useful for all concerned. 
 
AS And do you see that as a way of reducing disease incidents in 
the medium term? 
 
 1RW UHDOO\ QR LW¶V LW¶V UHDlly just a paper filling exercise and I 
GRQ¶W WKLQN LW¶VKDGDQ\SRVLWLYHEHQHILWRQ WKHXVDJHRIGUXJVRQ
WKH IDUP RU GLVHDVH LQFLGHQFH DW DOO 1R LW¶V PRUH RI D SDVVLYH
recording of what has gone before rather than active planning for 
ZKDWVKRXOGFRPH¶(Interview Practice Vet 2). 
 
So farmers are not exactly knocking down the door of their vet practice to 
demand farm KHDOWK SODQQLQJ DQG QRU IURP WKH VHFRQG YHW¶s comments are 
some large animal vets convinced that FHPs are particularly effective. At one 
EIG meeting where FHP was discussed, David Main of Bristol Vet School said 
that farmers do not seem to be willing to act upon the results of a review and 
that generally there seems to be a problem getting farmers to have FHPs 
(observation at EIG 5).  
 
The second problem facing FHP is that the schemes that do require a farmer to 
have a plan do not set especially rigorous standards. Generally having a plan is 
sufficient even if record keeping is not up to date or the plan not used or acted 
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upon. The Red Tractor 6FKHPH LV LQGXVWU\RZQHGDQG UXQDQGVR µ6WDQGDUGV
are pitched at a level to complement legislation and include the codes of good 
DJULFXOWXUDOSUDFWLFH¶(,*SDUD 
If FHPs are to be a success then it will need to be on the basis that they deliver 
real economic benefits to farmers. Improvements in health and welfare alone 
without economic benefit will not be enough. There is a general belief that 
FHPs will deliver benefits to farmers and adoption of FHP varies across 
sectors. The pig sector has for some years promoted FHP to good effect while 
the dairy sector lags far behind. In an endeavour to show a positive cost benefit 
analysis Defra has funded a scheme to demonstrate the benefits of health 
planning. Richard Bennett of Reading University and an EIG member has run 
models with BVD which demonstrate that incurring costs such as vaccination 
does deliver economic benefits by reducing losses through mucosal disease 
and abortion. The problem remains one of getting the benefits understood by 
farmers. Although FHP has its own Working Group involving industry, 
ordinary farmers have yet to be persuaded of the merits of FHP. This may 
constitute a major reason for AHWS not delivering the improvements in 
animal health and welfare it hopes for. 
 
Regional Difference 
 
The EIG does not hold all of its meetings in London. Rather, it tries to hold 
several meetings in the various English regions. At these meetings, there are 
speakers from the region concerned who give a flavour of what is happening in 
the particular region. There is a widespread agreement on the need to have a 
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regional perspective as animal health problems vary across the regions. A 
survey of government offices by Defra revealed significant regional difference. 
Bovine tuberculosis was mentioned by many regions, while avian influenza 
was mentioned only by the eastern region. (EIG 8-9, 2006). Kate Sharpe of 
the, then, State Veterinary Service (now Animal Health) explained that the 
2001 FMD outbreak had allowed much to be learnt about regional difference 
(EIG 4 para.63). Sharpe said that the SVS was working in partnership with 
many stakeholders to tailor the AHWS to the needs of the local animal profile 
and that a pilot study had been undertaken to explore this (EIG 4 para. 65).  
 
Other government bodies also had a role to play in delivering the AHWS. 
Again at the York meeting, Gordon Jones from the Government Office of the 
North West explained that each government office was implementing the 
strategy in different ways (EIG 4 para. 55). In addition, although the 
government offices were ready to play a role in animal health, he did not think 
that they would be able to offer a leading role. 
 
One alternative was to use small-scale projects that required little coordination. 
One such scheme focused on tackling the problem of sheep scab, a significant 
problem in Yorkshire. This was an example of where a consultant with support 
from the regional SVS had managed to coordinate the efforts of local farmers 
and vets in support of an effective protocol to tackle the disease. The key to the 
success of the scheme was buy-in from both farmers and vets to ensure that 
proper procedures were followed as scab could quickly become re-established 
if even a few farmers stopped participating. 
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The picture across the regions varies, and not just in terms of disease profiles. 
At a meeting in the West Midlands, for example, there appeared to be a 
problem in coordinating efforts within the region with local leadership lacking 
(EIG 9 para. 40-41). What is clear is that the regional picture is complex and 
that there is significant scope for local innovation to tackle locally determined 
disease priorities. 
 
Labeling 
 
2QHZD\LQZKLFKPHDWFDQEHPDUNHWHGDVDµZHOIDUH-IULHQGO\¶SURGXFWLVE\
using labels to differentiate one product from another. However, as one EIG 
meeting learned, there are so many labeling schemes that consumers can 
become confused. Furthermore, labeling schemes are not just used to promote 
ZHOIDUH EHQHILWV WKH LGHD RI µORFDOLW\¶ LV DOVR SURPRWHG E\ WKH XVHRI ODEHOV
The Soil Association has a label for products certified by them as organic, the 
563&$KDVDµ)UHHGRP)RRGV¶ODEHOWKDWDGYHUWLVHVDKLJKHUZHOIDUHVWDQGDUG 
 
Assured Food Standards (AFS) runs the Red Tractor label. Their scheme sets 
standards for good agricultural practice and assessed every aspect of the 
production chain that had a bearing on food safety or the health and welfare of 
animals. Over 70,000 farms are certified by the AFS, covering some £5b worth 
of British produced food (EIG 5 para. 88 - 89). The scheme is owned and 
managed by the industry itself. The Red Tractor, therefore, makes some sort of 
FODLP WR µTXDOLW\¶ +RZHYHU ZKHQ TXHVWLRQHG E\ (,* PHPEHU 6DUDK
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Wolfensohn, the spokesman for the AFS admitted that the standard that was 
assessed was based on existing industry practice and legal requirements. It was 
QRWDµSUHPLXP¶ODEHODVVXFK)XUWKHUPRUHIDUPVIDLOLQJDQLQVSHFWLRQKDYHD
grace period to rectify their errors and do not lose scheme membership in the 
meanwhile (observation made at the meeting). 
 
(,*PHPEHU'LDQD0F&UHDFRQVLGHUHGWKDWWKHUHZDVµLQIRUPDWLRQRYHUORDG¶
in respect of labels. There were many different labeling schemes in place, each 
with a different message ± organic, locally produced, welfare premium, etc. 
3UHVHQWO\µWKHUHDUHWRRPDQ\JDSVEHWZHHQFRQVXPHUV¶H[SHFWDWLRQVDQGZKDW
WKHVFKHPHVSURYLGH¶(,*SDUD 
 
From the perspective of the AHWS, labeling potentially offers a way of 
DFKLHYLQJD µZHOIDUHSUHPLXP¶+RZHYHU DVKDVEHHQ VKRZQ WKLV LV KDUG WR
achieve where no standardization of labels exists. However, McCrea argued 
WKDW ODEHOLQJ GRHV RIIHU WKH SURVSHFW RI D µZLQ-ZLQ¶ IRU FRQVXPHUV DQG
producers delivering higher welfare (EIG 5 para. 100). The problem is that no 
one seemed at all sure how to bring this about, reflecting, perhaps, the lack of a 
single body with overall responsibility. 
 
Responsibility and cost sharing 
 
One of the key themes of the AHWS is the idea of responsibility and cost 
sharing, of balancing the costs and benefits of animal health and welfare 
between the industry and the taxpayer. The EIG has examined this question 
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several times. Responsibility and cost sharing is a difficult issue. Early 
discussions in May 2006 appeared to suggest that industry was unsure as to 
what was being offered or demanded (Presentation by Stewart Houston at EIG 
7).  
 
By November 2006, Defra at least, had a clearer idea of how it wanted to 
interpret responsibility and cost sharing. For Defra, this was a key theme in the 
AHWS and was concerned with altering the balance between government and 
industry and offered an opportunity to promote disease prevention, and a 
greater alignment between risk ownership and responsibility for managing the 
risk of a particular disease. The budgetary constraint of the Comprehensive 
Spending Review, were a 50% saving in the animal health and welfare budget 
had been identified was also highlighted as a driver in the process of shifting 
some responsibilities and costs from government to industry (EIG 10 
presentation by Stuart Roberts). Ten principles of responsibility and cost 
sharing were given including sharing cost only when there was a clear benefit 
to industry and that where costs were shared so could responsibility.  
 
A consultation document was issued in December 2007. This document 
reported on some already existing schemes where responsibility but not costs 
had been shared. These included the emerging diseases of avian influenza and 
bluetongue (Defra 2007, para 4.2 and 4.4). On cost sharing, the consultation 
document admitted that the phraVHFDQµSURYRNHVWURQJUHDFWLRQV¶'HIUD
para 7.2). At the time of writing, the sub group appointed by the EIG to 
consider this issue was awaiting collation of the 73 responses received to this 
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consultation. Once collated, there would be final decisions on what 
responsibility and cost sharing would look like. 
Of the issues discussed at the EIG, responsibility and cost sharing has 
provoked most controversy, with the exception of bTB. Some industry figures 
see the process as little more than passing on costs (observation of comments 
at EIG meetings). However, for Defra and the EIG, responsibility and cost 
sharing offers the possibility of a significant improvement in animal health and 
welfare, delivered in a partnership manner in keeping with the vision of the 
AHWS.  
 
VETERINARY SERVEILLANCE STRATEGY 
 
This section discusses how Defra has changed its use of science in delivering 
veterinary surveillance. As noted in the methods section in chapter two, two 
VLA laboratories were visited, each for a period of two weeks. The experience 
and observation of these labs at these times was able to be compared to how 
the VLA worked prior to 2000, the point at which I left having served for 11 
years LQ RQH RI WKH 9/$¶V UHJLRQDO ODERUDWRULHV. It was also possible to 
interview Roger Hancock, one of the directors of the VLA. 
 
Prior to 2000 the VLA had been in a phase of contraction. Labs had been 
closed at Liverpool and Lincoln during the late 80s and 1990s. The focus of 
the work was for each lab to provide a comprehensive diagnostic service for its 
local practice vets. Thus each lab did its own microbiology, biochemistry and 
virology with each centre acting as an expert reference lab for the rest in a 
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specialist area. So Penrith, for example, was expert on fish microbiology and 
Langford expert on mycology. Service to the local vet was the primary 
objective. Service to Defra, or indeed to the Central Veterinary Laboratory to 
which the regional labs had been joined in one agency in 1995, was a distant 
second order priority. 
 
Surveillance data was collected passively. That is, what was recorded was what 
came through the door. Vets do not have to report mastitis cases for example, 
nor determine the aetiology of an individual outbreak, and most do not. So data 
on mastitis as discussed above in relation to indicators was patchy at best. 
 
In the late 1990s there was some change to this passive approach. Diseases 
with a strong human health impact such as salmonella and, following the 1996 
outbreak in Lanarkshire of E coli O-157, that bacterium became subject to 
DFWLYHVXUYHLOODQFH'HIUDZDQWHG WRNQRZµZKDWZDVRXW WKHUH¶DQGDV'HIUD
ZDV DQG LV WKH 9/$¶V PDMRU FXVWRPHU WKH 9/$ REOLJHG 9LVLWV ZRXOG EH
arranged to farms to test animals for these conditions. Access to the farms was 
arrDQJHGLQFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKWKHIDUPHU¶VRZQSUDFWLFHYHW7KLVLVDQH[DPSOH
of the importance of personal relationships based upon trust. VLA vets would 
know practice vets well as they spoke to them often, would know some of 
them socially too. These relationships were based on the fact that the practices 
which XVHG WKH 9/$ RIWHQ ZRXOG EH KHOSHG E\ WKH 9/$¶V FRPSOHWH VHUYLFH
and would be willing to help the VLA as well.  
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The other change that had started to come into effect by 2000 was that services 
were gradually being rationalized. Not every lab in VLA would do every test. 
Cost was the driver behind rationalization. It is much cheaper for one lab to do 
2,000 ELISAs than for ten labs to do 200 in a day for example. So, serology 
was rationalized as was biochemistry and media production. These 
rationalizations were not popular with VLA vets in regional labs nor with 
practice vets whose personal fast complete service was being taken away. All 
private vets that I interviewed were unhappy with the loss of biochemistry 
from their local VLA lab (Interview Practice vets 1, 2, and 3). The 
consequence of this rationalization was that the VLA was used less by practice 
vets and that the VLA missed out on important surveillance data (Interview 
VLA laboratory manager). 
 
On returning to the VLA in 2005 for fieldwork it quickly became clear that the 
focus of the labs had changed. No longer was the private vet the primary 
customer but Defra. This culture change appeared to have become embedded 
LQSHRSOH¶VZD\RIWKLQNLQJVRIar as it was possible to tell. Certainly so far as 
management of the local labs was concerned but also at lower levels though in 
both cases with reluctance. I visited VLA North in March 2005. In 2000 the 
place would have been really busy, too busy, mostly with ovine foetuses 
submitted for diagnosis. But in 2005, although there were some, the whole 
place was quieter and calmer than before. Submission numbers were greatly 
below what was common by 2000. What had changed was that instead of 
offering a diagnostic service, the lab had branched out into more high tech 
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areas such as gene sequencing and bTB culture that were in line with Defra 
priorities rather than with private practice priorities.  
 
This change within the VLA from regarding practice vets as their most 
important customer to seeing Defra in that light was confirmed in an interview 
with a VLA director. Asked if he had noticed any changes in approach since 
Defra replaced MAFF, the director said: 
 
µ7KHFKDQJH IURP0$)) WR'HIUDKDVKDG OLWWOHYLVLEOH HIIect on 
the VLA other than perhaps to make, you could say that Defra is 
actually much more,um, risk aware as far as things such as the 
2001 epidemic is concerned and therefore has contingency plans in 
SODFH LWVHOI ZKLFK RI FRXUVH ZH¶UH WLHG LQWR , KDYH QRWiced very 
little difference, um, in Defra as a customer as opposed to MAFF 
as a customer. (Interview VLA director). 
 
There was evidence, however, that the 2001 FMD epidemic had resulted in 
significant change within the VLA. 
 
µ7KH&KLHI9HWHULQDU\2IILFHU¶V number one priority is to avoid an 
animal health crisis similar to 2001 so we have prioritised the 
diseases which she wishes to avoid. We have a contingency plan 
IRUHDFKRIWKHPVRPHRIZKLFKDV,VD\ZH¶UHWKHSULPDU\RZQHU
of, some of which PirbrighW LV WKH SULPDU\ RZQHU RI¶ ,QWHUYLHZ
VLA director). 
 
7KHVH FRQWLQJHQF\ SODQV ZHUH UHIHUUHG WR DV µGLVHDVH WHPSODWHV¶ DQG ZHUH LQ
place for all major Defra disease priorities. However, although the director 
thought that there were some differences in policy style, he was not convinced 
that Defra was markedly different to MAFF so far as the VLA was concerned 
and that changes in policy style could be observed from the days when the 
VLA was an agency of MAFF rather than Defra. Asked what changes he had 
observed, he replied: 
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µ7R P\ PLQG WKHUH DSSHDUV WR EH D PXFK ZLGHU FRQVXOWDWLRQ RQ
SROLF\ WKDQ WKHUH ZDV SUHYLRXVO\ 7KHUH¶V PXFK JUHDWHU
involvement of stakeholders. We already could feel that MAFF 
was becoming progressively less secretive in its working; Defra 
has gone on from that to become very open and in fact the current 
Chief Veterinary Officer did come in saying that she had breathed 
the oxygen of openness and transparency in the Food Standards 
Agency and she intended to continue that in her role in Defra. So, 
yes, there is definitely a much more open and consultative process 
WKURXJKZKLFKSROLF\LVGHYHORSHG¶,QWHUYLHZ9/$GLUHFWRU 
 
There was one significant difference, however, although the difference had not 
been experienced much by the VLA itself: 
 
µPossibly one of the most significant is that animal health and 
ZHOIDUH LV RQO\ D VPDOO SDUW RI 'HIUD¶V UHPLW DQG WKHUHIRUH WKH
Director General who looks after our area of interest, the Chief 
Veterinary Officer, is a relatively smaller player than the Chief 
9HWHULQDU\ 2IILFHU ZDV LQ 0$)) %XW WKDW WRR KDVQ¶W KDG DQ\
YLVLEOHLPSDFWWKDW,¶YHEHHQDEOHWRVHH¶,QWHUYLHZ9/$GLUHFWRU 
 
During the two periods of fieldwork at VLA regional laboratories it was 
possible to observe how these changes had affected the day to day working of 
the labs. The emphasis on Defra as a customer had resulted in much work 
EHLQJVWUXFWXUHGDURXQGVL[WKHPHVZKLFKµVLPSO\ UHIOHFWPLQLVWHULDOSULRULW\¶
(Interview VLA director). The three largest programmes are for Transmissible 
Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs) and Statutory and Exotic Bacteria which 
LQFOXGHVWKH9/$¶VZRUNRQERWKUHVHDUFKDQGGLDJQRVLVRIE7%7KLUGLVWKH
(PHUJLQJ 'LVHDVH 3URJUDPPH ZKLFK FRYHUV ZKDW LV NQRZQ DV µVFDQQLQJ
VXUYHLOODQFH¶ WR ILQGRXW WKH LQFLGHQFHRf disease and to detect any emerging 
new diseases. 
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These priority areas had affected the work that the regional laboratories carried 
out. At both regional laboratories there was space set aside for the culture of 
bovine tuberculosis from lymph nodes. This was relatively new to both of 
these labs and in one case had resulted in the construction of a separate 
building to house the work as such cultures require a high level of biosecurity. 
In addition, at one laboratory, work was taking place to refit one of the 
laboratories to carry out the gamma interferon test for bTB. At VLA North, 
there was a dedicated laboratory for molecular microbiology. The centre had 
established this laboratory to carry out testing for a gene in sheep that made the 
animal susceptible to developing scrapie. However, this work was no longer 
done at VLA North; instead, the lab had been designated a centre of excellence 
for molecular biology and carried out genetic testing for a variety of diseases. 
 
At both laboratories, the organisation of work had changed to reflect the 
FKDQJHVLQSULRULWLHVWKDWKDGUHVXOWHGIURP'HIUD¶VDSSURDFKWRDQLPDOKHDOWK
Staff, too, recognised that change had occurred and were aware that Defra was 
now their biggest and most important customer whereas, in my time in the 
VLA, most considered the diagnostic work for the private vets to be the most 
important aspect of the work. However, although staff recognised these 
changes, most were not aware that they had been prompted by new animal 
health policies and some were unaware of the existence of the AHWS, 
Veterinary Surveillance Strategy and the bTB strategy. One exception to this 
was the officer in charge of bTB work at VLA Midlands who had read the bTB 
strategy and had discussed it with her staff so that they were aware of their 
roles in the wider context. She wanted people to know why they were coming 
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into work as the actual work in the category three lab was somewhat routine 
and dull (discussion at VLA Midlands). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has examined the AHWS and its daughter strategy, the Veterinary 
6XUYHLOODQFH6WUDWHJ\(YLGHQFHWKDW'HIUD¶VDSSURDFKWRDQLPDOKHDOWKSROLF\
has changed from that seen under MAFF has been found. In the case of the 
AHWS, the EIG is a good example of a new type of governance structure 
designed to facilitate key themes in the AHWS, such as partnership working, 
stakeholder participation and the idea that prevention is better than cure. The 
EIG has promoted these ideas through open meetings, active engagement with 
stakeholders and promotion of the idea of farm health plans. 
 
Progress with these themes has been patchy, however. Part of the problem lay 
in the arriving at an understanding within the EIG on definitions of some 
concepts. The EIG has constructed meanings for words like stakeholder and 
partnership that enable work to go ahead, while at the same time, reflecting 
examples of current practice. In the case of welfare, what was particularly 
significant was the downgrading of the importance of the concept relative to 
health coupled with a reluctance to challenge existing industry practices. 
Though the EIG works in a very open way, some of its outputs can be seen as 
demonstrating that industry interests retain a strong position. The EIG has also 
struggled to promote farm health plans although work in this area is ongoing. 
Responsibility and cost sharing has been a particularly difficult issue for the 
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(,*ZKLFKKDVKDG WR WU\DQGFRPEDW WKH LGHD WKDW LW¶V MXVWDERXWSDVVLQJRQ
cost to the industry at a time of increasing financial constraints upon Defra. 
Although some industry bodies are sympathetic to the idea, particularly the pig 
industry (comments by Stewart Houston to the EIG), other sectors remain 
either unconvinced or hostile. In the light of the decision not to issue licences 
to farmers to cull badgers to try and control bTB, the NFU withdrew from talks 
on the responsibility and cost sharing agenda. Perhaps this is another example 
RIµIRRWVWRPSLQJ¶,QWHUYLHZ'HIUDRIILFLDOLQWKHFRQWH[WRIE7%SROLF\LQ
the hope of gaining concessions. Progress has also been hampered by a 
complex and fragmented delivery landscape for animal health and welfare 
which requires reform to bring it under control (Eves 2006). The separation of 
bTB to another body, the establishment of a sub-group to focus on 
responsibility and cost sharing and the very recent announcement of a review 
of the future of the EIG must raise a doubt as to the future role, if any, of the 
EIG in providing that control. 
 
In considering the working of the Veterinary Surveillance Strategy there is 
evidence that change was underway prior to Defra. However, post-2001 FMD 
WKHSDFHRI UHIRUPKDV TXLFNHQHGDQG WKH ZRUNRI WKH9/$¶V ODERUDWRULHV LV
now more focused on the delivery of Defra priorities rather than those of local 
private vets. This was observed in fieldwork to the two laboratories in the form 
of new working patterns and organisation of work, and in throughput of work 
in marked contrast to my time in the VLA. These observations were confirmed 
in interviews and casual conversations with VLA staff. 
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Chapter 6: Bovine Tuberculosis 
 
Some animal health diseases arrive unexpectedly, like a bolt from the blue. 
BSE is perhaps the best known example of this. These diseases are new, of 
unknown aetiology, and the risks to both animal and human health are 
unknown. The role of science in these cases is to begin to understand the 
disease more, to get some idea of what causes it, how it spreads and what the 
impact is likely to be. Another set of diseases are those such as FMD. Here, the 
disease is well understood and its effects on both human and animal health are 
well known and understood. As would be expected, policy to deal with an 
outbreak is well established. However, even in this class of disease, as was 
demonstrated earlier, there is often an element of the unknown. In the case of 
FMD this arose as a consequence of the long time gap since the previous 
outbreak which had the consequence that many practicing veterinary surgeons 
KDGQHYHUVHHQDµOLYH¶FDVHLQWKHLUFOLQLFDOSUDFWLFHAs we saw with the 2001 
outbreak the expertise of one set of scientists, veterinary surgeons, was 
overridden in the eyes of policy makers by the expertise of another set of 
scientists in the form of epidemiologists. Their modelling expertise came to be 
seen as the means to quickly get the outbreak under control. Instead of using 
epidemiology in conjunction with the local knowledge that vets had to 
contribute, the policy makers supplanted one form of science with another, 
arguably to the detriment of the attempt to deal with the outbreak. 
 
Bovine tuberculosis (bTB) is not like either of the above two diseases. Like the 
poor, it appears that it will always be with us. The aetiology of bTB is well 
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known, although gaps in scientific knowledge exist. For example, it is not clear 
what role, if any, is played in the maintenance of the disease by wildlife 
reservoirs, in particular by badgers. 
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the science of TB. In particular, note 
will be made of the potential for error inherent in the method of testing 
employed. Then there is a brief history of policy employed to eradicate and 
contain bTB since the 1930s. Importantly, the disease was initially controlled 
to manageable levels by the use of measures focussing on cattle only. Thirdly, 
the debate that originated in the early 1970s around the role of badgers in 
infecting cattle with TB is discussed. This culminates in the recent public 
consultation on badger culling which provoked a record number of responses.  
 
It will be shown that Defra appeared to be very keen to retain culling as a 
policy option despite difficulties arising from issues of practicality, public 
consent and lack of clear scientific evidence to support such a cull. Finally, the 
governance arrangements that have arisen from the ten year strategy are 
described and discussed, concluding that Defra has been obliged to revert to a 
more in-house and private style of policy making more characteristic of MAFF 
than the open and transparent approach seen in the case of the AHWS. 
 
THE SCIENCE OF BOVINE TUBERCULOSIS 
 
Bovine TB is a zoonotic infection of cattle caused by the bacterium 
Mycobacterium bovis. The bacterium that causes tuberculosis in humans, M. 
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tuberculosis is closely related to M. bovis, as is M. avium ssp. paratuberculosis 
which causes a wasting enteric disease in cattle, Johnes disease, and is 
LPSOLFDWHGLQWKHKXPDQFRQGLWLRQ&URKQ¶V'LVHDVH 
 
M.bovis can infect all land mammals (Defra 2005b, p.1) although these hosts 
vary in their ability to pass on the infection. Badgers are an important wildlife 
reservoir of M.bovis, although their role in transmitting the disease to cattle is 
little understood and remains the cause of significant controversy. Deer also 
can become infected and transmit the disease within their own population and 
to other species. 
 
M.bovis is a slow growing microaerophilic organism. This makes the lungs an 
important site of infection. The fact that it is so slow growing, taking six to 
eight weeks in optimised laboratory conditions to grow, makes routine 
bacterial culture useless as a diagnostic method. A further difficulty in 
culturing M.bovis is that infected animals do not excrete organisms in a steady 
flow. On some days animals may excrete huge numbers of bacteria (super 
excretors), while the same animal may, on other days, not excrete observable 
numbers of bacilli. 
 
In addition to the lungs, bacilli may survive within T lymphocytes. The 
immune response to infection by M.bovis attempts elimination by 
phagocytocis, yet the survival of bacilli within cells makes the complete 
elimination of infection highly unlikely. Sites of infection are thus walled off 
by the body in tubercles. While such tubercles may remain latent for many 
 186 
months or years, they may grow and spawn secondary tubercles throughout the 
body (Hancox 2000, p.88).  
 
As bacterial culture is ineffective in diagnosing bovine TB, although used in 
confirming a diagnosis, diagnostic tests rely on the detection of an immune 
response. In the UK, a skin test (the Single Intradermal Comparative Cervical 
Tuberculin (SICCT)) is presently the definitive test in cattle. Inactivated 
proteins from M. bovis DUHLQRFXODWHGLQWKHVNLQRIDQDQLPDO¶VQHFN$VHFRQG
site on the neck is inoculated with proteins from M. avium. This is because 
cattle may have become exposed to this cause of avian TB, and will produce an 
immune response to it, although M. avium does not go on to cause disease in 
cattle. Three days post inoculation, the sites are examined. A positive test, one 
which results in an animal being clasVHG DV D µUHDFWRU¶ LV RQH LQ ZKLFK WKH
reaction to the site of M. bovis inoculation is 5mm or more than the reaction to 
M. avium inoculation (Defra 2005b, p.4). In a herd test, these reactor animals 
are slaughtered and examined post mortem. Lesions typical or suggestive of 
TB are then cultured under laboratory conditions. Lesions are most likely to 
occur in the lungs or in the lymph nodes of the lung and throat. A reactor 
becomes a confirmed case of bTB when M.bovis is successfully isolated from 
these cultures. Should this occur then the herd from which the animal was 
UHPRYHG LV GHHPHG WR KDYH H[SHULHQFHG D µEUHDNGRZQ¶ 6NLQ WHVWV IURP WKDW
herd are then re-examined and any animal where the M.bovis reaction is 3mm 
or more than the M.avium site is now deemed also to be infected with M.bovis 
(Defra 2005b, p.4). 
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The SICCT has a drawback that is common to many tests which attempt to 
detect an immune response in an animal. The drawback is that such tests 
cannot be 100% accurate. There is a balance to be struck between specificity, 
the certainty that the organism that has provoked the immune reaction is 
indeed the one that is being tested for, and sensitivity, that is the likelihood that 
the test will pick up a positive. The greater the sensitivity the greater the 
chance that the test will pick up a reaction that is a false positive. The greater 
the specificity, the greater the chance that a positive animal will be missed and 
that it will give a false negative result. The sensitivity of the SICCT, that is the 
ability of the test to detect all positive animals, is believed by Defra to vary 
between 77% and 95% based on the results of a number of studies. Sensitivity 
between these parameters means that for every 100 infected animals tested, the 
test will fail to pick up between 5 and 23 cases depending on the sensitivity of 
the particular batch of tests being performed (Defra 2005b, p.4). Sensitivity of 
the test is thought to be very good, at least 99%. This means that of 100 
uninfected animals tested only 1 will give a false positive reaction (Defra 
2005b, p.4). 
 
M. bovis used to be a significant cause of disease in humans. In the 1930s there 
were some 2,000 deaths annually from bovine TB (Hancox 2002, p.224). The 
consumption of raw milk was the usual source of infection, but as 
pasteurisation of milk became routine, the number of cases dropped. In 2001, 
only 40 cases of tuberculosis in humans were the result of infection with M. 
bovis. Doctors consider that most of these were contracted abroad or were the 
reactivation of lesions pre-dating milk pasteurisation (Defra 2005b, p.7). So 
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although bovine TB is a zoonotic disease, the risk of infection to humans today 
is very low. Those working in direct contact with infected animals are at the 
highest risk, while the risk to the general public is exceedingly small. 
 
While the human impact of the disease has been reduced, the impact of bovine 
TB on the farming industry remains significant. In 2003, 6% of cattle herds 
suffered TB breakdown (Defra 2005a, p.20), mostly concentrated in the 
southwest and west of England, and the southwest of Wales (Reynolds 2006, 
p.119). New herd breakdowns are running at an average of 18% increase per 
annum (Defra 2005a, p.20). The economic cost to the taxpayer has risen from 
£38.2m in 1999/00 to £88.2m in 2003/04 (Defra 2005a, p.26). This figure is 
mostly made up of the costs of herd testing and compensation to farmers. 
However, £14.3m was spent on research into bTB including the costs of the 
Randomised Badger Culling Trial (RBCT). The remaining sums were spent on 
a variety of other bovine TB related expenditure. The cost of testing and 
compensation alone for 2003/04 was £67.6m. The 2001 FMD epidemic 
appears to have had an adverse affect upon bovine TB with areas of the 
country previously with a low incidence of bovine TB experiencing new 
breakdowns following restocking. In Cumbria, for example, the vast majority 
of new TB cases can be linked to restocked herds post 2001 FMD outbreak, or 
to bought in infected animals (Defra 2005a, p.23). It is worth noting that 
during the FMD epidemic, routine bovine TB testing was in abeyance. 
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HISTORY OF bTB CONTROL 
 
As noted above, in the 1930s human infections of tuberculosis from cattle were 
commonplace. While we take for granted today the existence of a wide range 
of anti-microbial agents, in the 1930s antibiotics were not available. TB was 
thus a major human health problem. However, the human health risks from 
consumption of infected milk were recognised long before the 1930s. The 
Royal Commission on Tuberculosis (1907) established the common identity of 
the disease in both man and cattle (Macrae 1961, p.81). However, control 
measures were only introduced from 1913 onwards and only then to deal with 
cases of clinically diagnosed infection. Testing of cattle for bTB was 
introduced in 1935, initially on a voluntary basis in order to obtain attested 
status for a herd. This was introduced under the Milk Act 1934, the aim of 
which was to improve the quality of the milk sent for human consumption. A 
farmer who managed to obtain attested status for his herd would be paid a 
bonus of one penny per gallon of milk sold through the Milk Marketing Board. 
The basis of the scheme was, in essence, the same as it is today. Cattle were 
tested at regular intervals and the farmer was obliged to remove any reactors 
from his herd or lose his attested status. 
 
Take up of the Attested Herd Scheme was slow, such that by the end of 1936 
there were only 414 attested herds in the country. In addition, during 1936, 
23,716 cattle were slaughtered as a consequence of a diagnosis of tuberculosis 
(Macrae 1961). The Agriculture Act 1937 empowered the Minister to take 
action to eradicate TB and other animal diseases. Changes were made to the 
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benefits to farmers in having an attested herd and by the end of 1938 the 
number of such herds had increased to 5,353. 
 
Eradication of the disease as a policy goal was decided upon in 1950 (the 
Defra website says that testing and slaughter became compulsory in 1950, but 
that does not tell the whole story) (Defra 2007) with measures being taken 
under the 1937 Act to declare an area an eradication area. When such an area 
was declared then herds that were not attested were placed under movement 
restriction. In addition, such non-attested herds were now tested marking the 
point at which compulsory rather than voluntary testing was introduced into 
Britain. However, this was not as draconian as it might first appear. Notice had 
to be given to declare an area an eradication area. During the notice period 
which in practice amounted to two years (Macrae 1961), testing of non-attested 
herds would be paid for by the state setting the precedent for such tests to be 
paid for from the public purse. All farmers had to do to qualify for free testing 
was to dispose of the reactor carcases in accordance with Ministry guidelines. 
Reactors to the test were compulsorily slaughtered with compensation being 
paid to the farmer. Within the eradication area once all herds had been tested 
on two occasions and the reactors slaughtered, then the whole area would be 
declared an attested area. The intention was to declare new eradication areas 
each year until the point was reached that the whole country was one complete 
attested area. This goal was finally achieved in October 1960. 
 
It is important to QRWHWKDWE\µHUDGLFDWLRQ¶LWLVQRWPHDQWWKDWWKHGLVHDVHZDV
wholly eradicated in the sense that smallpox was eradicated in humans, but 
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that the disease is reduced to such low incidence as to be insignificant. The 
policy of declaring eradication areas until the whole country was an attested 
area was successful and, combined with annual testing of all herds (which still 
occurs for some other diseases such as Brucellosis), incidence of bTB was 
reduced to a low point of 89 affected herds in the country, mostly in the 
southwest of England by 1979 (Hancox 2002, p.223). However, even in 1961 
0DFUDH ZDV FODLPLQJ WKDW µ%RYLQH WXEHUFXORVLV LV QRZ DW OHDVW XQGHU
VDWLVIDFWRU\FRQWUROLQ*UHDW%ULWDLQ¶0DFUDH7KHFRVWZDVHVWLPDWHGDW
around £130m, the bulk of it going on bonus payments and compensation to 
farmers for loss of reactor animals. 
 
Other demands on the animal health budget, in particular BSE, led to annual 
testing being abandoned in 1992/3 and replaced with a system where herds 
were tested every 1, 2, 3 or 4 years calculated by the SVS (now Animal 
Health) on the basis of parish incidence of bovine TB. Hancox argues that this 
relaxation of the testing regime is responsible for the increase in bTB cases 
observed over the last fifteen years or so (Hancox 2002, p.223).  
 
The programme of testing of cattle and slaughtering of reactor animals does, 
KRZHYHU UHPDLQ DW WKH KHDUW RI 'HIUD¶V VWUDWHJ\ WR GHDO ZLWK E7% DOWKRXJK
QRZ'HIUD VD\V WKDW WKLV LV D VWUDWHJ\ WR µVWRS LWV VSUHDG¶ UDWKHU WKDQXVH WKH
language of eradication (Defra 2007). There have been some modifications to 
the testing regime other than the introduction of longer testing intervals. In 
November 2004 a range of relatively minor amendments was made with the 
aim of improving detection and reducing the spread of the disease. The main 
 192 
measure was the adoption of a zero tolerance approach towards late TB tests. If 
a farm becomes overdue for a test, movement restrictions come into force 
immediately rather than, as previously, a grace period of three months being 
allowed. 
 
In December 2005 pre-movement testing of cattle was announced. However, 
after a vigorous campaign of opposition by the NFU and livestock auctioneers, 
the effective date for full implementation of this policy was delayed until 1 
March 2007. The issue of pre-movement testing and opposition to cattle 
controls is discussed in more detail below. 
 
BOVINE TUBERCULOSIS AND BADGERS (meles meles) 
 
Despite the considerable success in reducing bTB to manageable levels, 
infection has always persisted. As noted above, some areas have been 
LGHQWLILHGDVµKRWVSRWV¶RILQIHFWLRQ7KHUHDVRQZK\LQIHFWLRQVPLJKWSHUVLVWLQ
such areas has been long debated. As long ago as 1961, Macrae identified a 
number of possible reasons including problems of disinfection on some farms, 
the failure rate of the test to detect infected animals, the possibility of infection 
from humans and domestic animals (thought unlikely) and, finally, the 
possibility of a reservoir of infection in other species. Macrae considered goats 
and pigs and suggests that farmers who keep such a mixture of animals on their 
farm may be required to keep these animals apart from their cattle. Macrae, a 
MAFF vet, did not consider the possibility of wildlife acting as a reservoir of 
infection, and badgers were not mentioned by him at all (Macrae 1961). 
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Badgers have come under suspicion since the early 1970s as a possible wildlife 
reservoir of infection since an infected badger was found on a TB affected 
farm in Gloucestershire. Since then, badgers have been regarded by MAFF and 
Defra as a significant cause of infection. Experiments where badgers and cattle 
were housed together seemed to suggest that badgers could pass the disease to 
cattle although the mode of transmission was not demonstrated nor, seemingly, 
was the likelihood that badgers and cattle would in practice be housed together 
long enough for transmission to occur considered.  
 
In its summary of current scientific knowledge relating to bovine tuberculosis 
(Defra 2005b) published along with the Strategic Framework for the 
Sustainable control of bovine tuberculosis (bTB) in Great Britain (Defra 
2005a), Defra provided a summary of current scientific knowledge on the issue 
of badgers and bovine tuberculosis.  
 
Infection of badgers with TB is thought to be by inhalation (the aerosol route) 
and, as badgers are territorial animals as a consequence of receiving a bite 
from an already infected badger. Female badgers may also infect their cubs 
although not via the placenta or through infected milk (Defra 2005b, p.12). 
Badgers come into contact with cattle in their search for food, especially 
earthworms which are found more numerously in pasture and which are easier 
to find for the badgers because of the short grass. 
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History of badger controls 
 
Following on from this work the Badger Act 1973 was passed giving the 
minister power to issue licences to kill badgers in the interests of preventing 
the spread of disease (Defra 2005d). Farmers granted licences to kill badgers 
on their own land under the provision of the 1973 Act did so primarily by 
shooting or by trapping (Wilkinson 2007, p.5). 
 
However, these practices gave rise to concerns over the welfare of the badgers 
and to concerns about the lack of controls over those licensed to kill badgers. 
Responding to these concerns, MAFF determined that only its own staff or 
those people under its control would henceforth be licensed to kill the animals. 
Welfare was addressed by specifying the method of killing. Shooting or 
trapping were no longer to be permitted but badgers were to be killed by 
gassing. The killing of badgers by this method was permitted, with no irony 
intended, under the Conservation of Wild Creatures and Wild Plants Act 1975.  
 
Gassing badgers was carried out using cyanide gas, killing the badgers in their 
setts. These operations were carried out in 166 areas across the South West of 
England. The average area for each cull was 7km2 (Wilesmith 1986 quoted in 
ISG 2007, p.28). Within this programme of gassing badgers an area around 
Thornbury in Gloucestershire was repeatedly cleared of badgers between 1975 
and 1982 resulting in the effective elimination of badgers from the area. In the 
following ten years there were no confirmed herd breakdowns in cattle within 
that area (Clifton-Hadley et al 1995 quoted in ISG 2007, p.28). 
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As was the case with trapping and shooting, the gassing of badgers also 
provoked concerns on the grounds of animal welfare. These concerns led to the 
first of several reviews of bTB policy in respect of badgers, the Zuckerman 
Review which was published in 1980. While Zuckerman was carrying out his 
review, gassing was halted. His review came to the conclusion that badgers 
were a wildlife reservoir of M.bovis and that badgers could spread the disease 
to cattle. Cattle infections had increased during the period of the review and so 
Zuckerman recommended that gassing should recommence as a control 
measure. However, he also sought to address the concerns of those who saw 
gassing as inhumane by recommending experimental research into how 
badgers died in the setts when gassed; were these deaths quick and humane? 
Following these experiments the Minister took the decision that gassing was 
not a humane method of killing and ruled that it should no longer be used. 
Instead he permitted killing by trapping the badgers in cages and then shooting 
them.  
 
Zuckerman had recommended that in order to tackle the problem of badgers 
LQIHFWLQJ FDWWOH D µFOHDQ ULQJ¶ VWUDWHJ\ ZDV UHTXLUHG 2QFH D KHUG KDG
experienced bTB and had the disease confirmed by the presence of visible TB 
lesions in the carcase and/or a successful laboratory culture of M.bovis from 
tissues taken from the slaughtered reactor animal, a case for considering a cull 
RIEDGJHUVDURXQGWKHIDUPFRXOGEHPDGH7KHµFOHDQULQJ¶VWUDWHJ\ZDVbased 
upon sampling badgers from social groups around the infected farm following 
a detailed mapping of badger population in the area. As no rapid test for 
M.bovis in the badger existed, sampled badgers would be trapped, killed and 
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then examined post mortem. Cultures from the carcases were taken. Where a 
positive badger was found the whole social group of animals would be culled. 
Then a second round of sample testing would be carried out on badger setts 
contiguous to the now culled sett. This process continued until an area was 
declared to have badgers that were uninfected, or at least found to be 
uninfected by this method. Within the cleared area monitoring, trapping and 
killing of badgers continued for a period of six months in order to keep the 
area free, µFOHDQ¶RILQIHFWHGEDGJHUV7KLVSROLF\UHOLHGXSRQWKHDVVXPSWLRQ
that infection of badgers occurred within pockets of infected social groups 
(ISG 2007, p.28). In the South West of England cases of bTB in cattle believed 
to have originated from badgers were treated in accordance with this clean ring 
policy. The policy recommended by Zuckerman was expensive and time 
consuming. Zuckerman had further recommended another review of policy in 
WKUHH \HDUV¶ WLPH 7KDW UHYLHZ FRQGXFWHG E\ 3URIHVVRU 'XQQHWW UHSorted in 
1986. 
 
Dunnett did not come to the same conclusions as Zuckerman. Dunnett noted 
the drop in the number of cases of TB that had occurred in the South West in 
the period immediately following the commencement of gassing. However, 
although this was considered by some to have been a consequence of the 
gassing operations, Dunnett found that bTB incidence had dropped across the 
country including in Northern Ireland where no gassing or culling of badgers 
had taken place at all. Dunnett concluded that insufficient evidence existed to 
support the assertion that gassing had caused the reduction in cases in the 
South West. Furthermore, doubts were cast on the underlying principle behind 
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=XFNHUPDQ¶V FOHDQ ULQJ VWUDWHJ\ WKH LGHD WKDW LQIHFWHG EDGJHUV ZHUH WR EH 
found in pockets around a farm that had experienced a breakdown. The costs 
of this policy were also considered high given the doubts surrounding both its 
basis and its efficacy. The high costs associated with the clean ring policy were 
not thought to be justified. 
 
In the light of these doubts and concerned about the lack of information 
available to demonstrate the benefits of culling badgers, Dunnett proposed an 
interim strategy. This strategy relied upon farmers taking responsibility for the 
disease in part upon themselves by taking measures to keep cattle and badgers 
VHSDUDWH 6XFK PHDVXUHV ZRXOG WRGD\ EH FODVVHG DV ELRVHFXULW\ 'XQQHWW¶V
report was the first time that farmers were expected to take some action for 
themselves in their own defence from the disease rather than as had previously 
been the case, MAFF carrying out the policy and subsequently compensating 
farmers for their losses as a consequence of the policy. Culls of badgers would 
only be permitted where an outbreak might reasonably be supposed to have 
been acquired from badgers. In addition, a cull would not be widespread as 
could potentially be the case under the clean ring policy, but would be 
UHVWULFWHGWRWKHIDUPHU¶VRZQODQGWKDWZDVRFFXSLHGE\WKHDIIHFWHGKHUG 
 
It should not be forgotten that by 1979 the annual herd incidence of bTB had 
reached a record low point both nationally and in the troubled hotspot of the 
South West and so one might reasonably ask why there was a continued focus 
upon the badger as a cause of infection in cattle when incidence of the disease 
was at a low point. However, from the 1980s onwards, rates of infection in 
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cattle began to rise and the disease again posed a serious problem for both 
farmers and policy makers. The policy response was to order a new review, 
this time under the chairmanship of John Krebs. While this group worked on 
the problem badger culling in line with the interim strategy were suspended. 
The scope of the Krebs Review was more wide ranging than the Zuckerman 
and Dunnett reviews. The Group was larger also than either of the two 
previous reviews. In respect of the role played by badgers in the transmission 
of bTB to cattle the group concluded that badgers played a role as a source of 
infection but that it was, with the present state of knowledge, unable to give a 
firm recommendation on killing badgers as there had not been any proper 
experiments carried out. Furthermore, the review noted that the link between 
badgers and cattle TB was one that depended upon correlations rather than one 
that had been demonstrated as a clear one of cause and effect. The Krebs 
review was thus not in a position to give a clear steer to policy in respect of 
badger culling. Krebs also noted that existing MAFF guidelines on keeping 
badgers and cattle apart, as recommended by the earlier Dunnett Review, were 
not widely adhered to by farmers. 
 
This inability on the part of the Krebs group to make clear recommendations 
was the subject of questioning by the House of Commons Agriculture 
Committee. Peter Luff, the committee cKDLU UHIHUULQJ WR WKH µVHQVH RI
disappointment that some farmers have expressed to me certainly that you 
laboured mightily for 18 months or two years and just concluded that there was 
QRW HQRXJK HYLGHQFH WR FRQFOXGH DQ\WKLQJ¶ +RXVH RI &RPPRQV  S
Krebs responded by saying that where there was uncertainty scientists should 
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acknowledge that this was the case and not seek to provide answers. Under 
further questioning from Austin Mitchell, Krebs elaborated on the nature of the 
XQFHUWDLQW\)LUVWO\µ7Kere may be a link [between badgers and cattle TB] but 
it may only be five or ten per cent of the problem, or it may be 90 per cent of 
WKHSUREOHP¶DQGVHFRQGO\LIWKHUHLVDVLJQLILFDQWFRQWULEXWLRQµZHVWLOOGRQRW
know whether culling badgers is an effective way of reducing or eliminating 
WKHSUREOHP¶+RXVHRI&RPPRQVS 
 
The most significant recommendation of the Krebs report was that MAFF set 
up an experiment to quantify the impact of culling badgers as a control 
measure. This experiment should be set up and monitored by a new 
independent group of experts. Importantly, Krebs said that this would enable 
MAFF to carry out a cost-benefit analysis of killing badgers to control bTB in 
cattle. The experiment would be carried out in TB hotspots. In the rest of the 
country Krebs recommended that no badger culling should take place, 
considering the benefits of a cull outside of the hotspot areas to be low. The 
expert group recommended by Krebs was set up in 1998 as the Independent 
Scientific Group on Cattle TB (ISG) and was charged with carrying out the 
experiment recommended by Krebs. The experiment was known as the 
5DQGRPLVHG%DGJHU&XOOLQJ7ULDO5%&7RUWKHµ.UHEV7ULDO¶ 
 
Before the Krebs Trial could begin the ISG had a number of practical problems 
to overcome. Principal among these problems was deciding upon the method 
of culling to be employed. There was a need to strike a balance between the 
efficient culling of badgers and concerns for the welfare of the animals. In this, 
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the ISG was faced with the same difficulty that had faced previous policy 
makers on culling. Krebs had suggested that traps could be used but did not 
rule out the use of snares. The ISG took the view that traps only would be used 
as the use of snares may result in public objections to the trial and perhaps also 
to protests. On similar grounds, gassing, which had been discontinued in 1982 
on the grounds that it was considered to be inhumane was also ruled out. But 
there was another reason for not using gas; with gassing the badgers die 
underground in their setts. This meant that the badger carcases would not be 
available to the scientists for examination. In addition, it was clear that 
Ministers would not countenance the widespread elimination of badgers from 
large swathes of the countryside. 
 
A second problem for the ISG was that Krebs had recommended that any 
culling protocol should include culling lactating sows. The ISG took the view 
that this would once again present problems of acceptability to the public. 
Consequently, the ISG decided that there should be a closed season for culling 
running from February to April each year when no culling would take place. 
This avoided the possibility that lactating sows would be trapped and 
subsequently killed leaving their cubs to starve to death in the sett below 
ground. 
 
The RBCT was designed to answer two important questions. Firstly, what 
proportion of bTB outbreaks in cattle are caused by badgers? Secondly, to 
determine whether culling badgers would be an effective and cost-effective 
way of controlling bTB in cattle and, if so, in what circumstances? In line with 
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the recommendations in Krebs, the ISG determined that the trial would take 
place in the bTB hotspots of West and South West England and would consist 
of dividing 30 areas, each approximately 100km2 into three. These were known 
as triplets. Within each triplet area one of the triplets was assigned one of three 
culling protocols. One was a survey area only where no culling took place but 
badger activity was surveyed within the area. One of the triplets was subject to 
reactive culling of badgers on and around a farm following a bTB outbreak, 
but no general cull or clean ruing strategy was pursued. The final of the three 
areas in the triplet was subjected to proactive culling where as many badgers as 
possible within the area were caught and culled and badger populations in the 
area kept as low as possible. 
 
The trial began in December 1998 and was designed to run until 2006. The 
trial was temporarily suspended between February and December 2001 as a 
consequence of the outbreak of foot and mouth disease. As the 2002 closed 
season was to begin soon after the trial could resume, it was decided to restart 
culling in May 2002. In their final report (ISG 2007) the ISG note that 
although there was a ORVVRIQHDUO\D\HDU¶VWUDSSLQJLQWKHDUHDVZLWKLQHDFK
triplet that were subjected to proactive culling, 70% of these areas had been 
culled and so data from those areas was being collected on the effects of 
badger removal during that time. The ISG are confident that the hiatus caused 
by the FMD outbreak does not bring into question the validity of their final 
findings from the trial. Indeed they consider that the FMD outbreak actually 
led to some interesting and valuable insights into the dynamics of M.bovis 
infection in both cattle and badgers (ISG 2007, p.55). 
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Interim findings from the RBCT were published in Nature. It was found that in 
the reactive areas where culling had taken place only after an outbreak, culling 
actually led to an increase in bTB incidence of 27% over the survey only areas 
(Donnelly et al 2003, p.835). This finding was consistent across the areas that 
had been subject to the triplet protocol by that time. This finding led the ISG to 
recommend to Defra ministers that culling in the reactive areas should be 
EURXJKWWRDQHQGDWWKHHQGRIWKHFXOOLQJVHDVRQµRQWKHJURXQGVWKDWLW
ZDVQRWDYLDEOHEDVHIRUDIXWXUHSROLF\RSWLRQ¶'HIUDE7%ZHESDJH
In the case of the proactive areas, incidence of herd outbreaks of bTB were 
found to be 19% lower than in the survey only areas but that incidence of bTB 
in areas up to 2km outside the proactively culled area were 29% higher than in 
the area adjoining the survey only areas. (Donnelly et al 2005, p.843).  
 
The effect, observed in the interim findings for both the reactive and proactive 
culling protocols, of bTB going up in the areas adjacent to the area where 
culling had taken place is known as the perturbation effect. Culling never 
completely eradicated all the badgers from an area. It is thought that those that 
survive roam widely. Observational data suggests that when this occurs, the 
incidence of TB in the badgers rises in the following year (Roper and Lupps 
1993 in Defra 2005b, p.17). This perturbation effect would come to have a 
GHFLVLYH UROH LQ WKH ,6*¶V ILQDO UHSRUW LQ UHFRPPHQGLQJ WKDW FXOOLQJ LV QRW D
cost-effective control strategy for bovine TB. 
 
Britain was not the only country to be carrying out experiments to determine 
the efficacy of culling for the control of TB. In SDUWLFXODUWKH,ULVKµ)RXU-Areas 
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%DGJHU 7ULDO¶ UHFHLYHG FRQVLGHUDEOH DWWHQWLRQ LQ WKH 8. DV LW DSSHDUHG WR
demonstrate that culling could significantly reduce the incidence of bTB in 
cattle by a dramatic 60 - 69% (BBC 2005). However, the Four Areas Trial has 
been strongly criticised both on the grounds of animal welfare; initially, 
badgers were strangled using wire snares, and on scientific grounds (e.g. 
Godfray et al 2005). In particular, the failure of the trial to use control areas 
where there was no culling of badgers has been criticised. Although the trial 
GLG KDYH µUHIHUHQFH¶ DUHDV FXOOLQJ RI VRPH EDGJHUV LQ WKHVH DUHDV ZDV DOVR
permitted to be culled. The perturbation effect noted in the interim findings of 
the RBCT did not feature in the reporting of the results of the Four Area Trial. 
,QGHHGWKHVHUHSRUWVµLJQRUHSXEOLVKHGHYLGHQFHRQWKHSHUWXUEDWLRQHIIHFW«
SURGXFHGE\FXOOLQJSURJUDPPHV¶:LOVPRUHDQG7D\ORUS)LQDOO\
despite having pursued a culling strategy that has resulted in a reduction in the 
Irish badger population by two thirds, bTB did not appear to be under control 
LQ ,UHODQG DQG µWKHUH LV QR GLVFHUQDEOH LPSURYHPHQW LQ ERYLQH 7% YLV D YLV
RWKHUFRXQWULHV¶%DGJHU7UXVWS 
 
The response of the British Government to the interim findings of the RBCT 
was threefold. In December 2005 it announced that pre-movement testing, that 
is, a farmer wishing to sell one of his animals to another farmer would have to 
first have the animal tested for bTB within 60 days prior to it being moved 
unless it is subject to an exemption. The test was to be paid for by the farmer 
unless the routine TB test paid for by the Government had taken place within 
the 60 day period. The aim of this measure was to reduce the spread of bTB 
from farm to farm via bought in cattle. Many vets regarded the measure as 
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VHQVLEOH ,QRQH LQWHUYLHZ DSUDFWLFHYHW VDLG µ,W VKRXOGKDYHKDSSHQHG DJHV
DJR¶7KHVDPHYHWZKRSUDFWLFHVLQ&XPEULDWUDGLWLRQDOO\DQDUHDIUHHRIE7%
save for the South West tip of the county near Barrow in Furness, advised all 
of his clients to have a pre-movement test prior to restocking after the 2001 
FMD outbreak where Cumbria was one of the hardest hit counties. However, 
µ7KH XSWDNH ZDV ]HUR RU GDPQ QHDU LW DQ\ZD\ 7KH\ >IDUPHUV@ ZRXld have 
done it if it had been free, if the government had paid for it, but damned if 
WKH\¶UHJRLQJ WRGR LW WKHPVHOYHVZKLFKZDV LQFUHGLEO\ VKRUW VLJKWHGRIERWK
SDUWLHVJRYHUQPHQWDQGIDUPHUV¶7KHFRQVHTXHQFHRIIDUPHUV¶IDLOXUHWRKDYH
bought in cattle tested was that bTB is now on the increase in Cumbria and is 
µSXUHO\LPSRUWHGVLQFH¶,QWHUYLHZSUDFWLFHYHW 
 
The second measure that Defra introduced was to revise the sums payable to 
farmers in compensation for slaughtered reactor animals. The existing scheme 
had produced overpayments with some farmers actually making a financial 
gain from having an outbreak. Interview respondent, Defra official 2, said  
 
µ:H¶YH JRW HYLGHQFH RI IDUPHUV ZKR KDYH EHHQ JHWWLQJ KDOI D
million pounds a year in compensation. This is hundreds of 
DQLPDOV EDG 7% RXWEUHDNV \RX ZRXOGQ¶W ZDQW WR EH LQ WKDW
SRVLWLRQEXWLW¶VEHHQTXLWHDQLQFRPHVWUHDP¶ 
 
Furthermore, the new system was supposed to more accurately reflect the 
value of the animals. The old system was thought to overvalue animals 
sometimes by 50 to 100% overvaluation of pedigree animals over their market 
valuation. Under the new arrangement there are 47 categories of compensation 
payment based upon the type of animal that is diseased. The valuations in the 
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table are based on averages and so some will gain over individual valuations 
while others will do less well. If the cow falls in a particular category the 
farmer is paid the tabular sum for it. It does not get valued individually. 
However, even the new arrangements for compensation can be argued to be a 
subsidy from the government to the farming industry. Defra official 2, for 
example, said,  
 
µ/DVWPRQWK>-XQH@ZHVWLOOSDLGRXWWHQWLPHVWKHDPRXQWLQ
compensation that we got back in salvage value from the animals. 
6R\RXFRXOGDUJXHWKDWZH¶UHSD\LQJWHQWLPHVPRUHWKDQWKH\¶UH
worth. Although clearly for some animals it will be less than their 
UHSODFHPHQW YDOXH DQG ZH DFFHSW WKDW EXW RQFH WKH\¶UH GLVHDVHG
they are not worth their replacement value.¶ 
 
It might be thought that the new system is one manifestation of the bTB 
6WUDWHJ\¶VIRFXVXSRQFRVWVKDULQJDVPLJKWWKHUHTXLUHPHQWIRUIDUPHUVWRSD\
for pre-movement testing. However, as will be shown, in the case of bTB 
farmers appear to be reluctant or opposed to cost sharing. Often this reluctance 
is expressed in terms of a trade off between government action to cull badgers 
and farmers acceptance of a greater cost burden to deal with the disease. More 
militant farmers even go so far as to advocate non co-operation with the TB 
testing regime until government accedes to their demands for action on 
badgers. The pressure group Farmers for Action, one of the leading groups 
behind the 2000 fuel protests, has renewed that call in the light of the 
publicaWLRQ RI WKH ,6*¶V ILQDO UHSRUW RQ WKH 5%&7 µ))$ DGGHG WKDW LW ZDV
calling on all livestock farmers to be non-compliant with Defra in respect of 
7% WHVWLQJ XQWLO WKH JRYHUQPHQW VKRZHG LW ZDV ³SUHSDUHG WR JUDVS WKHQHWWOH
DQGGHDOZLWKXQKHDOWK\ZLOGOLIH´¶(Farmers Weekly 19 June 2007). 
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Public consultation on badger culling 
 
7KH WKLUG UHVSRQVH WR WKH ,6*¶V ,QWHULP 5HSRUW ZDV WR DQQRXQFH D SXEOLF
consultation on badger culling. The consultation covered both the principle of 
badger culling and also the method(s) that could / ought to be used to carry out 
such a cull. The consultation document made a number of strongly worded 
statements that suggested that Defra was keen to retain culling as a policy 
option.  
 
µ,QWHUQDWLRQDOH[SHULHQFHLQGLFDWHVWKDWLWLVQRWSossible to contain 
and eradicate bovine TB if its background presence in wildlife is 
OHIWXQDGGUHVVHG¶'HIUDHS 
 
µ7KH VFLHQWLILF HYLGHQFH VKRZV WKDW LQWHQVLYH FXOOLQJ RI EDGJHUV
over large areas can be effective in helping to prevent the spread of 
bovine TB in cattle and vets advise that without badger culling 
satisfactory control and reduction of the disease in cattle is unlikely 
WREHDFKLHYHG¶S 
 
µ7KH *RYHUQPHQW UHFRJQLVHV WKDW FDWWOH-to-cattle and badger-to-
cattle transmission are both contributors to the high incidence of 
ERYLQH7%LQFDWWOH¶S 
 
µ)RU ERYLQH 7% FRQWUROV WR EH HIIHFWLYH YHWHULQDU\ DGYLFH LV WKDW
measures to reduce the risk of transmission from badgers to cattle 
VKRXOGLQFOXGHERWKFXOOLQJRIEDGJHUVDQGFDWWOH¶S). 
 
µ%RWK WKH VFLHQWLILF HYLGHQFH DQG YHWHULQDU\ DGYLFH VXJJHVW WKH
need for a balanced approach (my emphasis) that tackles the 
reservoir of infection in badgers as well as in cattle to achieve a 
sustained reduction in TB in cattle in high incidence areas in 
(QJODQG¶S 
 
+DYLQJSUHVHQWHGWKHµHYLGHQFH¶WKHGRFXPHQWZHQWRQWRDVNµ,QWKHOLJKWRI
the evidence presented as part of this consultation, on balance, do you think a 
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policy to cull badgers should be part of the approach to help control the disease 
LQFDWWOHLQKLJKLQFLGHQFHDUHDV"¶'HIUDHS 
 
Opinion on three culling options was sought: individual licensing, a general 
cull over large areas, and a targeted cull linked to herd incidence of bTB. The 
first option relied upon the powers already granted under that Protection of 
Badgers Act 1992 for the Minister to grant an individual licence to a farmer for 
the purposes of preventing the spread of bTB. However, the consultation 
document was cool on the possible benefits of this option noting the danger of 
the perturbation effect but also noting that more effective means of culling may 
be available or, finally, that it may be decided that culling may not have a 
benefit for bTB prevention. The second option of a general cull would depend 
upon loosely defined geographical boundaries, specific areas or by county. The 
document sought responses suggesting appropriate geographical areas for such 
a general cull. The third option of a targeted cull required suitable criteria for 
determining an appropriate disease history for an area to qualify for a targeted 
cull.  
 
For their part, the ISG was not happy with the consultation document. In its 
UHVSRQVH WR WKHFRQVXOWDWLRQ LW DUJXHG WKDW LQ WKHFRQVXOWDWLRQGRFXPHQW µ7KH
scientific basis for any badger culling is neither accurately portrayed nor 
carefully explored in the consultation document. The emphasis overall focuses 
on possible, mostly hypothetical, weaknesses of the RBCT, with no balancing 
comments on its methodological strengths and the robustness of the analytical 
findings it has delivered, nor on the broad acceptance of the findings by the 
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VFLHQWLILF FRPPXQLW\¶ ,6*  S 7KH ,6* DOVR DUJXHG WKDW ERWK
LQGLYLGXDO OLFHQVLQJ DQG D WDUJHWHG FXOO µZLOO LQFUHDVH UDWKHU WKDQ GHFUHDVH
cattle TB incLGHQFH¶,6*S$JHQHUDOFXOORYHUNP2, one of the 
options for defining the geographical area for such a cull in the consultation 
GRFXPHQWµVXJJHVWYLUWXDOO\QREHQHILWRYHUDOO>IRU7%UHGXFWLRQ@¶,6*
p.4). One reason why the ISG may not have been happy with the consultation 
document could be that they played no role in developing it. This revelation 
was met with surprise by members of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Select Committee. 
 
The consultation generated a huge response rate with 47,472 responses by 
letter and e-mail together with 13 petitions against a cull bearing 12,100 
signatures and 10,000 text messages (Defra 2006a, p.4). Of those responses 
68% of them came from campaigns run by farming and wildlife groups. 
Geographically, the majority of responses came from the South East and South 
West of England. Looking just at the raw numbers, 95.6% of responses were 
opposed to a cull with 4% in favour and 0.4% were neutral responses (Defra 
2006a, p.5). Certainly it is the case that campaign groups took the opportunity 
to put their case, with the Badger Trust and the RSPCA taking out 
advertisements in the national press, but even so, such a huge response to a 
consultation document was unprecedented, and surprised even civil servants at 
Defra (Interview Defra official 2). 
 
The accountancy firm PKF was asked by Defra to carry out an analysis of the 
UHVSRQVHV'HIUDD3.)VXEGLYLGHGWKHUHVSRQVHVDVµVWDNHKROGHU¶
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UHVSRQVHV  RI WKH WRWDO µFDPSDLJQ¶   RI WKe total), 
µVXEVWDQWLYHSXEOLF¶WKDWLVOHQJWK\UHVSRQVHVIURPWKHSXEOLFUHVSRQVHV
RIWKHWRWDODQGµRWKHUSXEOLFUHVSRQVHV¶UHVSRQVHVRIWKH
total). On the first question, on the principle of a cull, stakeholders divided 
41% for a cull, 50% against with 9% not stated. Substantive public divided 
51% for a cull, 44% opposed with 5% not stated. Other public responses 
divided 6% in favour of a cull, with 93% opposed and 1% not stated. 
Campaign responses were 2% in favour and 98% opposed. Unsurprisingly, 
there were no campaign responses where a preference was not stated. Taking 
away the campaign responses, the division of the remainder was 8% for a cull 
with 91% against and 1% not stated. (Defra 2006a, p.11). The region most in 
favour of a cull was not the South West, but the West Midlands but even here 
only 10% of responses favoured the principle of a cull (Defra 2006a, p.12). 
 
Given the huge number of responses generated by campaign groups, it is 
interesting to set aside these for a while and look at the responses originating 
from stakeholders. PKF did this and noted several arguments and points made 
by stakeholders both for and against the principle of a cull. Stakeholders 
divided 41% in favour to 50% opposed. The arguments employed by those in 
favour included the need to tackle bovine TB in both the cattle and badger 
populations. One unnamed stakeholder quoted in the report feared that 
µ:LWKRXW FXOOLQJ WKH FRPELQHG ZHLJKW RI LQFUHDVHG FDWWOH FRQWUROV DQG DQ
uncontrolled wildlife reservoir of bovine TB could potentially destroy the very 
LQGXVWULHVZKLFKJRYHUQPHQWSROLFLHVDUHWU\LQJWRSURWHFW¶'HIUDDS-
15). This group of stakeholders also argued that should farmers be required to 
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carry out a cull then their identity should be kept secret and should not be able 
to be made known using the Freedom of Information Act. In addition, there 
was criticism of the regime of pre-movement testing with some questioning its 
efficacy, some arguing that Government should fund all pre-movement tests 
and some arguing that farmers might only be willing to co-operate with testing 
if action were also taken to tackle the reservoir of infection in wildlife. Finally, 
some argued that as badger numbers had increased in recent years they were no 
longer endangered and the logic of granting them legal protection no longer 
applied. 
 
Among those stakeholders who were opposed to a cull a number of arguments 
were advanced. 37% of total stakeholder responses argued that controlling the 
spread of bTB required improved measures to control cattle to cattle 
transmission and improved biosecurity. Before commencing any cull of 
badgers, an assessment was required of the effectiveness of these cattle based 
measures (Defra 2006a, p.12). Within this class of objection were arguments 
that suggested that if pre-movement testing were to be introduced at the same 
time as a cull then it would not be possible to assess the effectiveness of either 
the cull or the pre-PRYHPHQW WHVWLQJ UHJLPH 'HIUD¶V 6FLHQWLILF $GYLVRU\
Council aUJXHG WKDW ODUJHVFDOHFXOOLQJ LV µXQOLNHO\ WREHDQHIIHFWLYHFRQWURO
measure until further control methods to reduce bovine TB have been 
LPSOHPHQWHG¶ 'HIUD D S ,Q DGGLWLRQ RWKHU VWDNHKROGHUV QRWHG WKDW
improved testing in Northern Ireland had reduced breakdowns by 40% since 
November 2004, and that cattle movements were the main factor in predicting 
bTB outbreaks. Finally, some argued that the test used to detect TB in cattle 
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was not as effective as the gamma interferon test and that testing using this 
method should be more widespread. 
 
Another group of stakeholders comprising 35% of the total stakeholder 
respondents considered that the present scientific evidence was inconclusive on 
the effectiveness of a cull. Points made in this group of responses included the 
argument that the RBCT should be completed and analysed before any 
decision could be taken, that as the ISG had stated that the consultation 
document was inaccurate in important aspects it was not appropriate to cull on 
the basis of a flawed consultation. 32% of stakeholder responses also noted the 
dangers posed by the perturbation effect that results from culling badgers, and 
quoted from the interim results of the RBCT. 
 
Given what appeared to be an overwhelming opposition to the culling plan, 
and certainly a response that would have delighted any local government 
officer both for the size of the response and the clarity of the position adopted 
by the respondents, it might be thought that Defra would have been happy to 
rely upon it as evidence of the unacceptability of culling to the wider public. 
However, the general consultation was not the only element in the consultation 
H[HUFLVH ,Q DGGLWLRQ WR WKH RSHQ FRQVXOWDWLRQ WKHUH ZHUH WKUHH µ&LWL]HQV¶
3DQHOV¶WKDWWRRNSODFHLQ<RUNDQDUHDwith low incidence of bTB, Brighton 
an area with medium incidence of bTB and Cheltenham an area of high bTB 
incidence. This element of the consultation exercise was conducted by Opinion 
Leader Research and its findings were published at the same time as the 
general consultation (Defra 2006b).  
 212 
Participants were recruited to reflect the area in terms of age, gender, socio-
HFRQRPLF JURXS HWF DQG PHW LQ WKHLU ORFDWLRQV IRU D WZR KRXU µVFRSLQJ
ZRUNVKRS¶ ZKHUH WKH LVVXHV ZHUH LQWURGXFHG DQG SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ LQLWLDO views 
gauged and then all participants took part in a one day workshop in London 
where participants engaged in various activities including small group 
discussions and exposure to panels of experts (Defra 2006b, p.10). The 
&LWL]HQV¶3DQHOVZHUHLQWHQGHGWREHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHµJHQHUDOSXEOLF¶DQG
so Opinion Leader Research excluded anyone who was involved in farming or 
who was a member of any organisation such as the Badger Trust that might 
indicate that their opinion was fixed on the issues.  
 
The reVXOWVRIWKLVH[HUFLVHDUHLQWHUHVWLQJ3DUWLFLSDQWVDFFHSWHGDVµNH\IDFWV¶
the following: 
 
µ%DGJHUVDUHDKRVWIRUERYLQH7%DQGWKH\SDVVLWRQWRFDWWOH 
The problem is severe and likely to get worse 
 
A decision to cull will involve extensive action ± µKDOI KHDUWHG¶
implementation is unlikely to work or may worsen the situation 
due to perturbation effect 
 
7KHVFLHQFHLVLQFRQFOXVLYH¶'HIUDES 
 
Following the workshops, participants were evenly split between those who 
would support a cull and those opposed. A general cull was considered the 
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PRVW OLNHO\ WR EH HIIHFWLYH DOWKRXJK µWKH\ DOVR EHOLHYH WKDW WKH VFLHQFH ZLOO
QHYHU GHOLYHU D FOHDU FXW DQVZHU¶ 'HIUD E S +RZHYHU HYHQ DPRQJ
those supporting a cull, there was concern that this could only be done if 
centrally co-ordinated and part of a wider package of measures to deal with the 
disease (Defra 2006b, p.8). 
 
'HIUDZDVYHU\LQWHUHVWHGLQWKHUHVXOWVRIWKH&LWL]HQV¶3DQHOV 
 
µ%XW LW ZDV UHDOO\ LPSRUWDQW WR WDNH SHRSOH DZD\ ZKR GLGQ¶W
necessarily have strong views on this and some who did, who 
KDGQ¶WUHDOO\WKRXJKWDERXWLWWDNHWKHPWKURXJKWKHDUJXPHQWDQG
VHHKRZWKH\FDPHRXW$QG\RXNQRZILIW\ILIW\ZDVLQWHUHVWLQJ¶
(Interview Defra official 2).  
 
The Minister, Ben Bradshaw was also interested in this element of the 
consultation: 
 
µ%XWZKDW,WKRXJKWZDVYHU\LQWHUHVWLQJDERXWWKHFRQVXOWDWLRQZH
did on it was that the workshops that were set up, the focus groups 
WKDWZH VHW XS LQYROYLQJSHRSOHZKRGLGQ¶W UHDOO\ NQRZDQ\WKLQJ
about the subject before, subjecting them to detailed information 
about it. By the end of their sessions they wee less reluctant to see 
EDGJHUFXOOLQJWKDQWKH\KDGEHHQLQWKHEHJLQQLQJ¶,QWHUYLHZ%HQ
Bradshaw). 
 
 At lower levels of Defra too, there was some enthusiasm to retain culling as a 
policy option with discussion at one conference of the VLA on how to make 
culling acceptable to the public (Interview VLA 2). 
 
Ministers remain committed to evidence based policy making and insist that a 
decision on culling would be based on the scientific evidence. Scientific 
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evidence landed on ministers desks in June 2007 when the ISG published its 
final report on the RBCT. As was shown in the discussion on the consultation, 
the general opinion was that the science was iQFRQFOXVLYH 7KH ,6*¶V ILQDO
UHSRUWZDVQRW ,W FDPHRXW ILUPO\DJDLQVWDFXOORIEDGJHUV µ2Q WKHEDVLVRI
our careful review of all currently available evidence, we conclude that badger 
culling is unlikely to contribute positively, or cost effectively, to the control of 
cattle TB in Britain (ISG 2007, p.23). Reactive culling was found to have an 
overall detrimental effect, while proactive culling produced very modest 
improvements over several years of intensive culling by professional staff and 
even then at the cost of increasing incidence of bTB in the adjoining areas. 
µ7KHUHDVRQVIRUWKHOLPLWHGFDSDFLW\RIEDGJHUFXOOLQJ«WRVXEVWDQWLDOO\UHGXFH
overall TB incidence in cattle stem from the behavioural and ecological 
responses of badgers to culling, leading to strongly non-linear relationships 
EHWZHHQEDGJHUGHQVLW\DQG0ERYLVWUDQVPLVVLRQ¶,6*S 
 
Ministers thus had in front of them evidence that, in the raw, there was 
significant public opposition to badger culling, opposition that could only be 
UHGXFHGWRHYHQZKHQOHGWKURXJKWKHDUJXPHQWVLQDQLQWHQVLYHFLWL]HQV¶
SDQHO,QDGGLWLRQ'HIUD¶VRZQFRPPLVVLRQHGUHVHDUFKE\WKH,6*KDGILQDOO\
come out strongly against a cull. Yet even now, Ministers did not rule out a 
cull as a policy option. David Miliband, then Secretary of State, in his 
VWDWHPHQWRQ WKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI WKH ,6*¶V UHSRUW VWDWHG LQDSUHVV UHOHDVH WKDW
µ:HZLOOEHFRQVLGHULQJWKHLVVXHVLWUDLVHVYHU\FDUHIXOO\DQGZLOOFRQWLQXHWR
work with the industry, government advisers and scientific experts in reaching 
DILQDOSROLF\GHFLVLRQRQWKLVVHULRXVLVVXH¶ 
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Further evidence of a continuing desire to see culling remain a policy option 
ZDVSURYLGHGVRRQDIWHU*RUGRQ%URZQEHFDPH3ULPH0LQLVWHU$OORI'HIUD¶V
ministers were moved from the department with one exception, that of Jeff, 
now Lord Rooker, who before his elevation to the peerage was the MP for the 
Birmingham constituency of Perry Barr, a constituency not noted for bTB 
containing as it does inner city Handsworth. SpeakLQJ EHIRUH %URZQ¶V
UHVKXIIOHEXWDIWHUWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRIWKH,6*¶VILQDOUHSRUW5RRNHUVDLGDWWKH
'HUE\VKLUH6KRZWKDWKHZDVVWLOOµRSHQPLQGHG¶DERXWDFXOO,QDGGLWLRQKH
was very critical of the ISG, accusing it of going beyond its remit and 
µGHYiating off into practical and financial issues, which was not really what 
WKH\ZHUHDVNHGWRGHDOZLWK¶)LQDOO\5RRNHUFODLPHGWKDWWKHUHSRUWGLGQRW
rule out culling but that it would need to be over a wider area and would not 
solve all of the problems+RZHYHUµWKDWGRHVQ¶WPHDQWRVD\LWVKRXOGQRWEH
SDUW RI WKH DUPRXU\¶ 5RRNHU TXRWHV IURP Farmers Guardian 29.06.07). In 
%URZQ¶V UHVKXIIOH 5RRNHU ZDV JLYHQ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU DQLPDO KHDOWK µ7KH
move is likely to be welcomed by the farming industry as the outspoken Lord 
Rooker has previously indicated strongly in private and in public that he 
VXSSRUWVFDOOVIRUDEDGJHUFXOO¶)DUPHUV¶*XDUGLDQ 09.07.07). 
 
)LQDOO\ 'HIUD DVNHG WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V &KLHI 6FLHQWLILF $GYLVHU 6LU 'DYLG
King, to review the evidence. His report, (King 2007), prepared in little more 
than six weeks, drew the opposite conclusion from that of the ISG. Unlike the 
ISG, King did not consider the cost effectiveness of any measure but contented 
himself with examination of the science only. On that basis he concluded that 
UHPRYDO RI EDGJHUV µFRXOG PDNH D VLJQLILFDQW FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH FRQWURO RI
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FDWWOH 7%¶ .LQJ  SDUD  7KLV LQWHUYHQWLRQ GLG QRW KHOS WR VHFXUH
DJUHHPHQW RQ WKH ,6*¶V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV EXW ZDV VHL]HG XSRQ E\ WKH 1)8
who stepped up demands for a cull. 
 
STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
 
As Chapter four showed, the new policies on animal health placed 
considerable weight to stakeholder participation. This section reviews the 
KLVWRU\RI'HIUD¶VDWWHPSWVWRHQJDJHZLWKVWDNHKROGHUVand argues that in the 
case of bTB, these attempts have met with very little success. As a 
consequence it is argued that governance of bTB has largely abandoned wide 
stakeholder participation and instead resorted to arrangements favouring expert 
advice. 
 
Before the publication of the 2005 strategy a TB Forum was established. This 
was a broad based stakeholder forum including vets, farmers, animal welfare 
and wildlife groups. Meeting three times a year the forum was attended by 
members who represented their organisations. This appears to have been a 
largely unsuccessful body. Interview data suggests that the meetings were 
characterised by conflict rather than by a desire to assist in moving policy 
forward.  
 
µ7KH7%)RUXPZDVEDVLFDOO\DJURXSRIRUJDQLVDWLRQs 
ZKR GLGQ¶W DJUHH RQ YHU\ PXFK DQG WKHUHIRUH WKH
meetings were virtually continual restatement of 
existing positions, plus various demands from 
JRYHUQPHQW« ,QHYLWDEO\ VRPHEXVLQHVVZDVGRQHEXW
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LW ZDV SUHWW\ VWHULOH E\ WKH HQG¶ ,QWHUYLHZ 'HIUD
official 2). 
 
Disputes were common, inevitably over the thorny issue of badger culling as a 
method of disease control. Radically different, and mutually exclusive 
SRVLWLRQVFDPHWREHUHSHDWHGPHHWLQJDIWHUPHHWLQJOHDGLQJWRWKHµ*HQHUDOO\
held belief that the TB )RUXPKDGQ¶WZRUNHG¶,QWHUYLHZ'HIUDRIILFLDO7KH
response to the perceived failure of the TB Forum was to set up a different 
stakeholder group, the Core Stakeholder Group appointed on a different basis 
to the Forum. Rather than appointment as representatives of particular 
interests, members would be appointed on their individual merits. In approach 
there are similarities with the EIG set up to oversee the Animal Health and 
Welfare Strategy particularly in the idea of appointment as individuals not as 
representatives. The Core Stakeholder Group was heavily involved in the 
development of the 2005 Strategy and was deemed to be more successful than 
WKH7%)RUXPEHLQJµTXLWHDXVHIXOVRXQGLQJERDUG¶,QWHUYLHZ'HIUDRIILFLDO
2). 
 
However, even on the Core Stakeholder Group, things did not progress as 
smoothly as might be hoped for. Relations between stakeholders got difficult 
in respect of two issues: the interim results of the RBCT and on pre-movement 
testing. A long quote from an interview with a Defra official gives a flavour of 
relations in respect of the RBCT interim report. 
 
Things got very difficult when the interim conclusions 
of the RBCT came out, when we knew what they were. 
And we had to rethink a bit where they were going. 
That did become quite difficult. And there were 
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DFFXVDWLRQV WKDW ZH ZHUH IRRW GUDJJLQJ ZK\ ZHUHQ¶W
we talking to stakeholders? To some extent because 
PLQLVWHUV WROG XV QRW WR :K\ ZHUHQ¶W ZH PDNLQJ
enough progress on setting up a new stakeholder body? 
:HOOLW¶VDELWGLIILFXOWto have a stakeholder body until 
you know what your policy is. And our argument was 
that particularly on badger culling this group needed to 
know what it was getting into, and effectively ministers 
KDGWRUHDFKWKLVGHFLVLRQDQGWKHUHZDVQ¶WPXFKSRLQW
puWWLQJLQDVWDNHKROGHUJURXSEHIRUHWKH\¶GUHDFKHGD
GHFLVLRQEHFDXVHRWKHUZLVH\RX¶UHHLWKHUVD\LQJWRWKLV
group you are looking at badger culling decision in 
which case it would do nothing else. And also in the 
HQGLWZDVQ¶WWKHLUGHFLVLRQWRWDNHPLQLVters had to take 
WKDWGHFLVLRQRU\RXVHWWKHPXSDQGVDLGDQGZHGRQ¶W
ZDQW\RXWRWRXFKEDGJHUFXOOLQJLQZKLFKFDVHWKH\¶G
say hang on a minute, how can we have a sensible 
GLVFXVVLRQ LI \RX ZRQ¶W OHW XV GLVFXVV EDGJHU FXOOLQJ"
So, to be frank we let it drift a bit, quite deliberately 
(Interview Defra official 2). 
 
This extract highlights very well some of the tensions and difficulties of 
stakeholder engagement. The respondent is, rightly, very clear that ultimately it 
is for ministers to decide the policy on badger culling. Yet also clearly, once 
stakeholders are invited to participate in a process there becomes an 
expectation that their opinion will carry weight. This can perhaps be seen in 
other policy areas through attempts to almost take the politics out of a decision 
by setting up independent bodies of various sorts. Surely, where a decision is 
political, it is simply impossible to take the politics out of a decision or to 
HVVHQWLDOO\ IDUP RXW WKH µKHDW¶ WR DQRWKHU ERG\ ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH TXRWH
demonstrates the difficulties faced by officials in setting up stakeholder bodies, 
in setting their terms of reference. To discuss badger culling would be to 
discuss nothing else and that would not assist policy makers in developing 
policy. The quote also suggests that while the Core Stakeholder Group played 
a useful role in developing the strategy, the fundamental differences on badger 
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culling were bubbling along just under the surface. To retain such a group 
post-strategy would risk renewing those basic conflicts. 
 
In respect of pre-movement testing there seems to have been a difficulty with 
trust. The Core Stakeholder Group was aware that there were proposals for 
pre-movement testing and for changes in the compensation regime. However, 
the matter was delayed a bit and this led to problems for officials. Again, from 
the interview with the same official: 
 
µ:H KDG PHDQW WR KDYH D GLVFXVVLRQ ZLWK WKH FRUH
stakeholder group but everything got very sensitive and 
ministers got very nervous about who was involved in 
disFXVVLRQVDWWKDWVWDJHDQGIUDQNO\LWZDVQ¶WSUDFWLFDO
to have any further discussions with them. So by the 
time we actually came to an announcement in 
'HFHPEHU SUHFLVHO\ WKH PDNHXS RI WKDW ZDVQ¶W WKDW
close ± it had elements but it was rather different from 
FRUH VWDNHKROGHU JURXS IURP WKH SRVLWLRQV ZH¶G
discussed with core stakeholder group. Which 
inevitably, for some of those people, enhanced the idea 
WKDWJRYHUQPHQWKDGQ¶WSOD\HGHQWLUHO\IDLU¶ 
 
Trust problems seemed to flow in both directions with ministers wary of who 
was involved in discussions and some stakeholders taking the view that 
government had tended to ignore stakeholder views. 
 
A fresh look at stakeholder engagement was considered necessary. Discussions 
on the form of stakeholder dialogue that should flow from the 2005 Strategy 
tended to be agreed that there was no going back to the TB Forum and that a 
body where people were appointed as individuals was more appropriate than 
one where stakeholders came together as representatives. In addition, regular 
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dialogue was not considered to be essential as the issues around bTB tended 
not to be fast moving. Therefore a two strand approach was adopted. A TB 
Advisory Group of people appointed on their own merits which would be a 
small group, and an annXDO FRQIHUHQFH RI VWDNHKROGHUV µWR HQVXUH WKDW NH\
VWDNHKROGHUV DUHNHSWXS WR VSHHG ZLWKZKDWZDVJRLQJRQ¶ ,QWHUYLHZ'HIUD
official 2). 
 
Peter Jinman, a veterinary surgeon from Herefordshire was appointed 
Chairman of the TB Advisory Group in July 2006. Jinman also serves as a 
member of the EIG. Four other members were appointed in October 2006. 
Two are farmers from bTB hotspots, one is the Chief Executive of the 
Universities Federation for Animal Welfare, and one is a Reader in Wildlife 
epidemiology at the Institute of Zoology, London. Defra say that the terms of 
reference for the group include obtaining stakeholder buy-in to TB control 
policies. In addition the TB Advisory Group will help to deliver the aims of the 
2005 Strategy by: 
 
x µDGYLVLQJ RQ GHYHORSment and implementation of bovine TB control 
policies in England providing in particular a practical perspective; 
 
x Working with interested organisations to take account of wider views 
in developing advice and also to help promote a shared understanding; 
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x Responding to requests for advice from ministers and the CVO, and 
identifying and advising on issues of concern to interested 
RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶'HIUDF 
 
By July 2007, the TB Advisory Group has offered advice on two issues to 
ministers and the CVO. One piece of advice on husbandry best practice, and 
one on pre-movement testing in respect of practical delivery and impacts of 
pre-movement testing. The group has held five meetings since its creation but 
had no stakeholder engagements. So far, then, the group has steered clear of 
RIIHULQJDGYLFHRQEDGJHUFXOOLQJRURQWKH,6*¶VUHSRUW7KHVHFRQGVWUDQGRI
stakeholder engagement, a national TB conference, has not so far been held. 
 
Pre-movement testing 
 
One area in which stakeholder engagement has been difficult has already been 
mentioned, the issue of pre-movement testing. Pre-movement testing of 
animals for bTB is one of the key cattle based measures together with the 
routine testing regime. It is a measure that was supported without exception by 
vets intervLHZHG IRU WKLV UHVHDUFK RQH YHW VD\LQJ WKDW µ,W¶V IRU WKH JRRG RI
HYHU\ERG\<HDKLWVKRXOGKDYHKDSSHQHGDJHVDJR¶,QWHUYLHZ3UDFWLFHYHW
However, the NFU raised a number of objections to the measure. Again, a 
quote from an interview with an official demonstrates some of the problems 
faced. 
 
µ7KHUHZDVDQLQFUHDVLQJIXURUHVWLUUHGXSE\WKH1)8
and the livestock auctioneers which focussed 
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SDUWLFXODUO\\RXNQRZIUDQNO\WKH\MXVWGLGQ¶WZDQWLW
± livestock auctioneers opposed it in principle, NFU 
saLG WKH\ GRQ¶W RSSRVH LW LQ SULQFLSOH EXW ZH¶UH QRW
having it until you introduce badger culling. And more 
and more mud has been thrown about lack of 
preparedness and in the end the issue they really 
focussed on was lack of capacity, lack of veterinary 
capacity to do pre movement testing. And they threw 
so much mud around that ministers decided they had to 
GHOD\ $QG ZH¶G FRPPLVVLRQHG DQ LQGHSHQGHQW VWXG\
to look at the veterinary capacity issue and there was 
not an issue there; the veterinary bodies had said all 
DORQJWKDWWKHUHZDVQ¶WDQLVVXHEXWWKDWDORQHZDVQRW
enough in the face of lots of, NFU in particular fuss. 
And then they made a fuss again about the payment 
issue and we agreed to pay until the end of June. We 
FKDQJHG RXU SROLF\ DJDLQ « GHVSLWH the fact that the 
benefit we gave by agreeing to pay for one test per 
farm until the end of June for pre movement testing did 
not really match in any way those who were in 
GLIILFXOWLHV EHFDXVH RI WKH GHOD\ LQ VLQJOH SD\PHQWV¶
(Interview Defra official 2). 
 
It seems clear from this that the NFU approach was to see the issue as worthy 
of a trade off in return for badger culling. It also seems clear that the NFU has 
particular problems with the cost sharing element of the AHWS and the TB 
Strategy, being seemingly unwilling to incur more of the costs of what is a 
disease solely of importance to the farming industry unless it is in return for 
something else such as badger culling. The strategy of the NFU of continually 
raising new objections has been described aVµIRRWVWDPSLQJ¶,QWHUYLHZ'HIUD
official 2). It still seems that on the issue of bTB, the NFU retains a privileged 
position among stakeholders having access to ministers on a regular basis in 
contrast to the Badger Trust, say, that does not have such access. Indeed, the 
PLQLVWHUWROGPHWKDWKHµKDGQ¶WVHHQWKH%DGJHU7UXVWIRUVRPHWLPHEXWZHGR
WDON RQ D IDLUO\ UHJXODU EDVLV¶ ,QWHUYLHZ %HQ %UDGVKDZ $OWKRXJK PDQ\
respondents were keen to say that the relationship between Defra and the NFU 
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was different to what is was under MAFF (Interview Defra official 3, Ben 
Bradshaw), on bTB the NFU still has significant successes demonstrating that 
µ)RRWVWDPSLQJTXLWHRIWHQVWLOOJHWVZKDWWKH\ZDQW¶,QWHUYLHZ'HIUDRIILFLDO
2).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has looked at bovine tuberculosis and sought to examine a 
number of aspects of policy in this field. Primarily, this case study, - though 
having some similarities with the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy - 
reveals significant differences in key areas under examination, namely, the 
governance methods used, and the use of science and the approach to evidence. 
All have impacted on policy on bTB. 
 
Firstly, unlike the AHWS, bTB is a policy that is characterised by dispute, 
especially over the role of badgers and badger culling, and a definite lack of 
stakeholder consensus. This lack of stakeholder consensus has created 
significant difficulties for policy makers in governing the strategy and 
engaging with stakeholders.  
 
The response to these difficulties has included creating structures that differ in 
the degree of openness and breadth of participation by stakeholders. The TB 
Advisory Group is significantly smaller in size than the EIG and holds its 
meetings largely in private although a summary of discussions of the group is 
published on the Defra web site. Interestingly, of the five meetings that had 
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taken place during the data collection period for this case study, three had no 
IRUPDODJHQGDSXEOLVKHGRQWKHJURXS¶VZHESDJH)XUWKHUPRUHLQUHVSRQVHWR
'HIUD¶VGLIficulties in dealing with a wide range of stakeholders, part of this 
task has been delegated to the Advisory Group, charged with obtaining 
stakeholder buy-in to TB control policies. Wider stakeholder participation, and 
presumably dispute, has been relocated to the safer arena of a conference. The 
decision to move away from an open and participatory stakeholder body like 
the EIG and to appoint a small, essentially expert group, is more characteristic 
of older policy making structures rather than the discourse of openness that 
runs through recent animal health policies.  
 
Among stakeholders, the interview data appears to suggest that the NFU 
retains a position of significance and influence as shown by the delays in 
implementing the policy of pre-movement testing. The NFU itself seems to 
adopt an approach of bargaining and exchange. For example, it took the 
position that badger culling should be given as a quid pro quo in return for 
agreement on pre-movement testing. In thinking about the issue in this way, 
the 1)8IDLOVWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRHYLGHQFHEDVHG
policy making, and the need for evidence that badger culling works before 
ministers will permit it. Rather, the NFU appears to believe that a relationship 
between it and Defra exists that had parallels with its position with MAFF. 
 
The area of policy where evidence has been given a prime position is the 
question of whether badger culling should form part of a control strategy. The 
ISG was charged with carrying out experiments to determine the effects of 
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badger culling and it came to the conclusion that badger culling would be 
unlikely to be effective, at least in any way which would be cost effective. 
However, as has already been shown, Defra has gone to considerable lengths 
not to rule out culling as a possible future option for policy which suggests that 
Defra is very keen to keep the NFU on board with engagement in TB and the 
AHWS. 
 
7KLVFKDSWHUKDVVKRZQWKHOLPLWVRI'HIUD¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRDQHZJRYHUQDQFH
approach to policy making in animal health. While the AHWS case has shown 
room for agreement and compromise among stakeholders, this is not present in 
E7%7KLVODFNRIDJUHHPHQWKDVVHYHUHO\WHVWHG'HIUD¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRDQHZ
way of working. In this case, stakeholder participation has not been possible on 
the lines of the EIG and discussion has, instead, been transferred to a largely 
expert group on the TB Advisory Group. Furthermore, the example of public 
consultation on badger culling was of debatable use, although the size of the 
response and the weight of objection to the cull offered ministers some idea of 
the problems they might face if they went for a cull. 
 
However, Defra is having some success in bringing about some changes. For 
example, although delayed, pre-movement tested was introduced. In addition, 
the problem of systematic over-valuation was also tackled. Furthermore, a 
zero-tolerance approach to missed bTB tests is now in place. Thus, some costs 
and responsibilities have managed to be shared despite the objections of the 
NFU. 
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Chapter 7: Modelling policy change 
 
Is it possible to explain the changes in animal health policy using the toolkit 
available to the political scientist? The previous chapters have explained what 
the new policies are and which factors led to institutional change. In addition, 
the case studies have described what happened and how new governance 
structures have worked in practice. In doing this, these chapters have been 
partially framed by the Bevir and Rhodes interpretive approach (Bevir and 
Rhodes 20  E LQ SDUWLFXODU E\ WKHLU LGHD RI µWKH UHFRYHULQJ RI
RWKHUSHRSOHV¶EHOLHIV IURPSUDFWLFHV DFWLRQV WH[WV LQWHUYLHZVDQGVSHHFKHV¶
(Bevir and Rhodes 2006b, p.106). In this chapter a policy network approach is 
employed to try to explain the changes and continuities within animal health 
policy within the structured context of a formal model, the dialectical model of 
Marsh and Smith (2000). 
 
7KH SUHYLRXV WKUHH FKDSWHUV KDYH H[DPLQHG %ULWDLQ¶V DQLPDO KHDOWK SROLF\
looking both at the policies themselves and at the various factors that 
contributed to institutional change. This change is most clearly observed in the 
replacement of MAFF by Defra. However, perhaps more importantly, these 
chapters have shown how the traditional Westminster model of governance 
was replaced by new governance where the boundaries between the public and 
private sectors have become blurred. Institutionally this shift can be observed 
in such bodies as the EIG.  
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What is the policy network? 
 
To start to think about animal health policy in policy network terms, it is 
necessary to be clear about what is meant by the policy network. If the 
typology of policy networks outlined by Marsh and Rhodes (1992) is 
considered, as discussed in chapter two, it is reasonable to characterise the 
MAFF era as clearly being at the policy community end of the spectrum. 
Indeed, Smith (1990, 1993) argues that British agricultural policy has been 
subject to a dominant primary policy community since the end of World War 
Two. The key relationship in this community was the one between MAFF and 
WKH1DWLRQDO)DUPHUV¶8QLRQ 1)8:KLOH WKLVPD\FHUWDLQO\KDYHEHHQ WKH
case for agricultural policy as a whole, does the same hold true for present day 
animal health policy? Indeed, as discussed in chapter four, Jordan et al (1994) 
doubted whether this dominant policy community was the case even under the 
MAFF regime, citing some of the agenda around environmental concerns, and 
identifying various other bodies as playing significant roles within the 
agricultural policy sector as evidence.  
 
As an alternative, Jordan et al propose a fragmented model of different policy 
communities operating at a sub-sectoral level rather than a single MAFF wide 
FRPPXQLW\)RUWKHPµ2XUDJULFXOWXUDOSROLF\PDSLVFRQJHVWHGZLWKGHtailed 
and overlapping sub-VHFWRUDOSROLF\FRPPXQLWLHV¶-RUGDQet al 1994, p.507). It 
LVQHFHVVDU\KHUHWRQRWHWKDWLQXVLQJWKHWHUPµSROLF\FRPPXQLW\¶-RUGDQet 
al (1994) do not understand the term in the same sense as Marsh and Rhodes 
(1992). They do not understand the term as one end of a continuum of possible 
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policy networks but, rather, hold the more traditional meaning of the word 
µFRPPXQLW\¶DVDQRUJDQLVHGERG\+RZHYHUWREHDSROLF\FRPPXQLW\HYHQ
at the sub-sectoral level there needs to be a shared view of the problem (Jordan 
1990, p.327). 
 
This more fragmented approach has some advantages when looking at the 
agricultural policy sector. While the NFU may be a leading member of the 
agricultural policy community in the Marsh and Rhodes sense, the sheer range 
of niche policy areas within the broad sector lends support to Jordan HW DO¶V 
notion of sub-sectoral policy communities. Thinking back to chapters five and 
six of this thesis, plenty of evidence is found there to suggest that, if the NFU 
could once be seen as primus inter pares, in the contemporary policy 
environment a much broader range of interests has a real influence. What 
power the NFU retains results from its position as a leading member of several 
of these overlapping communities and not, as Smith (1993) argues, as the 
dominant member of a single sectoral policy community (Jordan et al 1994, 
p.513). Academic studies of some of these niche policy areas within the 
agricultural sector also give support to the idea of sub-sectoral policy 
communities. Greer (2002), for example, sees the policy network around 
organic agriculture as a distinct policy domain, separate from a primary 
DJULFXOWXUDOSROLF\FRPPXQLW\,QGHHGµWKHHVWDEOLVKHGSROLF\FRPPXQLWLHVDUH
finding it increasingly difficult to control policy development and to continue 
to exclude such alternative viewpoints as the organic one from debate on the 
IXWXUHRIDJULFXOWXUH¶*UHHUS 
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Being clear about what precisely constitutes a policy network is thus a far from 
easy task. Marsh and Rhodes (1992) certainly use case studies in which the 
network is identified at a sectoral level. However, as Daugbjerg and Marsh 
SRLQWRXW0DUVKDQG5KRGHVµHPSKDVLVH WKDWZKHWKHUQHWZRUNVRFFXU
at what level they occur and the nature of the relationship between networks at 
WKHWZROHYHOVDUHDOOHPSLULFDOTXHVWLRQV¶'DXJEMHUJDQG0DUVKS
In respect of animal health policy the question must be asked, who is in the 
network? Furthermore, in respect of the case studies in this thesis, it is 
reasonable to ask if the network around bovine TB differs from the network 
around implementation of the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy. It is to this 
empirical question that attention now turns. 
 
The animal health policy network 
 
Given that participants in a policy network do not possess a card to prove their 
membership of the network any description of who is a member and who not is 
likely to be open to challenge. The new governance approach adopted in 
animal health policy adds further difficulty in determining network 
membership. Are stakeholders necessarily members of the network?  
 
Considering animal health policy, a reasonable starting point in determining 
network membership must be the structures that exist to implement the policy. 
By policy, it is meant the implementation of the AHWS and the initiatives that 
flow from that process of implementation. What follows is an assessment of 
network membership under Defra and those structures such as the EIG that 
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have been created specifically to implement the AHWS. When the 
relationships identified in the Marsh and Smith model are considered, then the 
question of network change over time will be addressed. 
 
Defra itself must be a candidate for network membership. Its officials enforce 
animal health regulation, service the EIG, draft primary legislation and 
statutory instruments, its ministers bear final political responsibility for animal 
health policy. In short, it is difficult if not impossible to think about an animal 
health policy network that Defra is not a member of. In terms of resources too, 
Defra brings with it money and expertise. Clearly, therefore, Defra is a 
member of the network. 
 
The EIG is tasked with implementing the AHWS. It is reasonable, then, to 
consider the EIG as a member. Its chairman has considerable access to officials 
and ministers and as it has carried out its work it has acquired an identity for 
itself, established itself as an actor within the network that transcends whatever 
institutional affiliations that its individual members may have. The 
membership of the EIG gives clues to other members of the policy network. 
Producer interests are represented on the EIG and it is reasonable to conclude 
that producer interests are members of the network. The precise identity of 
individual members may be more tricky to establish, but the NFU, major 
industry bodies for various sectors of animal husbandry may be considered 
members. The veterinary profession must also be considered a member of this 
sub-sectoral policy network, so the BVA and BCVA and others are in. The 
retail industry, especially supermarkets can also be considered as members 
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from the presence on the EIG of a supermarket executive. Local authorities 
have a role in implementing a number of regulations associated with animal 
health, so local authorities are members of the network.  
 
In addition to these, there are a number of bodies with a specific interest in 
animal welfare who might claim membership of the policy network. Chief 
among these are the Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC) and the RSPCA. 
7KH563&$KDVDVSHFLILFLQWHUHVWDVLWVµ)UHHGRP)RRGV¶ODEHOLVRQHZD\LQ
which the EIG has sought to promote labelling as a means of distinguishing 
higher standards of animal welfare in food production. More radical animal 
welfare groups which challenge the essential industrialisation of animal 
production such as Compassion in World Farming, although not excluded from 
attending meetings of the EIG, cannot be considered members of the network 
since they exclude themselves by virtue of not accepting the shared approach 
required of a policy network. 
 
Although bTB is part of animal health policy, it has been dealt with slightly 
differently and passed on to a separate body under EIG oversight. The nature 
of NFU involvement is slightly different with one interview respondent 
suggesting that NFU policy on bTB was driven by the South West region 
(interview Defra official 2). In addition, as the question of badger involvement 
in the spread of the disease among cattle is an important sticking point of 
policy, wildlife groups, especially the Badger Trust, are members of the policy 
sub-network around bTB yet play little or no part in broader animal health 
policy. The centrality of the badger issue in bTB policy has meant that it 
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proved impossible for the network to exclude the Badger Trust despite it not 
sharing the approach to the disease favoured both by industry and veterinary 
members. However, the recently created TB Advisory Group has been set up 
without Badger Trust membership. The question of badger involvement also 
brings into this policy network, but not the animal health network generally, 
the ISG. Finally, empirical research for chapter six suggested that valuers and 
auctioneers were participatory members of the bTB network to a much greater 
extent than with animal health policy more widely. 
 
To conclude this section, it can be seen that animal health policy has generated 
a policy network at the sub-sectoral level. This network is centred around 
Defra and the EIG. Producer interests are well represented and as chapter five 
showed, the network has not sought to challenge the fundamental basis of 
animal production in this country as a means of improving animal health and 
welfare. Bovine TB should be seen as a special case of a network with no 
unifying, consensual approach to policy. The badger question, as shown in 
chapter six has so paralysed network relationships that policy making has been 
rendered difficult in the extreme. Having looked at network membership, it is 
now time to analyse animal health policy using the Marsh and Smith model 
described in chapter two. 
 
FEATURES OF THE MARSH AND SMITH MODEL 
 
The Marsh and Smith model posits three relationships which they term 
dialectical. This ought not to be understood in the Marxian sense, but rather, as 
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0DUVKDQG6PLWKSXW LW µDQ LQWHUDFWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ WZRYDULDEOHV LQ
ZKLFK HDFK DIIHFWV WKH RWKHU LQ D FRQWLQXLQJ LWHUDWLYH SURFHVV¶ 0DUVK DQG
Smith 2000, p.5). The need for a continuing process answered one perceived 
weakness of policy network analysis, that it tended to a static approach of 
looking at the network at a particular moment in time and that a more dynamic 
approach was required (Hay 1998). The dialectical model proposed by Marsh 
and Smith built upon this earlier work by Hay (1998) and Marsh (1998). 
Chapter two described the features of the Marsh and Smith model and noted 
that the three relationships they identified were those between: structure and 
agency, network and context and policy and outcome. In this section each of 
these relationships is examined more closely. 
 
Structure and agency 
 
For Marsh and Smith previously existing approaches to policy networks had 
privileged either structure or agency. That is, either policy outcomes are a 
consequence of bargaining between actors within the network (a rational 
choice approach) or the structures of the network themselves were decisive in 
determining policy outcome. Marsh and Smith seek to move beyond this 
binary distinction. For them, agents alone cannot explain policy outcome. 
Rational choice perspectives fail to recognise that within a network actors may 
not necessarily have a free choice of actions. Although agents may act 
UDWLRQDOO\ WKDW UDWLRQDOLW\ LV D ERXQGHG UDWLRQDOLW\ WKH DJHQW¶V FKRLFHV DUH
constrained by the structures in which the agent finds herself. 
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Marsh and Smith make two points about structures. The first is, as above, that 
structures act both to constrain agents but also to facilitate them. Secondly, the 
culture of a network is important and this culture also acts both as a constraint 
and an opportunity for its members (Marsh and Smith 2000, p. 5). This cultural 
element to policy networks was recognised by Marsh and Rhodes in their 
concept of a policy community. Within a policy community the shared culture 
and approach to a policy problem acts as a constraint on behaviour and policy 
FKRLFHV7KXV LQFKDSWHU WKUHH0$))¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI%6(DVHVVHQWLDOO\
an animal health problem can be seen as a consequence of the shared approach 
and culture of MAFF. The decisions MAFF made in the BSE case can be seen 
as almost inevitable given this cultural dimension to the network. 
 
However, for Marsh and Smith structures alone do not explain outcomes. 
Decisions are made not by structures but by agents working within those 
structures. Three points are made about agents. Their interests may not solely 
be defined by network membership. Agents may hold membership of more 
than one network that may overlap or conflict with their membership of the 
network in question. Secondly, the agent must perceive the opportunities 
offered by the network for themselves and, finally, the particular skills of the 
agent affect their ability to utilize the opportunities offered by the network 
(Marsh and Smith 2000, p. 6-7). 
 
For Marsh and Smith, therefore, it is neither agents nor structures which 
determine outcome but the relationship between the two. A skilful agent will 
gain more than a less skilful agent, but all are not completely free in the 
 235 
choices available to them. Within these structural constraints agents are not the 
utility maximisers of rational choice theory but utility satisfiers. 
 
Network and context 
 
As discussed in chapter two, existing policy network analysis tended to explain 
policy change in terms of factors endogenous or exogenous to the network. For 
Marsh and Smith this distinction is of little value and they argue that there is a 
QHHGWRUHFRJQLVHWKDWµWKHUHLVDGLDOHFWLFDOUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHQHWZRUN
DQGWKHEURDGHUFRQWH[WLQZKLFKLWLVORFDWHG¶0DUVKDQG6PLWh 2000, p.7). 
 
Marsh and Smith argue that policy networks reflect broader inequalities found 
in society such as those based upon class and gender. In their study of the GM 
crops issue, Toke and Marsh (2003) note that biotechnology and farming 
interests helG D SULYLOHJHG SODFH LQ WKDW SROLF\ QHWZRUN µDV VSRQVRUHG FOLHQW
JURXSV RI 0$))¶ 7RNH DQG 0DUVK  S 7KH\ DOVR DUJXH WKDW
economic and, in the GM crops case, professional interests dominate the 
QHWZRUNEXW WKH\ µGRQRWFODLPKHUH WKDW WKHGRPLQDQt network reflects class 
interests, but it is clear that it is economic, and to a lesser extent professional, 
LQWHUHVWVWKDWGRPLQDWHWKHQHWZRUNV¶7RNHDQG0DUVKS6R7RNH
and Marsh interpret broader inequality based on class in terms of the 
DWWDLQPHQWRI DSULYLOHJHGSRVLWLRQ LQ WKH*0SROLF\QHWZRUNRI µHQWUHQFKHG
HFRQRPLF LQWHUHVWV¶ 7RNHDQG0DUVKS DQGSURIHVVLRQDO LQWHUHVWV
rather than other middle class interests represented by pressure groups such as 
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Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the Soil Association which are excluded 
from the GM policy network. 
 
0DUVKDQG6PLWK¶V VHFRQG LQVLJKW LQWR WKH UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQQHWZRUNDQG
FRQWH[WLVWKDWµQHWZRUNVWUXFWXUHQHWZRUNFKDQJHDQGWKHSROLF\RXWFRPHPD\
be partially explained by reference to factors exogenous to the network, but 
these contextual factors are dialectically related to network structure and 
QHWZRUN LQWHUDFWLRQ¶ 0DUVK DQG 6PLWK  S 6LJQLILFDQW VRXUFHV RI
exogenous influence on a network are other networks. In addition political, 
economic or knowledge-based challenges to a network are also regarded as 
important (Marsh and Smith 2000, p.8). These exogenous influences may, for 
Marsh and Smith, have effects that range from altering relationships within a 
network to bringing about new policies or even resulting in the breakdown of 
WKH QHWZRUN +RZHYHU µ$OO VXFK H[RJHQRXV FKDQJH LV PHGLDWHG WKURXJK WKH
understanding of agents and interpreted in the context of the structures / norms 
and interpersonal relationshLSVZLWKLQWKHQHWZRUN¶0DUVKDQG6PLWKS
9). 
 
Network and outcomes 
 
Marsh and Smith argue that existing literature on policy networks focussed on 
the extent to which networks affected policy outcomes. However, for them, it 
is important to recognise that policy outcomes also affect the shape of the 
policy network and that the relationship between network and policy outcomes 
is not one that is unidirectional (Marsh and Smith 2000, p.9). 
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Marsh and Smith note three ways in which outcomes may affect policy 
networks. A policy outcome may lead to a change in either the membership of 
the policy network or to a change in the balance of resources of the members 
within the network. Marsh and Smith give examples of Conservative 
government policies which resulted in the removal or the considerable 
reduction in influence of the trades unions within some policy networks 
(Marsh and Smith 2000, p.9). Related to this, policy outcomes may weaken the 
position of a particular interest in a network or networks. Conservative 
economic policies in the 1980s, for example, weakened the trades unions not 
simply within particular policy networks, but also within the broader structure 
of society (Marsh and Smith 2000, p. 9). Thirdly, policy outcomes act as a 
learning experience for agents. Agents learn from the results of strategies 
adopted and abandon or continue them depending upon the benefits of those 
actions to the agent (Marsh and Smith 2000, p.9). 
 
USING THE MODEL 
 
Having discussed in some detail the three relationships identified in the Marsh 
and Smith model and identified the range of actors to be found in the network, 
LWLVQRZSRVVLEOHWRGLVFXVVDQLPDOKHDOWKSROLF\LQWHUPVRIWKHPRGHO¶VWKUHH
relationships. 
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The dialectical relationship between structure and agency 
 
What is striking when thinking about the structures within the animal health 
policy network is the range of actors and structures that comprise the network. 
Indeed, this very complexity, especially in delivery was identified as a 
weakness in animal health policy in a review of the delivery landscape carried 
out for Defra by David Eves (Eves 2006). Part of the structure of the network, 
then, is the large number of bodies with a role to play in delivery. However, 
many of these bodies are part of Defra either DVµFRUH¶'HIUDRUHVWDEOLVKHGDV
executive agencies of Defra as new governance inspired reforms under New 
Public Management.  
 
Toke and Marsh in discussing structure in relationship to GM crops accept the 
notion of a dominant discourse as a structure in itself (Toke and Marsh 2003, 
p.239). In the GM crops debate, the dominant discourse included a limited 
interpretation of what was meant by environmental testing (that it should be 
restricted to examining the effect on wildlife). The effect of the dominant 
discourse was to exclude groups from the network who rejected this discourse. 
As how a problem is conceptualised influences what issues are important, the 
dominant discourse also restricts the range of policy options on the agenda. By 
defining the problem and limiting the agenda, the dominant discourse acts as a 
structural constraint, excluding otherwise credible scientific and economic 
LQWHUHVWV µ,QGHHG WKH QHWZRUN VWUXFWXUH LV GHVLJQHG SUHFLVHO\ WR DFKLHYH WKLV
DLP¶ 7RNH DQG0DUVKS ,Q DQLPDl health policy the effects of a 
dominant discourse can be observed in the cases of BSE and FMD. During the 
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BSE period, those rejecting the framing of the problem as one of animal health 
were excluded from the network. This can be seen in the cases of dissident 
scientists like Alan Dickinson and Harash Narang, as well as in the reluctance 
with which MAFF accepted the involvement of the Department of Health 
(DH) in the Southwood Committee. While BSE was nominally therefore a 
joint venture between the two policy networks of agriculture and health, in 
practice, at least until 1996, DH members were expected to conform to the 
dominant discourse that BSE was an animal health problem and thus not likely 
to pose a significant risk to human health. Thus, by being selective in which 
actors were admitted to the network either by prior socialisation within the 
primary agricultural network in the case of MAFF actors, or by selection of 
advisory committee members based upon selection of the right sort of person 
for the job (qua Jasanoff), the structure of the network was such that while 
policy was made by actors, they did so within the context of a structure that 
was predisposed toward particular policy choices. 
 
A dominant discourse can be observed too when considering the 2001 FMD 
outbreak. Again, network membership was limited and confined to those actors 
sharing the dominant discourse that eradication of FMD and the protection of 
WKH8.¶VH[SRUWPDUNHWZHUH WKHSULPDU\JRDOVRISROLF\2UJDQLVDWLRQV OLNH
the Soil Association, a key member of the organic food sub-sectoral network 
were rigorously excluded from influence in the policy network dealing with 
FMD at this time. Other competing networks such as that supporting tourism 
were also excluded by virtue of the fact that FMD was framed as an animal 
health policy problem. Here, the particular strength of the NFU can be seen at 
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work in its successful moves to prevent the introduction of a vaccination 
regime to help contain the outbreak. So in the cases of both BSE and FMD we 
can see that the network was able to privilege policy preferences by limiting 
membership of the network. 
 
This study has not used the term dominant discourse in the case of animal 
health policy. However, mention has been made of the need for members to 
accept a shared understanding of the policy area in order to be accepted into 
the network. This shared understanding involves a willingness not to challenge 
the fundamental basis of industrialised animal production in the UK. The Soil 
Association has gained membership in the person of EIG Chair Helen 
Browning. However, as discussed in chapter five, her appointment as Chair 
was in a personal capacity and not as a representative of the Soil Association. 
Furthermore, the Soil Association enjoys a key role within another niche 
policy network within Defra that of organic food (Greer 2002). So the Soil 
Association can be seen as having some credibility within Defra. In the animal 
health policy network, Helen Browning has not sought to challenge the shared 
understanding of animal health, or dominant discourse, despite the sometimes 
critical official position adopted by the Soil Association, although as shown in 
chapter five, has pressed for fuller understanding and consideration of animal 
welfare. As Toke and Marsh accept a dominant discourse as a structural 
constraint in the case of GM crops, so may it be accepted as such in the case of 
animal health. 
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The position of the EIG itself is complex. As the body with responsibility to 
implement the AHWS it is certainly an agent in the policy process. However, 
the EIG also functions as one of the structures through which stakeholders can 
articulate their preferences. The EIG prefers to function on the basis of 
consensus, a preference which requires the EIG members to accommodate the 
preferences of other members of the EIG when considering their own 
positions. The EIG is thus an example of an organisation that is itself an agent. 
Marsh and Smith do not make a distinction between an agent as an individual 
and an agent as an orgaQLVDWLRQ)RU0DUVKDQG6PLWKDJHQWVDUHµVWUDWHJLFDOO\
FDOFXODWLQJ VXEMHFWV¶ 0DUVK DQG 6PLWK  S +RZHYHU DV 7RNH DQG
Marsh recognise, these calculations in the case of an organisation as agent are 
influenced by both the norms of the group and the objectives of the individuals 
concerned. This is certainly the case in respect of the EIG. 
 
In chapter five, the EIG was presented as an example of a body influenced by 
the ideas of new governance. The agencies created during the period of 
Conservative government under the guidance of New Public Management can 
be seen as first generation governance structures. New bodies such as the EIG 
can be seen as second generation new governance, an institutional response to 
coordinate the disparate groups and bodies with an interest in animal health. 
More broadly, new governance can be seen as a structural element as, with the 
hollowing out of the state, the role of non-state actors in delivering animal 
health policy became more important.  
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Animal health policy can be seen as a good example of outcomes being a 
consequence of a continuing process of interaction between agents and 
structures as predicted by the Marsh and Smith model. Entry to the network is 
dependent upon accepting the dominant discourse which acts as a limitation on 
the actions that individual agents can undertake. Members of supposedly 
oppositional groups such as the Soil Association have been obliged to limit 
their opposition and to work within the requirement to operate in a consensual 
manner within the EIG.  
 
So, examined through the lens of the dialectical model of policy networks, 
actors make the policy decisions but those decisions are taken in a structural 
FRQWH[W 7KHUH LV YDOXH LQ FRQVLGHULQJ 5KRGHV DQG 0DUVK¶V  VFKHPD RI
policy networks in relation to agents actions. If we consider a policy network 
that lies toward the issue network end of the spectrum, it can be seen that with 
a larger membership of the network, greater space exists for a diversity of 
opinion. No one group or small collection of groups has the resources to create 
a dominant discourse and effectively exclude significant groups from the 
network. Actors in such a network thus have greater space in which to take 
decisions. The EU policy network on environmental policy is a good example 
RI D GLYHUVH LVVXH QHWZRUN :LWKLQ D SROLF\ FRPPXQLW\ VXFK DV WKH 8.¶V
agricultural policy community with a small number of members, the scope for 
development of a dominant discourse within the network is greater. In this 
case, the division of the network into sub-sectoral networks reinforces that 
tendency. Big players such as MAFF and the NFU were able to gain 
membership across the range of sub-sectoral networks and able to set the 
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agenda for those sub-sectoral groups. Outside bodies, such as biotechnology 
companies or the Soil Association were admitted into particular sub-sectoral 
networks where they possessed resources which were of value to the network 
as a whole, but were rigorously excluded from those sub sectors where their 
interests differed from the overarching policy aims of the sectoral level 
network. 
 
The actions of individual agents are also constrained by their expectations of 
what will prove acceptable to the wider network. In BSE for example, 
Millstone and van Zwanenberg argue that soon after its creation the 
6RXWKZRRG&RPPLWWHHµVWDUWHGLQHIIHFWWRDFTXLHVFHZLWKWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V
ULVN FRPPXQLFDWLRQSULRULWLHV¶ 0LOOVWRQHDQGYDQ =ZDQHQEHUJS
Furthermore the same authors describe, quoting from Southwood himself, how 
the committee felt that it had to tailor its recommendations such that they 
might be acceptable politically by MAFF (Millstone and van Zwanenberg 
2001, p.106). This seems clear evidence to show that network structures do 
LQGHHG KDYH DQ LQIOXHQFH RQ DJHQWV¶ EHhaviour. Similarly, powerful actors 
within the network, those with the greatest resources, can use their position to 
maximise their influence upon policy outcome. A good example here is the 
ability of the NFU to prevent a vaccination strategy in the FMD outbreak. The 
constraints on powerful actors are perhaps not as great as on those in a weaker 
position, a relationship itself which suggests that power and therefore agency 
are constrained by institutional structures. 
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The dialectical relationship between network and context 
 
The Marsh and Smith model is effective in identifying that networks are not 
discrete islands with complete power over their dominion. Within animal 
health policy external context existed in the BSE case in the form of interaction 
with another network (the DH) and by the action of consumers. The latter led 
to a campaign of trying to allay public fears over the safety of British beef. 
Thus risk communication can form part of the broader context in which the 
network operated. During the 2001 FMD outbreak, awareness of the political 
context is critical in understanding the action of the network. Also in FMD we 
see the MAFF-centred network supplanted by the Prime Minister and his close 
advisors ± an example of the exercise of political authority to over-ride the 
network supposedly charged with handling the policy. In addition, government 
preferred to use the advice of an outside group of scientists rather than a group 
from within the MAFF network.  
 
In their study of policy networks and the GM crops issue Toke and Marsh 
identified five dimensions of the context in which the policy network operates. 
7KHVH DUH µVRFLHWDO VWUXFWXUDO FRQVWUDLQWV SXEOLF RSLQLRQ (XURSH RWKHU
QHWZRUNVDQGULVNDYHUVLRQ¶7RNHDQG0DUVKS$VWKHVHDXWKRUV 
utilised the dialectical model in their analysis, their approach is adopted here 
also. Each of the Toke and Marsh contextual factors are now examined in turn. 
  
Societal structural change: Policy networks reflect the broader pattern of 
structured inequality (Marsh and Smith 2000, p.7). Societal inequalities of 
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class, race and gender will thus be reflected in network membership and 
structure. Most importantly, economically powerful groups are likely to attain 
powerful positions within the network. Thus, historically, MAFF and the NFU 
representing the economic power of the state and the farming industry held 
sway across the agricultural network including animal health. Radical groups 
such as the Soil Association, while being primarily middle class in 
composition and outlook, do not represent entrenched economic interests (save 
in the case of the organic food sub-sectoral network where the Soil Association 
is a key player) and are excluded from the network.  
 
However, in the case of animal health policy, these economic considerations 
have been influenced by a wider government need to keep expenditure on 
animal health under control. In the case of bovine TB this need to bring 
expenditure under control has been particularly marked as a rising incidence of 
the disease has yielded a higher burden on public expenditure in the form of 
compensation payments to farmers affected by the disease. Chapter six has 
discussed this in more detail. From a perspective of examining context and the 
network, the previously privileged position of industry bodies, especially of the 
NFU has come under sustained challenge. Although industry interests retain a 
strong position in the network, those interests are now represented by a much 
broader range of bodies than just the NFU. In the GM crops case although 
opponents of GM crops are represented by pressure groups with a strong 
middle class membership such as Greenpeace, these groups are excluded from 
the GM policy network on the basis that they do not represent entrenched 
economic interests (Toke and Marsh 2003, p.244). So, the economic interests 
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represented in GM crops is the interest of the biotechnology industry as an 
economic power. In animal health policy the same pattern can be seen with 
industry interests prominent while more radical groups in the animal health 
field which may enjoy the support of many middle class people are excluded 
or limited in their membership. 
 
Public Opinion: When thinking about the recent history of animal health 
policy public opinion forms part of the context in both the BSE and FMD 
cases. In BSE, policy makers were concerned to reassure consumers about the 
safety of British beef. This led to a number of statements asserting, without 
scientific evidence to support the claims, that beef was safe to eat. The 
management of public opinion in BSE was an important objective of policy in 
so far as it handled risk communication. Phillips observes, 
 
µ7KURXJKRXWWKH%6(VWRU\WKHDSSURDFKWRFRPPXQLFDWLRQRIULVN
was shaped by a consuming fear of provoking an irrational public 
scare. This applied not merely to the government, but to advisory 
committees, to those responsible for the safety of medicines, to 
Chief Medical Officers and to the Meat and Livestock 
Commission. All witnesses agreed that information should not be 
withheld from the public, but some spoke of the need to control the 
manner of its release. Mr Meldrum [Chief Veterinary Officer] 
VSRNH RI WKH GHVLUDELOLW\ RI UHOHDVLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ µLQ DQ RUGHUO\
IDVKLRQ¶± of ensuring that the whole package of information was 
SXW WRJHWKHU WDNLQJ FDUH LQ WKH SURFHVV QRW WR µURFN WKH ERDW¶
(Phillips 2000, para. 1.1294). 
 
Thus, while it does not appear to have been the intention to deliberately 
deceive the public, clearly there was concern that risk communication should 
not lead to alarm and a loss of confidence in the safety of British beef. Post 
BSE, the May Guidelines (OST 2000) had openness as one of its objectives. 
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By the time of FMD, public opinion again provided an important element of 
the context in which the policy network operated. At the start of the outbreak 
there was a great deal of support for the farming community, and restrictions 
on access to the countryside enjoyed public support and compliance. Yet, 
public opinion did begin to become more critical once the outbreak proved 
more long lasting than anticipated and as funeral pyres and problems for the 
tourism industry began to become apparent. 
 
Public opinion does not appear to have played a significant role in the 
management of the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy. In general, matters 
discussed under its remit have not generated sufficient public controversy for 
public opinion to seriously impact upon the working of the network. Generally, 
the AHWS approach has been to manage the opinion of stakeholders in 
support of the strategy rather than direct engagement or conflict with public 
opinion more broadly as chapter five has shown. Public opinion has been a 
factor in two current animal health problems. In the case of avian influenza 
(AI), this was perceived as a need to be shown to be on top of things and to 
have a clear plan. Indeed, AI as a disease resulted in resources within Defra 
being reallocated from other animal health policy areas in response to what 
was seen as an immediate threat resulting in some delays in the progressing of 
the AHWS (observation of remark by Defra official at an EIG meeting). The 
other disease where public opinion had a significant role to play is bTB. 
Chapter six discusses in detail the process of public consultation on the 
question of badger culling. From an analytical perspective, it may be held that 
it is significant that the network set up a smaller sub-network to handle 
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specifically tuberculosis. This can be seen as an attempt to prevent the broader 
AHWS becoming bogged down with bTB but also, arguably, to prevent public 
opinion from becoming engaged with broad animal health policy. 
 
Europe: The EU is an important element in the context within which UK 
animal health policy is determined as UK policy must conform to EU 
regulations. The EU was the body with the final power to restore the ability of 
the UK to export beef after both BSE and FMD. The Over Thirty Months 
Scheme, whereby cattle over that age were culled and prevented from entering 
the food chain with compensation payable to farmers was introduced on the 
advice of the EU. Other EU member states also had their own public opinion 
to worry about and this too, will have shaped their response to a degree. Less 
heralded is the role of the EU in funding the compensation scheme during 
BSE. Some 70% of slaughter compensation funds had an EU origin although 
this is reduced in reality as greater EU support had the effect of reducing 
%ULWDLQ¶VUHEDWHIURPWKH(87KH(8LVHVWLPDWHGWRXOWLPDWHO\SLFNXS
of the bill for culling cattle (Grant 1997, p.346). The EU played a similar role 
during the 2001 FMD outbreak. The export ban on British cattle was both 
introduced and lifted by the EU. Thus in animal health, as in so many other 
policy fields, Europe plays a key role both as context in which the national 
policy network operates but also as a policy network in its own right. 
 
Other Networks: The role of other networks is important. The EU as another 
policy network has already been mentioned, but other, domestic policy 
networks impact on animal health policy too. Looking first at recent animal 
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health problems, during the BSE crisis, as fears over human health became 
more grounded, the DH policy network assumed increasing importance. This is 
evidenced by the fact that it was a health minister who announced that BSE 
was the likely cause of the vCJD in 1996. The increasing role of the DH also 
reflected a partial redefining of BSE as a policy problem. While it could be 
defined in terms of an animal health problem, MAFF was always likely to 
remain the lead department. Once BSE became redefined as a human health 
problem as well as an animal health one, the DH was able to increase its 
involvement. However, research into BSE appears to show that there was little 
conflict between MAFF and the DH over BSE (Winter 1996, p.560). 
 
During FMD, a competing policy network for the tourism industry was 
successfully excluded from influence by the MAFF-dominated animal health 
QHWZRUN+RZHYHU WKH LQIOXHQFHRI WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V&DELQHW2IILFHZDV
not able to be excluded. Marsh and Smith argue that the Prime Minister can 
effect change if s/he so wishes, although the political costs may be high. 
)XUWKHUPRUH µLW LV GLIILFXOW« IRU QHWZRUN PHPEHUV WR LJQRUH GLUHFW SROLWLFDO
SUHVVXUHIRUFKDQJH¶0DUVKDQG6PLWK S+HUHWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V
LQIOXHQFH ZDV GHFLVLYH LQ GLUHFWLQJ SROLF\ 7KH UROH RI WKH 30¶V VFLHQFH
advisor David King was considerable. Dr King often appearing on the 
influential Radio 4 programme Today WR H[SODLQ SROLF\ 7KH 30¶V LQIOXHQFH
can also EH VHHQ LQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V XVH RI WKH ,PSHULDO &ROOHJH WHDP¶V
HSLGHPLRORJLFDOPRGHOLQSUHIHUHQFHWRWKDWRI0$))¶VRZQWHDPDVGLVFXVVHG
in chapter three.  
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With present animal health policy, new governance has been argued as a 
structural constraint on the animal health policy network. However, it can also 
be seen as a broader component of the context within which the network 
operates. The New Public Management reforms of the Conservative 
JRYHUQPHQWV RI WKH V DQG µV H[HUFLVHG D VLJQLILFDQW LQIOXHQFe on how 
government operated across all policy sectors. As chapter three explained, 
NPM undermined the traditional public sector ethos of the civil service and 
replaced it with a more market oriented approach based around performance 
indicators, targets and a growing tendency to create executive agencies to 
implement policy. The Labour government elected in 1997 did not seek to 
reverse the trend toward new governance but embraced it. However, within 
animal health policy, the government sought to take steps to better coordinate 
policy by creating new structures such as the EIG.  
 
Because of the significance of the bovine TB issue and the associated 
controversy, the animal health policy network has tried to create a separate 
sub-network to handle that disease, an issue network in the Marsh and Rhodes 
(1992) schema has emerged to handle that particular policy. Observations at 
EIG meetings show that for some industry interests a decision on bTB, 
especially on badger culling would impact upon their approach to wider animal 
health policy cooperation. Indeed, following the very recent announcement by 
Hilary Benn that the government had decided not to proceed with a cull of 
badgers, the NFU immediately announced that it was withdrawing from 
discussions on responsibility and cost sharing (Farmers Weekly Interactive 8 
July 2008).  
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The present policy network for animal health is a recent creation emerging 
from the publication of the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy in 2002. The 
network centred around the EIG is clearly different in how it works and more 
diffuse in its membership than the more closed policy community type 
arrangement that could be observed around the central relationship between 
MAFF and the NFU. In trying to explain network change the dialectical model 
favours neither endogenous nor exogenous factors as determining network 
change but argues that changes in the external environment are interpreted 
within the structure of the network. However, within animal health policy, it 
can be argued that exogenous factors, most particularly the government wide 
movement towards new governance are most important when considering 
network change.  
 
This is an example of political change, one of four categories of change in 
QHWZRUNV¶H[WHUQDOHQYLURQPHQW LGHQWLILHGE\0DUVK and Rhodes (1992). The 
challenge posed by new governance required the network to change, to adapt 
to the realities of needing to work in a partnership way rather than in the 
traditional Westminster model approach. However, economic change also 
contributed to network change. As farming became a less important aspect of 
the rural economy, so the policy need to consider other rural interests grew, as 
was shown in chapter four. These external challenges could not be effectively 
managed in the pre-Defra policy network and so new network structures and 
with them new policies were required. 
 
 
 252 
Risk-aversion as a cultural context: Toke and Marsh (2003, p.246) identify 
risk aversion as another element in the context in which policy networks in the 
GM food case operated. They suggest that environmental groups enjoyed some 
VXFFHVVLQµSOXJJLQJLQ¶WRDQDOUHDG\H[LVWLQJULVNVRFLHW\FRQVFLRXVQHVV%HFN
1992). In the case of animal health policy, some aspects of this phenomenon 
can also be observed. The BSE and FMD episodes have been held to have led 
to a loss of trust in government use of expertise and pronouncements on food 
safety. The creation of the independent Food Standards Agency (FSA) may be 
VHHQ DV D UHVSRQVH WR WKLV SUREOHP ZLWK WKH )6$¶V RVWHQVLEO\ PRUH RSHQ
pURFHVVHV KDYLQJ µVRPH OLPLWHG YDOXH LQ LPSURYLQJ SXEOLF FRQILGHQFH LQ WKH
UHJXODWRU\UHJLPH¶5RWKVWHLQS 
 
The relationship between network and outcomes 
 
One advantage of the dialectical model is that rather than simply focussing 
upon, as the literature tended to, how networks affected policy outcomes, it 
also considers how policy outcomes have affected the network. The model 
rejects a unidirectional causal link between networks and outcomes. Animal 
health policy offers a rich body of evidence to support the assertion that 
networks affect outcomes and that outcomes affect networks. 
 
Chapter three discussed two policy outcomes in detail which were profoundly 
affected by the network. In the case of BSE the policy network defined the 
problem simply as an animal health problem (Greer 1999, p.600) with little 
ULVN WR KXPDQ KHDOWK 7KLV YLHZ ZDV VXSSRUWHG E\ 0$))¶V XVH RI VSHFLDOLVW
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committees such as Southwood. However, this view turned out to be mistaken; 
BSE did pose a risk to human health that was only publicly acknowledged 
after assurances that no risk to human health existed. Arguably, the insulated 
nature of the MAFF policy network centred around the relationship between 
MAFF and the NFU led MAFF to favour the protection of the market for beef 
over protection of the public. One consequence of the BSE case for the 
network was that public confidence in it dissipated and the network was forced 
to adjust to this new reality by adopting new procedures that emphasised 
openness and transparency.  
 
The network influenced policy outcome in the case of the 2001 FMD outbreak. 
Again, defining the problem as simply one of animal health and not as a 
broader rural crisis promoted a policy that relied upon the tried and tested 
method of stamping out the disease by culling, a policy essentially 
unquestioned and unaltered since the 1920s (Woods 2004a). The relatively 
closed nature of the network, with a central position for the NFU, was also able 
to continue to insist on this policy against those who argued for a role for 
vaccination. As has been shown, although the Cabinet Office and the Prime 
Minister himself assumed a leading role in handling FMD, it may be argued 
WKDWWKLVZDVPRUHDFRQVHTXHQFHRIGRXEWVRYHU0$))¶VDELOLW\WRGHOLYHUWKH
policy efficiently rather than a criticism of the policy prescription emanating 
from the network. 
 
However, within animal health policy outcomes have also most definitely 
influenced the network. The present arrangements for animal health policy can 
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be seen to be directly affected by the outcomes of both BSE and FMD policy 
problems. Perceived difficulties within MAFF resulted in that department 
being effectively sidelined in handling FMD. The Phillips Report has resulted 
in a number of changes in the way in which science should be used by 
government, including the need for openness especially in the need to 
communicate uncertainty to the public. These changes can be seen as the 
consequence of outcome affecting network in two ways; firstly, policy 
outcome, particularly the perception of policy failure affected the composition 
and structure of the network, and a change in the balance of resources within 
the network. Within Defra, for example, the farming industry finds itself in the 
same sectoral network as environment policy. Formally powerful actors like 
the NFU, cannot expect to have the same level of influence over policy as 
previously. Secondly, outcomes affect actors within the network. The strategy 
of risk communication having been considered a failure in BSE, agents 
modified their behaviour in dealing with FMD. In particular, scientists were 
employed as explainers of policy to the public directly in an attempt to 
maintain trust in the rightness of government action. This strategy was 
recommended in the May guidelines (OST 2000, para.28).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Examining the animal health policy network as a whole, it can be seen that the 
structure of the network has changed over the time period covered. After the 
2001 FMD outbreak, MAFF was wound up and replaced by Defra with a new 
agency, the Food Standards Agency (FSA), created to deal with issues of food 
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safety. In seeking to explain network change over time the interaction of the 
network and context, and network and outcomes are important considerations. 
Interestingly, food safety was taken away from the animal health network after 
the FMD outbreak which had no implications for human health. By taking a 
historical view, however, it can be seen that the relationship between the 
network and context and network and outcomes can explain network change. 
BSE as an issue showed the weakness of combining animal health and food 
safety in the same network. However, this weakness was not completely 
evident until it became clear that in framing BSE as an animal health problem, 
policy makers had missed the possibility of human health implications of the 
new disease. Those implications began to become apparent in 1996. The 
network thus affected the wider context by damaging public trust in its claims 
of safety. After the change of government in 1997 and the creation of the 
Phillips Committee, institutional change was put on hold pending the 
publication of the report. The Phillips Report itself is a huge document, with 
many recommendations. Time was required to consider these 
recommendations. However, before FMD appeared, the network had begun to 
change in its approach somewhat. The OST issued in 2000 guidelines on the 
use of science in policy making. These guidelines highlighted openness as an 
objective in the use of science by government (OST 2000, para. 27). The FMD 
outbreak brought the Prime Minister into contact with the network, supplanting 
it in policy making terms with his own Cabinet Office. FMD proved to be the 
catalyst to introduce more wide ranging changes in network structure, but the 
origin of these changes can be found earlier in the BSE crisis period. 
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)XUWKHUGULYHUV IRUQHWZRUNFKDQJHFDQEHIRXQGLQWKH/DERXUJRYHUQPHQW¶V
enthusiastic adoption of new governance ideas of partnership working and 
stakeholder participation. In the new animal health policy network that 
followed the AHWS, these ideas became institutionalised within the EIG. 
However, in the case of bTB where no shared understanding of the problem 
was present among stakeholders, Defra was willing to use more old 
governance methods to handle the problem. Stakeholder participation was 
more limited within the network and the meetings of the TB Advisory Group 
are far less public than those of the EIG. However, even here with bTB, 
FRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKWKHSXEOLFIRUPHGDQHOHPHQWRI'HIUD¶s approach to try and 
find a way forward in a particularly difficult situation for them. 
 
So, it may be held that, overall, the Marsh and Smith dialectical model does 
offer a useful tool for analysing animal health policy and for explaining 
network transformation. Admittedly, in animal health policy, that 
transformation was dramatic, essentially a replacement of one network with a 
way of doing business by another network with markedly different ways of 
working. However, the three relationships described by the model are useful in 
framing the analysis and making clear the two-way nature of those 
relationships. 
 
In their study of GM crops, Toke and Marsh identify a particular weakness 
with the model (Toke and Marsh 2003, p.250) They note that the model does 
not distinguish between individuals and groups as agents. Groups as agents 
will be influenced in their actions by their own internal norms and problem 
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definition. Groups may also have greater resources than individuals. However, 
individual actors such as government ministers are themselves constrained by 
their position which puts them in the network and also by their relationship 
with other government departments and ministerial colleagues. However, their 
position does also give them access to the resources of government. While this 
is seen as a problem for Toke and Marsh, it is uncertain that such a distinction 
is either necessary or desirable. Indeed, given that one of the claims of the 
model is that there is a dialectical relationship between structure and agency, 
that should hold true whether one is talking about an individual as agent or a 
JURXS3HUKDSVWKHRQHH[FHSWLRQWRWKLVLVWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶VUROHGXULQJWKH
FMD crisis. As an individual agent he was able to invest his personal authority 
into getting the action he wanted. While this is presented in the analysis above 
as an example of context influencing network, it may also represent the result 
of clear political calculation by an individual agent. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This chapter brings together the findings of this research and directly addresses 
the research questions set out in chapter one. In addition, some suggestions for 
future research are offered as are thoughts on the broader implications of this 
study. 
 
This research was motivated, in part, by a reaction to the events of the 2001 
FMD epidemic and the winding up of MAFF as a ministry with responsibility 
for animal health. Its replacement, Defra, had a wide policy remit. How would 
Defra manage animal health and would this be different to the way that MAFF 
operated? This was the central concern of the research. This was translated into 
the over arching research question: 
 
Is Defra policy-making qualitatively different to that of MAFF? If 
so, how, and in what ways, do governance structures and processes 
reflect that difference? 
 
In addition, two further questions addressed particular case studies: 
 
How have the new governance structures created by the AHWS 
worked in practice? How do stakeholders participate in the policy 
process? 
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Has Defra effectively deployed new governance measures to 
resolve the problems posed by competing interests and uncertain 
science to produce policy on bovine tuberculosis? 
 
This chapter has three sections. Section one reviews the findings of the 
research and offers answers to the research questions. Section two takes a look 
at developments in animal health policy that occurred too recently to have been 
included in the main body of the thesis and considers how these developments 
fit with the findings of this research. Section three considers the possibilities 
for future research in this policy area, and considers the broader implications of 
this research. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
Chapters one and two set the scene and build the foundations of the research. 
Chapter one detailed the creation of the productivist regime in agriculture and 
the establishment of a closed policy community centred upon MAFF and the 
NFU (Smith 1993). This relationship was for several decades a successful one 
and MAFF was seen as an efficient department (Hennessy 1990). 
 
In chapter two the various methods and theoretical tools used in the research 
were discussed. A variety of methods were employed in the research. 
Document analysis, interviews and participant observation were used in the 
acquisition of the empirical data. Interpretivism, letting actors and documents 
say for themselves what they think they are doing, guided the document 
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analysis and some of the case study work (Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 2006). 
Policy networks were employed as an analytical framework in chapter seven to 
analyse the process of policy and institutional change. In the animal health 
field, as in many others, developments such as new public management have 
had a significant impact. However, the governance literature alone was shown 
to be somewhat vague with no clear agreement on defining quite what was 
PHDQWE\µJRYHUQDQFH¶3ROLF\QHWZRUNVKHOSWRJLYHDVWUXFWXUHWRDQDO\VHWKH
impact of new governance ideas on animal health. Like the governance 
literature, policy networks can work in a context in which the lines between 
SXEOLFDQGSULYDWHKDYHEHFRPHEOXUUHG,QGHHGSROLF\QHWZRUNVµFDQEHVHHQ
DVDSUHFXUVRUWRWKHJRYHUQDQFHOLWHUDWXUH¶5DPDQSIRUWKLVUHDVRQ
The combination of interpretive and policy network methods and frameworks 
was justified on the basis that they contributed to different aspects of the 
project and helped to answer different research questions.  
 
Chapter three looked at MAFF and told the story of how its policy making 
style came under attack from political pressures introduced by a Conservative 
government implementing NPM measures. In addition, policy problems ± 
salmonella in eggs, BSE and FMD were discussed. These were shown to 
contribute to the undermining of public confidence in MAF)¶V KDQGOLQJ RI
animal health issues.  
 
In chapter four, the story of institutional change from MAFF to Defra was 
completed. It showed that demands for change were present under MAFF. 
Most importantly, the interface between environment and agriculture and how 
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demands to consider the needs of the wider rural economy were shown to be 
most prominent in generating demands for a new department that could 
address these wider rural concerns.  
 
Chapter four also described the features of Defra as a new department and its 
responsibilities for both environmental policy as well as agriculture. It was also 
shown that Defra intended to be different from MAFF and would consider the 
wider rural economy and not just the needs or demands of farming. The wide 
UDQJHRI'HIUD¶V responsibilities led to concerns that the interests of farming 
would be sidelined.  
 
Defra intended to mark a break with the past and made explicit claims that it 
would forge a new relationship with the farming sector. Defra would also 
UHMHFW WKHµ6RYLHW-VW\OH¶ WRS-down approach to policy and would employ new 
governance methods to work in partnership with stakeholders and recognised 
the resources and skills that they could offer. However, as chapter four also 
showed, even early in its life Defra was under financial pressure and could not 
do all that it or its stakeholders wanted. 
 
The new policies for animal health that emerged from this new department 
were discussed. New governance themes were shown to be leading ideas 
within them. Ideas such as partnership working have prominence in these 
policies. Farming should not expect Defra to do things for them but should 
expect to be active participants in delivering good animal health. 
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Chapter five covered the first case study, the Animal Health and Welfare 
Strategy and its daughter strategy for veterinary surveillance. The England 
Implementation Group, it was argued, can be seen as a new sort of institution 
with the aim of improving policy delivery under a new governance policy 
style. EIG meetings were open and stakeholder participation encouraged. It 
was also argued that the role of the EIG was to persuade and encourage 
industry to take a greater share of responsibility for itself. This chapter also 
identified a desire to control the cost of animal health policy as important. This 
desire was seen in two major ways. First, by the emphasis placed by the EIG 
on the cost and responsibility sharing agenda and also by its encouragement of 
Farm Health Plans as a means of improving animal health and reducing the 
likelihood of destructive disease outbreaks. Second, by the use of more 
targeted surveillance with the establishment of clear reasons for government 
intervention. Even here, however, government intervention did not necessarily 
mean that government would be the body paying the bill for that intervention. 
 
Success has been patchy. It was shown that the EIG constructed working 
meanings for ideas such as partnership, stakeholder and welfare that sat 
FRPIRUWDEO\ZLWKWKHIDUPLQJLQGXVWU\7KHµHOHSKDQWLQWKHURRP¶DVLt were 
was bTB, with progress on responsibility and cost sharing threatened by a 
decision not to cull badgers combined with industry concerns that the agenda 
was about passing on costs from Defra to the industry rather than 
responsibilities. 
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Chapter five also found that veterinary surveillance had been radically altered. 
It showed how the workings of the VLA had changed to accommodate the 
requirements of Defra to the detriment of the needs of the local practice vets 
who, previously, had been seen as a major customer. An unintended 
consequence of this was observed to be a reduction in the quantity of private 
practice work coming to the VLA labs. 
 
Chapter six looked at the second of the two case studies, that of bovine 
tuberculosis. Bovine TB was shown to be a special case characterised by a lack 
of stakeholder agreement on the right way to proceed with policy. Two aspects 
of bTB policy caused significant dispute among stakeholders. Pre-movement 
testing of cattle for the disease caused significant disquiet among farming 
interests. It was shown that the NFU was able to delay the implementation of 
the policy though not, ultimately, to prevent its introduction. However, the 
NFU was able to succeed in obtaining additional funding to pay for much of 
this testing on its introduction. 
 
The second aspect of bTB that caused controversy was the question of the role 
of culling badgers in controlling the disease. On this question there was no 
possibility for stakeholder agreement ± the NFU was for a cull, the Badger 
Trust equally strongly against it. Defra attempted to use scientific evidence to 
plot a way forward but found that this evidence was contested with both sides 
RIWKHGHEDWHXVLQJWKHILQGLQJVRIWKH,6*¶VUHSRUWWRVXSSRUWWKHLUFDVH,QWKLV
respect, the interveQWLRQE\ WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V&KLHI6FLHQWLILF$GYLVRU'DYLG
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King served to intensify debate rather than contribute towards a final decision 
on the badger question. 
 
The lack of stakeholder consensus was shown to limit the possibilities for 
constructive stakeholder dialogue. The various forums established to facilitate 
this were acknowledged by Defra officials to have been unsuccessful resulting 
in Defra moving to establish an advisory group more in keeping with an old-
style expert panel conducting much of its work privately than an open forum 
for stakeholder participation. In bTB, therefore, a new governance approach 
has not been able to be adopted and a retreat to older governance forms 
observed. 
 
Chapter seven used the dialectical model of policy networks (Marsh and Smith 
2000) to explain changes in the animal health policy network and policy. The 
network was shown to be more open than the closed policy community that 
characterised MAFF. The relationships identified by Marsh and Smith, in 
particular the ones between network and context and network and outcomes 
were shown to be important in explaining network and policy change. The 
model was found to offer a useful tool with which to analyse animal health 
policy. The use of the model confirmed that the process of change was 
underway before Defra came into being. Most importantly, policy outcomes 
were shown to have had a significant effect upon the network. 
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Answering the questions 
 
What then, in summary, are the answers to the research questions? 
 
The first question was: 
  
Is Defra policy-making qualitatively different to that of MAFF? If 
so, how, and in what ways, do governance structures and processes 
reflect that difference? 
 
The answer to this is broadly yes. New animal health policies, in particular the 
Animal Health and Welfare Strategy, emphasise new governance themes such 
as stakeholder participation, partnership working and the sharing of costs and 
responsibilities. The EIG represents a qualitatively different type of 
governance structure from anything seen when MAFF was the ministry with 
responsibility for animal health. In the case of bovine tuberculosis, however, a 
lack of stakeholder consensus on the general direction of policy for the disease 
KDVOLPLWHG'HIUD¶VRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUQHZZD\VRIZRUNLQJin keeping with the 
new governance approach. The exception to this was the public consultation on 
the proposal to cull badgers which yielded more responses than any other 
consultation. This was of limited value for Defra, however, as pressure groups 
whipped up supporters to submit responses, especially from those opposed to 
WKHLGHDRIDFXOO7KH&LWL]HQV¶3DQHOVWRRFDQEHVHHQDVDPRUHGHYHORSHG
form of public consultation and, as the comments from Defra official 2 quoted 
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in chapter six shows, the findings of this exercise were of considerable interest 
to Defra. 
 
Defra has also demonstrated a willingness to transfer responsibilities to a range 
of non-state actors for aspects of animal health policy implementation. 
However, its desire to also transfer some of the costs of animal health policy to 
the farming industry has met with significant opposition. Presently the extent 
to which Defra will be successful in transferring costs and responsibilities 
remains unclear. 
 
The second question, looking at the AHWS, was: 
 
How have the new governance structures created by the AHWS 
worked in practice? How do stakeholders participate in the policy 
process? 
 
The EIG has been an innovative structure. Its meetings have been held in 
public and stakeholders have been encouraged to attend those meetings 
and have been given opportunities to contribute their comments before 
the group. The EIG itself has enjoyed some success in establishing an 
identity for itself and has sought to demonstrate its arms length distance 
from Defra by, for example, insisting on taking control of the process for 
establishing performance indicators for the group. 
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The EIG has worked in a manner designed to reach consensus. At the 
observed meetings no votes were ever taken, the chairman summed up 
what she saw as the sense of the meeting. The striving for consensus has 
meant that the EIG members have not taken up fixed, inflexible 
positions. Debates have sometimes been heated but the chairman has 
managed to express a sense of the meeting that appeared to satisfy all 
present. Stakeholders attending the meetings have also been largely 
restrained in the tone of their remarks. Only when bTB was discussed 
was it clear that no consensus existed or could be achieved. 
 
On the bovine tuberculosis case study itself, the question was:  
 
Has Defra effectively deployed new governance measures to 
resolve the problems posed by competing interests and uncertain 
science to produce policy on bovine tuberculosis? 
 
To this question the answer is largely no. Attempts to engage with stakeholders 
such as the TB forums were regarded as a failure by Defra officials and by 
participants (Interview Defra official 2). The large scale public consultation on 
EDGJHUFXOOLQJDQGWKHDVVRFLDWHG&LWL]HQV¶3DQHOVVHUYHGRQO\WRUHLWHUDWHWKH 
lack of agreement on the way forward on this issue. Rather than resolving the 
problem, this exercise confirmed that it remained a problem. In addition, the 
SXEOLF FRQVXOWDWLRQ DQG WKH &LWL]HQV¶ 3DQHO H[HUFLVHV GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW
openness and participation also presented problems as well as opportunities. 
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The question of whether or not to cull badgers as part of any TB control 
strategy is a difficult one for Defra. The significant delay in arriving at a 
decision reflects a fear of alienating the farming industry from the wider 
DQLPDOKHDOWKSROLF\ SURFHVV %RYLQH WXEHUFXORVLV DQG 'HIUD¶VSROLF\RQ WKH
disease, remains the most likely cause of policy failure both for bTB and the 
wider AHWS if Defra cannot secure stakeholder engagement. 
 
In the bTB case, Defra has preferred to fall back upon expert groups for 
advice. The TB Advisory Group cannot be seen as a new governance inspired 
stakeholder body but more an expert group. In addition, unlike the EIG which 
holds its meetings in public, the TB Advisory Group holds its meetings in 
private although the minutes of these meetings are published on the Defra 
website.  
 
The ISG too is an expert body. The Randomised Badger Culling Trial began 
before Defra came into existence. Defra continued with the trial and the RBCT 
represented perhaps the best chance of arriving at a scientific solution to the 
problem. However, in using a cost-benefit approach the ISG attracted criticism 
from the Chief Scientific Advisor and from Lord Rooker, the minister for 
animal health. Farming unions too have disputed the findings of the ISG. 
Consequently, a solution to this problem based on natural science alone 
FDQQRWXQVXUSULVLQJO\EHIRXQGDQGWKH,6*¶VDWWHPSWVWRXWLOLVHDZLGHUUDQJH
of disciplines have attracted criticism for failing tRDGKHUH WR µVFLHQFH¶DV WKH
basis of recommendations. 
 
 269 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Since the work for this research was concluded there have been recent 
developments in respect of both the AHWS and in bovine tuberculosis that are 
worthy of mention. 
 
An e-mail sent to stakeholders on 5 September 2008 announced that a review, 
conducted by David Eves, a consultant and former Deputy Director of the 
Health and Safety Executive, was to take place into the future of the EIG. He 
would report in December 2008, with Defra making its decision on the future 
of the EIG in early 2009. The terms of reference for this review are: 
 
µ $VVHVV WKH JURXS¶V SHUIRUPDQFH VR IDU LQ FRQWULEXWLQJ WR
'HIUD¶V VWUDWHJLF REMHFWLYHV UHYLHZLQJ LWV YDOXH IRU PRQH\ DQG
identifying good practice and lessons for the future; 
 
 $VVHVV WKH JURXS¶V FRQWLQXLQJ UHOHYDQFH DQG UROH LQ WKH ZLGHU
and evolving landscape of stakeholder bodies in farming and food, 
especially the forthcoming animal health and welfare 
Responsibility and Cost Sharing body; and 
 
 ,Q WKDW OLJKWPDNHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVIRU WKHIXWXUHRI WKH(,*¶
(E-mail sent to stakeholders 5.09.08). 
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The possibility exists, therefore, that in 2009 the EIG may be wound up and 
replaced by a wide range of stakeholder bodies with more limited objectives 
and areas of coverage. If that were to happen then there would no longer be a 
body with overall responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the 
AHWS. However, with the announcement of the review so recent, it is far too 
VRRQWRNQRZ'HIUD¶VWKinking on this. The fact of a review, though, possibly 
suggests that there is some disquiet within Defra over the way that the EIG has 
operated to date. Chapter five noted that a review of the animal health and 
welfare delivery landscape revealed a need for some greater control (Eves 
2006). Possibly, the EIG will be found unable to demonstrate that control. The 
DQQRXQFHPHQW RI WKH UHYLHZ DOVR FRQILUPV 'HIUD¶V SRVLWLRQ DV WKH GRPLQDQW
policy actor. Even when pursuing a new governance agenda the state, in the 
form of Defra, retains the power to review, expand, or close down an 
institution that it created. 
 
Bovine tuberculosis 
 
On 7 July 2008, the Secretary of State for Defra, Hilary Benn, made an 
DQQRXQFHPHQW WR WKH +RXVH RI &RPPRQV DERXW WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V SODQs for 
WDFNOLQJE7%,QWKHVWDWHPHQWWKHPLQLVWHUVDLGWKDWµ+DYLQJOLVWHQHGFDUHIXOO\
WR D ZLGH UDQJH RI YLHZV « DQG KDYLQJ FRQVLGHUHG DOO WKH HYLGHQFH , KDYH
GHFLGHGWKDWZKLOHVXFKDFXOOPLJKWZRUNLWPLJKWDOVRQRWZRUN¶0LQLVWHULDO
statement 7 July 2008). Consequently, the minister announced that the 
government would not issue licences to farmers to cull badgers as part of its 
TB control policy in England. The decision is a devolved matter for Scotland, 
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Wales and Northern Ireland. As an alternative, vaccination would become the 
priority for government spending in this area with the aim of developing an 
effective vaccine for both badgers and cattle. 
 
NFU reaction to this decision was strong. NFU president Peter Kendall 
announced that the NFU would immediately withdraw from Defra discussions 
on responsibility and cost sharing and would launch a legal challenge against 
the decision ()DUPHUV¶ :HHNO\ ,QWHUDFWLYH 8/07/08, )DUPHUV¶ *XDUGLDQ 
8/07/08). The strength of the NFU reaction adds evidence to the argument that 
bTB remains the most likely cause of policy failure for the whole AHWS. 
 
Both of these developments support, to an extent, the findings of the empirical 
research conducted into the two case studies. The EIG had been reasonably 
successful in bringing together stakeholders in support of the aims of the 
AHWS and developing a shared understanding of animal health problems. It 
had also worked quite well as a new governance institution. The review may 
lead to some fragmentation and specialisation of groups on the EIG model. As 
the announcement of the review stated, there are already plans for a separate 
body to oversee the responsibility and cost sharing agenda. The EIG itself had 
also set up sub-committees for responsibility and cost sharing and animal 
welfare delivery. This approach may be continued by the review, or an EIG-
type body may remain to oversee the strategy as a whole. 
 
The decision on badger culling was something of a surprise. As chapter six 
emphasised, Defra had sought not to rule out culling as an option with the 
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public consultation and the King Review both offering evidence in support of 
that proposition. Even in the ministerial statement announcing the decision, Mr 
%HQQ PDGH LW FOHDU WKDW µZH UHPDLQ RSHQ WR WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI UHYLVLWLQg this 
policy under exceptional circumstances or if new scientific evidence were to 
EHFRPH DYDLODEOH¶ 0LQLVWHULDO VWDWHPHQW  -XO\  7KH QDWXUH RI WKH
µH[FHSWLRQDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV¶ ZDV QRW PDGH FOHDU :KHWKHU LQGXVWU\
disengagement from the responsibility and cost sharing agenda would 
constitute such circumstances is, perhaps, unlikely, but not ruled out. However, 
the decision does suggest that stakeholder preferences can be overridden and 
that government, in this case Defra, remains the dominant policy actor within a 
network. 
 
POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This research has argued that a new governance approach to animal health 
policy has been pursued by Defra but that it has not been uniformly practiced 
across the sector. Aspects of the AHWS, especially the EIG can be seen as 
reflecting new governance ideas to a considerable degree, whereas the 
approach with bTB has tended to retain control within Defra and used expert 
committees rather than stakeholder bodies to inform policy. 
 
The research has provided many possibilities for future research. At a 
theoretical level, the dialectical model of policy networks (Marsh and Smith 
2000) has been shown to be useful in framing analysis in this field and in 
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explaining network change over time. Research using this model in other 
policy areas is thus an attractive prospect. 
 
Within animal health policy, continuing research to monitor the development 
of policy suggests itself. In particular, from chapter five, the idea of 
responsibility and cost sharing and its implementation offer a rich field for 
study. Whether the NFU will continue its boycott of discussions on the issue 
remains to be seen. With or without the NFU, however, responsibility and cost 
sharing represent a sea change in thinking about animal health. How Defra 
handles that change will be interesting to observe. The development of bTB 
policy now that a decision on a badger cull has been made also offers rich 
pickings. How far will Defra be able to maintain partnership working when a 
key partner rejects its decision on badgers? 
 
Farm health planning was shown to be a key objective of the EIG in chapter 
five. One of the ideas behind farm health plans is to encourage regular contact 
between farmers and their vets and to practice farming in line with current 
ideas of good husbandry. In addition, there are various disease management 
practices that, if implemented, would reduce the incidence of that disease (e.g. 
Green et al 2007 on a mastitis protocol). However, best practice is not always 
followed. Researching the reasons for this may be a fruitful avenue of research 
with policy implications. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Reflecting upon the research project as a whole, there are some broad 
conclusions to be drawn. First, the decision not to proceed with a cull of 
badgers was a surprise given the lengths that Defra had gone to in order to 
NHHSWKDWRSWLRQRSHQ,KDGQRWH[SHFWHGWKH,6*¶VILQDOUHSRUWWRFRPHRXWVR
strongly against a cull, but was certain that a cull, or at least a partial cull in 
some small areas, would be RUGHUHGRQFH'DYLG.LQJ¶VUHSRUWFDPHRXW 
 
Second, the choice of methods was profitable. The Marsh and Smith model 
helped to provide some structure to the analysis of policy change. However, it 
was not without its problems. Some difficulty was experienced in deciding 
how to approach the analysis. For example, was new governance a structure or 
part of the wider context?  
 
Interviews, especially with Defra officials, were particularly rewarding and 
delivered a lot of rich data. The willingness of officials to be interviewed may 
also, perhaps, be seen as a finding. The secretary of one official told me that 
they had been encouraged to talk to researchers. Another manifestation of 
'HIUD¶VRSHQDSSURDFKSHUKDSV" 
 
Observations of the EIG meetings was also fruitful. Observing who were the 
most frequent speakers and watching as the group constructed meaning and 
struggled, at times, to find a consensual way forward were rewarding.  
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Taken together, the variety of methods chosen combined with using the 
seemingly contradictory analytical frameworks of interpretivism and the Marsh 
and Smith model of policy networks combined well. Each approach offered 
something specific. The interpretive approach allowed the stories of 
governance in practice to be told, at least in part. The case study chapters 
therefore contribute to our understanding of policy making by giving the 
perspectives of those intimately involved in the policy process. The policy 
network analysis gave the work some structure and explanatory potential. It 
highlighted the major reasons for network and policy change over the period 
covered by the project. 
 
There can be little doubting the relevance of this research. Although it accounts 
for a small chunk of the overall government spending, animal health problems 
have punched above their weight in causing difficulties for government. 
Furthermore, Defra has been bold in its attempts to manage animal health 
policy with the new governance structures acting like laboratories for new 
ways to make policy in a differentiated polity in which the capacity of the state 
to manage alone no longer exists.  
 
Although focussing on animal health policy, this study also suggests that 
policy making in agriculture more generally has been subjected to change over 
time. Within agriculture specifically, the European dimension has assumed 
much more significance. More generally, winding up MAFF ended the practice 
of having a specific department to deal with agriculture. Other policy areas 
have come to impact upon agriculture and these are reflected in Defra. First, 
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the environmental impact of agriculture has risen in significance as chapter 
four showed. As climate change continues to exercise policy makers, it may be 
DQWLFLSDWHGWKDWIDUPLQJ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRJUHHQKRXVHJDVHPLVVLRQVPD\Fome 
under scrutiny in a way that so far has not occurred. Second, agriculture is no 
ORQJHU VHHQ DVEHLQJ V\QRQ\PRXVZLWK µUXUDO¶ ,QFUHDVLQJO\ IDUPLQJ LQWHUHVWV
have to compete with other industries such as tourism. Demands for the right 
to roam suggest that agricultural interests can no longer expect to necessarily 
expect to get their way when their demands conflict with other rural interests 
and industries. 
 
The bTB case study, in particular, highlighted the limitations for policy makers 
in seeking to arrLYH DW GHFLVLRQV RQ WKH EDVLV RI ZKDW WKH\ WHQG WR FDOO µWKH
VFLHQFH¶9DULRXVSUREOHPVFRQIURQWWKHSROLF\PDNHU7KHUHLVWKHTXHVWLRQRI
which scientific discipline to rely upon, for example. There is the question of 
what to do on occasions where different groups of scientists offer different 
advice that suggest different policy options. This was observed in this study 
both in the discussion of the 2001 FMD outbreak and in the question of 
whether or not to cull badgers to control bTB. In the former case different 
epidemiological models suggested different culling strategies while vets in the 
field had their own perspectives that took account of the particular local 
topology. In the bTB case groups of scientists could be found on both sides of 
the badger debate. Vets tended to argue for a cull, at least through the BVA, 
while ecologists focussed on the observed behaviour of the badgers to suggest 
that a cull would be of limited use. The RBCT - VXSSRVHGO\ WKH µGHILQLWLYH¶
experiment - yielded results that required considerations of cost and 
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practicability. This led David King, in his subsequent report, to suggest that the 
ISG had relied on considerations that were not scientific in coming to their 
conclusion. 
 
If we consider policy problems such as climate change, GM food, energy 
policy, obesity, alcohol and drug policy, it can be seen that science alone 
cannot be expected to provide the answer. Questions of practicability, the 
legitimate interests of important stakeholders all have a role to play. Perhaps 
most importantly for politicians the level of public acceptability of any 
proposal is an important consideration. Lord Krebs suggested in a 2009 
Distinguished Lecture at Nottingham Trent University that one of the reasons 
why tobacco is heavily taxed and its consumption controlled and limited while 
SROLWLFLDQV UXVKHG WRRSSRVH WKH&KLHI0HGLFDO 2IILFHU¶V DGYRFDF\RI UDLVLQJ
the price of alcohol was that only some 21% of British adults smoke while 
nearly 80% consume alcohol. It may be considered, therefore, that in policy 
areas with a scientific component, policy makers cannot simply pass on 
decision making to the scientists. Instead, a more mature understanding would 
see science as one of several inputs into the policy making process. 
 
It is also useful to reflect upon what the network approach tells us about our 
understanding of policy making and new governance. Botterill (2005), using 
the example of Australian agricultural policy making, confirms the long held 
view that tight policy communities tend to lead to policy stability and that 
policy change is more likely in an environment of looser network structures. 
This suggests that the classification of the type of policy network in each 
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policy area is an important empirical question since it may give clues as to 
future policy stability. Furthermore, it may be that dialectical models work best 
in situations where significant policy or institutional change has occurred, as a 
way of understanding that change. This present study certainly suggests this. 
Hindmoor (2009) looked at another policy - the decision not to vaccinate 
during the 2001 FMD outbreak. He relied upon the idea of priming; that 
different actors have differential opportunities to promote their ideas to policy 
makers. He suggests that the NFU was in this position during the 2001 FMD 
outbreak. However, while priming may help to explain that particular decision, 
it does not explain the subsequent collapse of the NFU-MAFF centred closed 
policy community. The present study suggests that the dialectical approach is 
much better equipped to fully understand the process of network change over 
time. So while the network approach generally helps in understanding policy 
decisions, it may be that network change requires the rigors of the dialectical 
model. 
 
This study can also be seen to make a contribution to debates about new 
governance. In particular it makes a contribution to the debate about the 
FRQWLQXHG VWUHQJWK RI WKH VWDWH UHODWLYH WR 5KRGHV¶ LGHDV RI WKH GLIIHUHQWLDWHG
polity model. Marsh et. al (2001) and Richards and Smith (2002) instead argue 
for what they term an asymmetric power model. That is, a model in which the 
state remains the dominant political actor. Changes in governance are 
acknowledged but, it is argued, that the core executive has adapted tRWKLVµ$W
the heart of this adaptation has been the shared goal of ministers and civil 
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VHUYDQWV WR SURWHFW WKHLU RZQ VWDWXV DQG SRZHU¶ 5LFKDUGV DQG 6PLWK 
p.271). 
 
The state is seen by these authors as remaining the single most powerful 
political actor. Others have also shared this view. In a review of what he terms 
the Anglo-governance school, Marinetto (2003) acknowledges that the old 
Westminster model with its view of politics centred on ideas of a sovereign 
parliament is outdated. However, he is also critical of the idea of new 
governance theorists, such as Rhodes, who argue that the state has lost power 
DV RIIHULQJ RQO\ µD SDUWLDO FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH VWDWH¶ 0DULQHWWR  S
,QVWHDG 0DULQHWWR DUJXHV WKDW µDOWKRXJK JRYHUQPHQW KDV EHHQ VXEMHct to 
restructuring, these reforms have tended to reinforce the ability of the central 
FRUHWRH[HUWFRQWURO¶0DULQHWWRS 
 
What these authors, and this study, have shown is that the governance 
perspective is useful in understanding day to day behaviours within the 
network. However, within networks, the state remains the single most 
powerful actor by virtue of having the greatest resources at its disposal. 
Furthermore, the state can destroy new governance institutions just as readily 
as it can create them. This study has noted that Defra intends to review the 
future of the EIG. Similarly, in other policy areas we might try to identify 
where government has altered the institutional arrangements to favour 
particular interests or policy prescriptions. 
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Finally, therefore, to claim a simple shift from government to governance is 
perhaps to oversimplify the situation. It is better, perhaps, to see governance as 
just one of the ways in which government operates in order to secure its 
objectives. Marsh et al (2001) accept that while government may rely upon 
governance networks that include non-state actors for the delivery of services, 
these networks remain dependent upon government for things such as 
legitimacy, legislation and force which these non-state actors cannot provide 
(Marsh et al 2001, p.248). 
 
Bache (2003) agrees that governance is used by government to get its way. 
Using the example of education policy he argues that the process of 
fragmentation of education has, in fact, increased government¶V FRQWURO RYHU
policy. Indeed,  
 
µ7KHIUDJPHQWDWLRQRIHGXFDWLRQGHOLYHU\XQGHUPLQHGWKHDELOLW\RI
existing powerful institutions, individual LEAs, to frustrate 
national policy objectives either through the pursuit of conflicting 
policy priorities or thrRXJKLQHIILFLHQF\¶%DFKHS 
 
This study too, has shown how Defra has remained the single most powerful 
actor within the animal health policy network. It has also shown how, if 
governance measures cannot deliver effective policy, as was observed with 
bTB, then a revision to more traditional forms of policy control can be 
employed which can bypass the network and, ultimately, take a decision which 
is against the wishes of powerful members of the policy community. New 
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governance has secured a place as a valuable means of understanding policy 
making in Britain, but the abiding power of the state ought not to be 
underestimated. 
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